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Transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat) in the United States (U.S.)
constituted 22.8% of the total tonnage transported in 2012 with an estimated value of
more than 2.3 billion dollars. As such, hazmat transportation is a significant economic
activity in the U.S. However, hazmat transportation exposes people and environment to
the infrequent but potentially severe consequences of incidents resulting in hazmat
release. Trucks and trains carried 63.7% of the hazmat in the U.S. in 2012 and are the
major foci of this dissertation. The main research objectives were 1) identification and
quantification of the effects of different factors on occurrence and consequences of
hazmat-related incidents, towards identifying effective policies and countermeasures for
improving safety and; 2) quantifying components of risk of hazmat transportation for
costs prediction, planning purposes, or short-term decision-making.
A comprehensive review of literature, study framework, and available data led to
identification of six foci for this dissertation: 1) estimation of hazmat release statistical
models for railroad incidents; 2) estimation of rollover and hazmat release statistical
models for Cargo Tank Truck (CTT) crashes; 3) analyzing hazmat-involved crashes at
highway-rail grade crossings (HRGCs); 4) model-based and non-model-based methods
for classifying hazmat release from trains and CTTs; 5) estimation of macroscopic-level

statistical models for frequency and severity of rail-based crude oil release incidents; and
6) estimation of statistical models for types and consequences of rail-based crude oil
release incidents.
Some of the findings of this research include: train derailments increased hazmat
release probability more than other incident types; non-collision CTT crashes were more
likely to result in rollovers, while rolling over increased the likelihood of hazmat release;
at HRGCs, flashing signal lights were associated with lower hazmat release probability
from trucks; increase in volume and distance of crude oil shipped from one state to
another led to greater frequency and severity of incidents between the two states; and in
rail-based crude oil release incidents, non-accident releases were associated with higher
probability of gas dispersion, and lower probability of fire and explosion. Based on the
results, recommendations regarding policies and countermeasures for improving safety
are provided.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat) exposes people and environment
(e.g., air and water) to the infrequent but potentially severe consequences of incidents
resulting in hazmat release. Such incidents, depending on the type of hazmat, quantity of
release, environment and spatial/temporal characteristics of the incidents may impose
monetary and non-monetary (e.g., pain and suffering of incident victims) costs upon the
society. For example, in a 2015 train incident in Maryville, Tennessee release of 29,710
gallons of Acrylonitrile led to fire, explosion, gas dispersion, water pollution,
environmental damage, 195 injuries, evacuation of 5,000 people, and $7.7 million worth
of damages (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety 2018). Improving safety of hazmat transportation by
decreasing the frequency of such incidents and alleviating their consequences from safety
planning or shipper/carrier points of view benefits society.
Substances are categorized as hazmat if they can cause injury, death and serious
illness, or put a significant threat to the human population or the environment due to their
chemical, physical or other characteristics (Lee 2014). The U.S. Department of
Transportation defines hazmat as belonging to one of the nine hazard classes, presented
in Table 1.1, along with the U.S. shipment amounts and ratios in 2012 according to the
U.S. Census Bureau’s 2012 Commodity Flow Survey (the latest publicly available
Commodity Flow Survey at this time) (U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S.
Department of Commerce 2015).
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Table 1.1 2012 Hazardous Material Shipment Characteristics by Hazard Class for the
U.S.
Class

Value
Description

Ton

Ton-miles

2012
(million
dollars)

Percent
of total

2012
(1000s)

Percent
of total

2012
(million
s)

Percent
of total

1

Explosives

18397

0.79%

4045

0.16%

1012

0.33%

2

Gases

125054

5.36%

164794

6.39%

33157

10.78%

3

Flammable and
combustible liquids
Flammable solids

2016681

86.39%

2203490

85.42%

204573

66.52%

5415

0.23%

11321

0.44%

5804

1.89%

7562

0.32%

12025

0.47%

5479

1.78%

15196

0.65%

7612

0.30%

3607

1.17%

4
5

7

Oxidizers and
Organic Peroxides
Toxic (Poisonous)
Materials and
Infectious Substances
Radioactive Materials

12288

0.53%

NA

NA

39

0.01%

8

Corrosive Materials

75850

3.25%

125287

4.86%

37784

12.29%

9

Miscellaneous
Dangerous Goods
Total

57981

2.48%

51006

1.98%

16068

5.22%

2334424

100.00%

2580153

100.00%

307523

100.00%
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(Source: 2012 Commodity Flow Survey (U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Department
of Commerce 2015)), NA: Not Available

Hazmat transportation constitutes a considerable portion of freight transportation
and is a significant and non-negligible economic activity in the U.S. According to the
2012 Commodity Flow Survey, 2,580,153 thousand tons (307,524 million ton-miles) of
hazmat was transported in 2012, with the approximate monetary value of $2,334,425,000.
This constitutes 22.8% of the total tonnage and 10.4% of the total ton-miles of freight
transportation. Demand for hazmat transportation in the U.S. has grown over the past
decade, specifically due to transportation of crude oil. A 15.6% increase in the tonnage
and 49.4% increase in the value of the transported hazmat since 2007 is reported in the
2012 Commodity Flow Survey. These statistics justify the need to study the safety
aspects of hazmat transportation in the U.S.
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Hazmat is transported by different modes. Highway, rail, water, air and pipelines
(and also multimodal, e.g. combination of truck and rail) are the most common modes of
hazmat transportation. In 2012, highway accounted for 59.4% of the total tonnage (31.4
% of the total ton-miles) and rail constituted 4.3% of the total tonnage (27.6% of the total
ton-miles) of hazmat transportation in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Transportation and
U.S. Department of Commerce 2015) (Figure 1.1). Also, according to Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) 2008-2017 ten-year incident
summary reports (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
2018), hazmat-released highway incidents made up 87.6% of the total reported release
incidents, 93.1% of fatalities, 72.2% of injuries, and 72.2% of the total damages
(excluding pipelines). These values were 4.0%, 2.0%, 21.1% and 26.5% for rail incidents
Figure 1.2). This information shows the importance of improving safe transportation of
hazmat by trucks and trains.

Figure 1.1 Distribution of Hazmat Transportation by Different Modes in the U.S. for
Tons (left) and Ton-miles (right) of transportation (Source: 2012 Commodity Flow
Survey)
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Figure 1.2 Distribution of Different Transportation Modes in Number of Hazmat Release
Incidents (top left), Fatalities (Top Right), Injuries (Bottom Left) and Total Damages
(Bottom Right) due to Hazmat Release Incidents (Source: 2008-2017 PHMSA ten-year
incident summary reports)
1.2 Problem Statement
This research is focused on safe transportation of hazmat by trucks and trains at
microscopic and macroscopic study levels, and from safety planning and shipper/carrier
points of views. Transportation of hazmat exposes society to the costly consequences of
release of hazmat when incidents happen. Therefore, stakeholders, such as safety
planning agencies and hazmat shipper/carriers, are interested in decreasing these costs by
reducing the likelihood and possible consequences of hazmat release during
transportation. At both levels of study, the main objectives are: 1) identification and
quantification of the effects of different factors on occurrence and consequences of
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hazmat-related incidents, towards identifying effective policies and countermeasures for
improving safety and; 2) quantifying components of risk of hazmat transportation in a
study unit (e.g. a link/route in a transportation network, an intersection, or a census tract)
for costs prediction, planning purposes (e.g. hazmat network design), or short-term
decision-making (e.g. routing).
1.3 Study Framework
In this study the major approaches of studying hazmat transportation and their
objectives are categorized into microscopic and macroscopic levels. In the microscopic
approaches, the unit of analysis is individual hazmat carrier incidents (e.g. trains, hazmat
cars, or cargo tank trucks (CTTs)), and the potentially important variables are at
microscopic-level (e.g. train length, tank car characteristics, or truck’s weight). In the
macroscopic approaches the unit of analysis is geographic areas, segments of
transportation infrastructure, or pairs of origin-designation (OD). In these studies, the
explanatory variables are at the macroscopic level (e.g. population, traffic volume, or
volume of hazmat movement among ODs). Figure 1.3 presents the objectives and tools of
this framework for hazmat transportation safety analysis.
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Figure 1.3 Outline of the objectives and tools for hazmat transportation safety analysis.
Microscopic and macroscopic analyses provide useful information for
stakeholders and they can be used in risk-based decision frameworks. In this study, risk
of hazmat transportation is defined as equation 1.1.
𝑅𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 𝑐𝑖

(1.1)

In this equation, 𝑅𝑖 is the risk of hazmat transportation on transportation entity i (a
road segment, an intersection, a route, etc.), 𝜋𝑖 is the probability of release of hazmat
from train/truck on entity i, and 𝑐𝑖 is the cost of release of hazmat from train/truck on
entity i. Depending on the type of study, an appropriate entity may be chosen. For
example, network design problems are usually formulated as link-based, while routing
problems may rely mostly on the hazmat transportation risk of routes.
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Probability of release of hazmat and release costs are quantified using equations
1.2 and 1.3.
𝜋𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) × 𝑃𝑖 (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)

(1.2)

𝑐𝑖 = ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 (𝑘)

(1.3)

𝑘∈𝑆

In these equations 𝑃𝑖 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) is the probability of occurrence of an incident on
entity i (examples of incidents are train derailments or truck traffic crashes),
𝑃𝑖 (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) is the conditional probability of release given an incident on entity
i, 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 (𝑘) is the costs of type k as a result of hazmat release on entity i, and S is the set of
all types of costs, S = {carrier damage, property damage, response, clean-up, injuries,
fatalities, evacuation, transportation infrastructure closure}.
In the above formulation of the hazmat transportation risk, 𝑃𝑖 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) has a
macroscopic nature (defined as the frequency/rate of incident occurrence), while
𝑃𝑖 (𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) and 𝑐𝑖 can be studied in a microscopic scale. Microscopic and
macroscopic levels are introduced next, as individual types of study and also components
of risk.
1.3.1 Microscopic-Level Approach
The main objectives of this approach are: 1) Policy-making and determination of
countermeasures regarding safe transportation of hazmat: this approach is able to identify
and quantify the impacts of microscopic-level variables on different components of risk
of hazmat transportation. Such information enables governmental agencies to make
policies to restrict and guide shippers/carriers towards fewer and less severe hazmat
release incidents, and also enables shippers/carriers directly to determine
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countermeasures that can make their operations safer and less costly. 2) Risk assessment:
it involves calculation of probabilistic costs of hazmat transportation on segments of
transportation network. Risk can be used in decision-making from both safety planning
and shipper/carrier’s points of view. Network design and pricing for hazmat
transportation, and emergency response planning are examples of government’s decision
frameworks, while hazmat routing, mode choice, destination choice and facility location
(in cases of existence of more than one alternative) are shipper/carrier’s concerns.
1.3.1.1 Conditional Probability of Release
In this research, different approaches for estimating 𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) for
trucks and trains are proposed. The concept behind these approaches is estimating the
probability of release of hazmat in an incident involving a hazmat-carrying truck/train,
based on explanatory variables such as characteristics of truck/train, roadway/railroad,
incident, and environment. The differences in the proposed approaches are based on the
level of analysis, modeling techniques and how the variables are used. Different
approaches for trucks and trains are as follows.
The conditional probability of release of hazmat from trains can be analyzed at
train-level and hazmat car-level. In the former, the unit of analysis is trains and the
probability of a train release is of concern, while in the latter hazmat cars are the units of
analysis and a hazmat car release’s probability is estimated. Equations 1.4 and 1.5 present
these approaches, respectively.
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 = Φ(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 , 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 , 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 )

(1.4)

𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)𝑐𝑎𝑟 = Φ(𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟 , 𝑋𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 , 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 )

(1.5)
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In these equations, X shows the characteristics of its subscript. Some of the
characteristics of incidents may depend on other explanatory variables (e.g. number of
derailed/damaged cars may depend on train’s speed) and can be estimated accordingly,
while some of them are not predictable at the microscopic level (e.g. type of incident) and
may be taken in to account in the estimation of 𝑃𝑖 (𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡).
Conditional probability of release for hazmat-carrying vehicles, similar to trains,
can be assumed to be a function of the explanatory variables (e.g. characteristics of
trucks, road, environment, and crash). Equation 1.6 presents this approach.
𝑃(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) = Φ(𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑘 , 𝑋𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑 , 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 , 𝑋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ )

(1.6)

Examples for 𝑋𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ include number of vehicles involved in the crash and rolling
over. According to literature (Douglas Behrens Pape 2012), in crashes of CTTs, one of
the main highway hazmat carriers, rollovers are frequent, leading to hazmat release.
While the number of vehicles involved in the crash is independent of the crash
characteristics and may be predicted at the macroscopic level (similar to type of train
incidents), rolling over can be modeled based on explanatory variables (similar to the
number of railcars derailed/damaged).
1.3.1.2 Costs
Equation 1.3 showed that calculating costs of a hazmat release incident needs
quantification of the eight members of set S. Each of these components are dependent on
different factors, such as type of release (spillage and/or gas dispersion), consequences of
release (fire, explosion, environmental damages, entering waterway), quantity of release,
type of hazmat, mode of transportation, population living within a specified distance from
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the location of incident, public/private properties located within a specified distance from
the location of incident, type of environment (e.g. type of soil), and distance to waterway.
These factors are also interdependent, for example probability of fire depends on the
quantity released, type of hazmat and type of release.
Quantification of some of these components can be based on statistical modeling.
Equations 1.7 and 1.8 are examples of such approaches. It should be noted that,
parameter estimation of these equations, along with the cost models, can provide useful
information regarding policy- and decision-making.
𝑃(𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑒|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 , 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟, 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 )

(1.7)

𝑃(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 , 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 , 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟, 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 )

(1.8)

Examples for 𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 include type of hazmat, for 𝑋𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 include quantity
released and type of release (spillage and/or gas dispersion), for 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟 include mode of
transportation and their characteristics, and for 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 include weather. It should be
noted that type of release is dependent on explanatory variables, itself and can be
expressed as equation 1.9.
𝑃(𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 , 𝑋𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑟, 𝑋𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 )

(1.9)

1.3.2 Macroscopic-Level Approach
In the macroscopic-level approaches, the unit of study can be a geographic area
(e.g. state, county, urban area), or pairs of ODs (e.g. among counties of a state). The main
objectives of the macroscopic-level study of hazmat-related incidents are: 1) policymaking for decreasing hazmat transportation costs due to releases, by identifying and
quantifying the macroscopic factors that affect these costs, such as hazmat production,
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consumption, infrastructure, policies and restrictions. 2) prediction of frequency and costs
of hazmat transportation incidents in the future for planning, decision-making, and
budget allocation.
1.3.2.1 Probability of Incident Occurrence
𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) is commonly estimated as an annual incident frequency or rate (e.g.
incidents per mile, incidents per ton-mile, or incidents per car-mile) multiplied by
distance or the exposure measure of the transportation entity. Examples of such
approaches can be found in (Harwood, Viner, and Russell 1990, 1993; Qiao, Keren, and
Mannan 2009). Besides measures for traffic, incident rates are usually estimated based on
characteristics of highway/rail, land-use characteristics and driving behavior. Incident
frequency/rate can solely be the subject of a macroscopic study with the purpose of
policy/countermeasure identification towards decreasing hazmat incident frequency/rates.
An example is provided here to avoid confusion about the definitions of probability,
frequency and rate in this context: if 5 derailments occur on a segment of a railroad per
year and 3500 trains pass that segment every year, then: the frequency is 5 incidents per
year; the rate of incidents is 5/3500 = 0.0014 crashes per train passage; if the traffic
increases to 7000 trains in a year, we expect 7500*0.0014 = 10 crashes in that year; and
the probability of a derailment in one passage of a train in that segment is 0.14%.
Area-based approaches may be used in macroscopic hazmat transportation safety
analysis. However, in this research an OD-based macroscopic approach is considered. In
this approach, frequency and costs of hazmat-related incidents among pairs of ODs in the
area under study is modeled based on a set of macroscopic variables. The advantage of
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OD-based approaches, as opposed to area-based approaches, is that variables such as
hazmat traffic between the OD pairs, distance of transportation, and availability of modes
of transportation can be taken into account. This approach can be formulated as equations
1.10 and 1.11.
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗 = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 , 𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 )

(1.10)

𝐶𝑖𝑗 = Φ(𝑋ℎ𝑎𝑧𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐 , 𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑗 , 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 )

(1.11)

𝑖𝑗

𝑖𝑗

𝑖𝑗

𝑖𝑗

In these equations, 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 are frequency and costs of hazmat-related
incidents between OD pair i and j, respectively and X represents different characteristics
between OD pair (i, j). The total costs of the area under study will be ∑𝑛𝑖 ∑𝑛𝑗 𝐶𝑖𝑗 , in which
n is the number of sub-areas.
1.4 Research Foci
Based on the study framework of section 1.3, previous studies (in chapter 2) and
available data, six areas were identified as the foci for this dissertation.
The conditional probability of hazmat release from a hazmat-carrying train in a
train incident or from a hazmat-carrying truck in a traffic crash is the subject of four of
these foci. In the first focus, conditional hazmat release statistical models were estimated
at train and car level for railroad incidents. The second focus estimated rollover and
hazmat release statistical models for CTT crashes. In the third focus, crashes at highwayrail grade crossings (HRGCs) were analyzed and separate hazmat release statistical
models were estimated for truck-train crashes where at least one of the two were carrying
hazmat. The first three foci used statistical model-based approaches for modeling hazmat
release with an emphasis on model interpretation for countermeasure and policy
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determination (while there was a minor emphasis on estimation of the release
probability). The fourth focus used model-based and non-model-based classification and
regression methods for classifying hazmat release and estimating hazmat release
probability (along with a few other incident/crash outcomes) from trains and CTTs.
Transportation of crude oil by rail has increased significantly in the U.S. in the
past decade. The other two foci of this dissertation (fifth and sixth) are on rail
transportation of crude oil in the U.S. The fifth focus developed OD-based macroscopiclevel statistical models to identify and quantify the effects of volumes and distances of
crude oil movement and other macroscopic variables on the frequency and aggregate
measures for severity of crude oil release incidents. The sixth focus identified and
quantified the effects of crude oil, tank car and incident characteristics on types and
consequences of crude oil release, using statistical models.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation consists of ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the study
background, states the research problem, outlines the study framework, lists the six foci
of the dissertation and ends with introducing the structure of the manuscript. Chapter 2
presents a comprehensive literature review on the general topic of hazmat transportation
safety. Chapter 3 introduces the statistical models and approaches that were used in this
research. Chapter 4 to 9 each presents one of the six foci of the dissertation, including
problem statement, methods, additional literature review, data description, modeling
results and conclusions for each focus. Chapter 10 presents summary, general
conclusions and recommendations for future studies.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Safe transportation of hazmat has been a topic of research for decades. While the
studies include a large variety of topics and approaches, in this literature review they are
categorized into three major sets: studies that used operations research (optimization) as
their main tool towards hazmat transportation safety operations; studies that are focused
on assessment and quantification of risk of hazmat transportation; and studies that
collected hazmat incident data from different sources and provided insightful descriptive
statistics. This chapter presents general literature review, while chapters 4 to 9 present
additional literature review wherever needed.
2.2 Operations Research
Operations research-based approaches have been used in the hazmat
transportation literature, frequently. These approaches are proposed from both the safety
planning and shipper/carrier points of view. Some of the methods from the safety
planning point of view include: hazmat transportation network design (Verter and Kara
2008; Bianco, Caramia, and Giordani 2009; Erkut and Alp 2007; Kara and Verter 2004)
which involves finding an optimum subset of the transportation network links to close
down to the hazmat-carrying vehicles; transportation network pricing (Marcotte et al.
2009; Wang et al. 2012) that is the assignment of specific tolls to the transportation
network links for the vehicles that carry hazmat; and emergency response planning
(Hamouda 2004; Zografos and Androutsopoulos 2008) that includes decisions regarding
location, routing and operations of emergency response units. Studies from the
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shipper/carrier’s point of view focus on: hazmat transportation routing (List et al. 1991;
Abkowitz and Cheng 1988; Zografos and Androutsopoulos 2008; Romero, Nozick, and
Xu 2016) which is the consideration of risk in routing caused by the hazmat on-board,
besides the usual economic concerns in freight routing; mode choice (Bagheri, Verma,
and Verter 2014) that involves the choice of the safest mode of transportation for hazmat;
and facility location (Romero, Nozick, and Xu 2016), which is the identification of
proper locations for hazmat storage, loading, unloading, etc.
Glickman et al. proposed a routing strategy for hazmat-carrying trains that
accounts for incident risk from a macroscopic perspective. They quantified rail
transportation risk by estimating the expected population that resides within a given
radius of the location of a probable train incident and then used a weighted combination
of cost and risk to generate alternate routes. The results showed in some cases the
alternate routes achieved significantly lower risk measures than the practical routes at a
small incremental cost (Glickman, Erkut, and Zschocke 2007).
Some studies focused on manifest trains (trains carrying both regular and hazmat
freight). Verma presented a bi-objective optimization model for planning and managing
railroad transportation of hazmat by determining the best routing plan for railcars, with
hazmat and regular freight, and the number of trains of each type required to meet the
given set of demand. The two minimization objectives were risk and costs (Verma 2009).
Verma et al. also, proposed a bi-objective optimization problem for tactical planning of
railroad hazmat transportation (short-term planning for a railroad company with
predetermined amount of hazmat and regular freight to move). This formulation
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determines the routes to be utilized for each shipment, the yard activities, and the number
of trains needed, while minimizing transportation cost and risk. Risk was defined based
on population exposure (Verma, Verter, and Gendreau 2011).
Consistency between trucks and trains in intermodal hazmat transportation has
been the subject of some studies. Verma and Verter defined rail–truck intermodal
transportation of hazmat as inbound drayage (the transportation activity between the
shipper and the origin rail terminal by truck), rail haul, and outbound drayage (between
the destination rail terminal and the receiver by truck). They formulated a bi-objective
optimization model to plan and manage intermodal shipments by minimizing
transportation costs and population exposure to hazmat (Verma and Verter 2010).
Assadipour et al. proposed a bi-objective optimization framework for planning rail–truck
intermodal hazmat shipments, considering terminal equipment capacity and congestion.
Risk and transportation costs were minimized, while satisfying the demand on-time. The
results showed that congestion at the terminals is a potential source of public risk and
could be a significant source if intermodal terminals are close to population centers. They
proposed several approaches for reducing this congestion (Assadipour, Ke, and Verma
2015).
Some researchers used multi-objective optimization formulation of hazmat
transportation to consider more than one aspect for optimality. Liu et al. formulated
hazmat risk management as a multi-attribute decision analysis problem and estimated a
negative binomial regression model to estimate car derailment probability, following the
use of a pareto-optimality technique to determine the lowest risk that can be achieved at a

17
specific level of investment. They analyzed two types of risk reduction strategies (broken
rail prevention and tank car safety design enhancement) and their optimal combination
under a budget constraint (Liu, Saat, and Barkan 2013). Zografos and Androutsopoulos
presented a decision support system for hazmat routing considering travel time, risk and
evacuation implications, while coordinating the emergency response deployment
decisions with the hazmat routes. The proposed system worked towards alternative
hazmat routing, in terms of cost and risk minimization, specification of locations for firstresponse emergency service units to achieve on-time response to accidents, and
determination of evacuation paths from the impacted area to shelters (Zografos and
Androutsopoulos 2008).
2.3 Risk Assessment
While quantifying risk of hazmat transportation for segments of the transportation
systems is necessary in risk-based approaches to hazmat safety (such as in the operations
research approaches mentioned earlier), it also may provide useful operational
information. Risk of hazmat transportation is defined generally as the multiplication of
probability of occurrence of an incident leading to hazmat release and a measure of
consequences of such a release. Most of these definitions have some components in
common and many studies focused on quantifying these components. Examples of these
components include: hazmat-related incident rates in the transportation infrastructure
(Anderson and Barkan 2004; Liu, Rapik Saat, and Barkan 2017); probability of release
given an incident (Liu, Saat, and Barkan 2014; Treichel et al. 2006); and the release
consequences (Saat et al. 2014; Liu et al. 2013).
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A general study by Nayak et al. presented a set of methods for quantifying risk
components in hazmat rail transportation. This included development of measures for
accident rates based on track class, severity of an accident based on accident speed and
the probability and mean amount of release based on accident speed. Finally, a method to
estimate the impacts of hazmat release on people and property was proposed in this study
(Nayak et al. 1983).
Incident rates per unit of transportation infrastructure (e.g. roadway segment, rail
segment, route, etc.) as a component of hazmat transportation risk is studied. Harwood et
al. calculated truck accident rates and hazmat-released truck accident probability based
on a combination of federal and state truck accident databases. They found area type
(urban/rural), roadway type (two-lane, multilane undivided/divided, and freeway), and
truck ADT effective on accident rates, and type of incident (collision/non-collision,
single/multiple vehicle, run-off/overturn, etc.) effective on hazmat release probability
(Harwood, Viner, and Russell 1993). Qiao et al. developed hazmat transportation incident
frequency models for trucks using negative binomial and fuzzy logic. The former was
used to account for route-dependent variables (population, number of lanes, and weather)
and the latter took into account route-independent variables (truck configuration,
container capacity, and driver experience). They recommended the use of multiple data
sources, such as The Department of Public Safety (DPS) accident databases and the
Commodity Flow Survey (Qiao, Keren, and Mannan 2009).
Probability of hazmat release given a hazmat-carrying truck/train incident is
another important component of hazmat transportation risk. Treichel et al. estimated
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probabilities of lading loss (given derailment) for a variety of tank car specifications,
using logistic regression models. Head shield type, head thickness, tank insulation, shell
thickness, tank car pressure and yard/mainline affected probability of release from head,
shell, top fittings, and bottom fittings of tank cars. They also investigated effects of train
speed on lading loss probability and the distribution of quantities of lading lost given a
release (Treichel et al. 2006).
Another component of the hazmat transportation risk may be different measures
for severity of incidents, which may be useful in predicting the consequences of release.
One of these severity measures for trains is the number of released tank cars. Liu and
Barkan estimated a generalized probabilistic model for the number of tank cars releasing
hazardous materials in a train derailment. They considered train length, derailment speed,
incident cause, position of the first car derailed, number and placement of tank cars in a
train and tank car safety design as the potentially effective factors (Liu, Saat, and Barkan
2014). Liu and Hong estimated the number of tank cars released based on the number of
tank cars derailed. They used a binomial model and a generalized binomial model. The
former considers the probability of release from a tank car independent of the number of
the other released tank cars, while the latter takes into account interdependence of
released tank cars in a train incident. The results showed a better estimation by the
generalized binomial model, indicating the presence of the interdependence (Liu and
Hong 2015).
The number of released tank cars in an incident is a function of the number of
derailed cars, as was shown in (Liu and Hong 2015). Therefore, some studies worked on
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modeling the number of derailed cars. Liu et al. used negative binomial models for the
number of derailed tank cars based on track class, method of operation and annual traffic
density. The latter variable was obtained from class 1 railroad companies, while the
others were from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data. Higher track classes,
signaled operations and larger annual traffic density were associated with lower sizes of
derailment (Liu, Rapik Saat, and Barkan 2017). Liu et al. analyzed derailments, as the
most common type of freight-train accidents in the United States. Zero-truncated negative
binomial regression model was developed to estimate the conditional mean of train
derailment size. Recognizing that the mean is not the only statistic describing data
distribution, a quantile regression model was also developed to estimate derailment size
at different quantiles. Combining the two models resulted in a better understanding of
train derailment severity distribution (Liu et al. 2013).
The consequences of release of hazmat and the subsequent costs is another major
component of risk of hazmat transportation. These costs are comprised of carrier/property
damage, response/clean-up costs, injuries/fatalities, environmental damages and
evacuation. Some studies worked on quantifying these costs. Saat et al. proposed a
quantitative environmental risk analysis of rail transportation for a group of chemicals.
They developed probabilistic estimates of exposure to different spill scenarios. The
authors considered the clean-up cost based on route-specific probability distributions of
soil type and depth to groundwater, traffic volume, car accident rate, and car safety
features (Saat et al. 2014). Dennis quantified the monetary costs of unit exposure of
hazmat transportation by trains, considering type of hazmat based on environmental and
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safety hazard. The costs that were accounted for included equipment damage, lading loss,
way and structures damage, signal damage, wrecking expenses, environmental costs, and
others. The data was collected through a survey of railroads in the U.S. (Dennis 1996).
Clark and Besterfield-Sacre proposed a data-driven quantitative risk assessment approach
during unloading. They used latent class analysis, loglinear modeling and Bayesian
networking as their data analysis tools. Consequences of hazmat release were considered
as dollar loss and release quantity and the most influential variables on these two
measures were related to the failure of the container (Clark and Besterfield-Sacre 2009).
Verma developed a risk assessment methodology for hazmat rail transportation
based on the characteristics of trains and accidents, using Bayes Theorem and Logical
Diagrams. The results of implementing the method on a case study found transportation
risk a function of train length, train-decile position of the hazmat railcar, and the number
of intermediate handling. The front of the train was found riskier, and that 7–9th traindeciles were the most appropriate for moving hazmat railcars for freight-trains of any
length. Furthermore, it was concluded that rail-track risk can be reduced by strategically
distributing hazmat railcars in the train-consist (Verma 2011).
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics could provide preliminary useful insight towards hazmat
release incidents. Oggero et al. investigated 1932 incidents reported from the beginning
of the 20th century to July 2004 around the world that involved the transportation of
hazmat by road and rail. More than half of the incidents happened on roads (63%). The
most frequent type of accidents were releases (78%), followed by fires (28%), explosions
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(14%) and gas clouds (6%). More than half of the accidents did not cause any fatalities.
Among fatal incidents the number of deaths was between 1 and 10, frequently. Given the
occurrence of an incident, the consequences were more severe on average in train
incidents, rather than trucks. Evacuations were rare, however the number of people
evacuated was mostly between 101 and 1000 (29%), followed by the class of between 1
and 10 (24%) (Oggero et al. 2006). Ambituuni prepared descriptive statistics of 2318
accidents involving truck tankers carrying crude oil from 2007 to 2012 in Nigeria. The
results showed 79% of the accidents were caused by human factors. More than 70% of
the accidents resulted in loss of containment leading to spills, fires and explosions. 81%
of the accidents resulted in either injuries, fatalities or both. About $7 million was
estimated as the average cost per accident (Ambituuni, Amezaga, and Werner 2015).
2.5 Summary
Based on the literature review, areas that require more research attention are
identified. Only one major study was found that focused on conditional probability of
hazmat release given an incident (Treichel et al. 2006), which was a car-level modeling
for trains. This probability needs to be studied at other levels considering more
comprehensive variables for trains, and also for trucks. Hazmat-carrying CTTs’ crash
data is not analyzed sufficiently, based on this review, while they are responsible for a
significant portion of hazmat release incidents in the U.S. Although a large number of
studies focused on quantifying components of hazmat transportation risk, they rarely
have evaluated the accuracy of these quantifications. While model-based statistical
approaches are useful in measuring the impacts of factors on risk components, they may
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not be necessarily good predictors for these quantifications. So, non-model-based
methods may provide better estimates, and this needs to be evaluated. Moreover, trucks
and trains may involve in collisions in highway and railroad grade crossings (HRGC),
leading to hazmat release, given either of them carrying hazmat. Such incidents are not
investigated in the literature.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY
This chapter presents an introduction to the statistical models and other methods
used in different sections of this research. While this chapter presents general information
about each method, the way they are utilized, and necessary additional explanations are
provided in chapters 4 through 9, as needed.
3.1 Logistic Regression and Multinomial Regression
Logistic regression models, a common method for modeling binary responses, are
a type of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) with the Bernoulli distribution assumption
for the response variables and cumulative density function of a logistic probability
function as the link function (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011).
Assuming outcomes of the binary response as success and failure, in logistic regression
the probability of success (𝜋𝑖 ) is modeled based a set of explanatory variables. In this
study, 𝜋𝑖 is the conditional probability of hazmat release in the ith train incident or vehicle
crash (hazmat release is replaced by other binary response variables in some sections of
this dissertation). If 𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 are p explanatory variables measured on the ith
observation, in the logistic regression model 𝜋𝑖 is defined as in equation 2.1.
𝜋𝑖 =

exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 )
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 )

(2.1)

In this equation, 𝛽0 , … , 𝛽𝑝 are the logistic regression parameters or coefficients of
the explanatory variables that are estimated based on the data. Equation 2.2 is another
way to state logistic regression. The left side of equation 2.2 is the natural logarithm for
the odds of success (hazmat release) and the right side is a linear combination of the
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coefficients with the explanatory variables, often referred to as linear predictors. This
transformation of 𝜋𝑖 is referred to as the logit transformation (Bilder and Loughin 2014).
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝜋𝑖
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝
1 − 𝜋𝑖

(2.2)

In this study, Maximum Likelihood (ML), a common estimation approach for
logistic regression, was replaced by the bias-reduction method developed by Firth (Firth
1993) (except where noted), as bias was detected in the outcome of ML estimation
(abnormally large estimated standard errors for some of the coefficients (Bilder and
Loughin 2014)). The bias could be due to complete or quasi separation (an explanatory
variable separates the data between 0 and 1 for the response variable), as a result of rarity
of cases of either outcome in the response variables.
In case of multi-category response variables (types and consequences of crude oil
release in this dissertation), a popular model is multinomial regression (also known as
multinomial logit model or baseline-category logit model), which is developed by
selecting one response category as the base level and forming the odds of the remaining
J-1 categories against the base level (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Assuming category 1 as
the base level, multinomial regression relates a set of explanatory variables to each logodds by equation 2.3 for 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽.
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝜋𝑗
) = 𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝
𝜋1

(2.3)

The probabilities will then be defined as equations 2.4 and 2.5 for 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐽.
𝜋1 =

1
1 + ∑𝐽𝑗=2 exp(𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 )

(2.4)
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𝜋𝑗 =

exp(𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 )
1 + ∑𝐽𝑗=2 exp(𝛽j0 + 𝛽j1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 )

(2.5)

Similar reasons, as in logistic regression, cause bias in ML estimates for
multinomial regression. The bias-reduction method developed by Firth (Firth 1993) and
adapted to the multinomial case by Kosmidis and Firth (Kosmidis and Firth 2011) is one
solution for this issue and was utilized in this study due to detection of signs of bias in the
ML-estimated models.
3.2 Mixed Logistic Regression
A logistic regression assumes uncorrelated observations in the dataset. However,
single-level or multi-level grouping might exist in a dataset causing correlation among
the observations. In the hazmat release models for trains, a single-level grouping existed
in the train-level models, while a two-level grouping was present in the car-level models.
Neglecting these correlations could result in smaller estimated variances, leading to
model misinterpretation (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Generalized Linear Mixed Models
(GLMMs) relax the uncorrelated observations assumption by inclusion of random effects
in models. In case of this study, with binary response and Bernoulli distribution
assumption, mixed logistic regression as a class of GLMM, were estimated. In a mixed
logistic regression, equation 2.2 turns into equation 2.6. In this equation, 𝑏𝑗𝑖 s are the
random parameters (for 𝑗 = 0 to p) and are assumed to follow a normal distribution with
mean of 0 and unknown variance (which will be estimated).
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (

𝜋𝑖
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 + 𝑏0𝑖 + 𝑏1i 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑝𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑝
1 − 𝜋𝑖

(2.6)
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There are different methods for estimation of mixed logistic regression through
ML, including penalized quasi-likelihood, Laplace approximation and Gaussian
quadrature (Bilder and Loughin 2014). The latter one was used in this study.
3.3 Poisson Regression and Mixed-effects Negative Binomial Regression
Count-response models were estimated in several cases in this dissertation,
including the number of railcars damaged/derailed on a train, the OD-based frequency of
crude oil release incidents and the number of crude oil released tank cars. Poisson
regression was an appropriate approach for the former case, while Mixed-effects
Negative Binomial Regression was used in the other two.
For a count response variable 𝑌𝑖 and p explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 for the ith
observation, assuming a Poisson distribution with mean 𝜇𝑖 for 𝑌𝑖 , where 𝜇𝑖 = exp(𝛽0 +
𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 ), results in the Poisson regression model. It is a GLM with Poisson
random component, a linear systematic component 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝 𝑥𝑖𝑝 and
logarithmic link function (Bilder and Loughin 2014). These models do not account for
overdispersion, meaning there is more variability to the counts than what the models
assume there is (Cox 1983). Negative Binomial Regression (NBR) (also known as
negative binomial loglinear models) is often used as an alternative to the Poisson
regression to account for overdispersion. NBRs assume a loglinear relation between the
count response variable and the explanatory variables.
Let 𝑉1, 𝑉2, …, 𝑉𝑛 denote an independent and identically distributed sample of unit
mean gamma random variables with shape parameter 𝛼; that is 𝑓(𝑣1 ) ∝
𝑣1𝛼−1 𝑒 −𝛼𝑣1 𝐼(𝑣1 > 0). Suppose the ith count 𝑌𝑖 has a Poisson distribution with mean 𝑣𝑖 𝜇𝑖
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conditional on 𝑣𝑖 , therefore 𝑌𝑖 |𝑣𝑖 ~ 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑣𝑖 𝜇𝑖 ). The counts are then marginally
independent negative binomial variables with mass functions given by equation 2.7,
where 𝑦 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … } (Booth et al. 2003).
Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 𝑦; 𝛼, 𝜇𝑖 ) =

𝛼
Γ(y + 𝛼)
𝛼
𝜇𝑖 𝑦
(
) (
)
Γ(𝛼)𝑦! 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼
𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼

(2.7)

If 𝜇𝑖 is related to a set of explanatory variables, denoted by vector 𝒙𝑖 , while 𝛽0
and 𝜷 are the model constant and the vector of model coefficients, respectively, the NBR
loglinear equation will be as equation 2.8.
log(𝜇𝑖 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝑖 ′𝜷 or 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑒 𝛽0 +𝒙𝑖 ′𝜷

(2.8)

Similar to the mixed logistic regression, a potential three-level correlation among
the observations as a result of presence of grouping among them was possible. One way
to account for this possible multilevel grouping was addition of random effects to the
above NBR (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Booth et al. 2003), resulting in Mixed-effects
Negative Binomial Regression (MNBR), as in equation 2.9.
log(𝜇𝑖 ) = 𝛽0 + 𝒙𝑖 ′𝜷 + 𝑏0 + 𝒙𝒊 ′𝒃 or 𝜇𝑖 = 𝑒 𝛽0 +𝒙𝑖 ′𝜷+𝑏0 +𝒙𝒊 ′𝒃

(2.9)

In this equation, 𝑏0 is the random parameter for the model constant and it is
assumed to have a Normal distribution with mean 0 and unknown variance. 𝒃 is the
vector of random parameters for some or all of the explanatory variables’ coefficients,
and they are also assumed to follow Normal distributions with mean 0 and unknown
variances. These variances are estimated along with the fixed effects. Similar to mixed
logistic regression, at least three methods are available for estimating MNBR through
ML, and Gaussian quadrature was used in this study.
3.4 Mixed-effects Ordered Logit Models
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As measures of aggregate severity of crude oil release incidents, quantity released
and total costs of release of crude oil were categorized as ordinal categorical response
variables. Ordered Logit Models (OLM), also known as cumulative logit models or
proportional odds models, is a tool for modeling ordinal categorical response variables on
a set of explanatory variables, through modeling cumulative probabilities based on the
category ordering. If the probability of category i of the J categories of the response
variable is 𝜋𝑖 , then cumulative probability for category j of Y is 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗) = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 +
⋯ + 𝜋𝑗 and 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝐽) = 1. The log-odds of cumulative probabilities is, then, as equation
2.10 (Bilder and Loughin 2014).
log (

𝜋1 + ⋯ + 𝜋𝑗
𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
) = log (
)
1 − 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
𝜋𝑗+1 + ⋯ + 𝜋𝐽

(2.10)

OLM assumes this log-odds of cumulative probabilities is a linear function of
explanatory variables and also the slope of this relationship is the same regardless of the
category j (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011). The OLM model is stated
as equation 2.11.
log (

𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
) = 𝛽𝑗0 − 𝒙𝑖 ′𝜷
1 − 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)

(2.11)

In this equation, vector 𝒙𝑖 is a set of explanatory variables, 𝛽𝑗0 is the model
constant for the response category j and 𝜷 is the vector of model coefficients.
Similar to the MNBR model, to address grouping by inclusion of random effects in the
OLM models, mixed-effects ordered logit models (MOLM) are used. Equation 2.12
shows MOLM. In this equation 𝑏0 and 𝒃 are defined as in equation 2.9 (Christensen
2011).
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log (

𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)
) = 𝛽𝑗0 − 𝒙′𝑖 𝜷 + 𝑏0 − 𝒙𝒊 ′𝒃
1 − 𝑃(𝑌 ≤ 𝑗)

(2.12)

Among the three methods for ML estimation of MOLM (similar methods as in
logistic regression and MNBR), Laplace approximation was used in this study.
3.5 Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA)
The idea behind BMA is to find an average for all the models, using different
subsets of the set of explanatory variables which have close values of the variable
selection criteria (instead of choosing one model as the best model) to account for the
uncertainty in finding the best model (since a slight change in the data can result in
selection of a different “best” model) (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Bayesian model
averaging uses Bayesian theory to compute the probability that each possible model is the
correct model (Hoeting et al. 1999).
Suppose M models are estimated, where M is the total number of possible models
(𝑀 = 2𝑝 ). If Bayesian Information Criteria (a model selection criteria where lower
values indicate better models) for model m is 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚 , 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, the smallest value for
BIC among all models is 𝐵𝐼𝐶0, and ∆𝑚 = 𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚 − 𝐵𝐼𝐶0 ≥ 0, then assuming all models
equally likely before estimation, the estimated probability that model m is correct, 𝜏𝑚 , is
as equation 2.13.

𝜏̂ 𝑚

1
exp(− 2 ∆𝑚 )
=
1
∑𝑀
𝑎=1 exp(− 2 ∆𝑚 )

(2.13)

If 𝜃 is the parameter being estimated, such as the logistic regression parameters,
̂ (𝜃̂𝑚 ),
its estimate in model m is denoted by 𝜃̂𝑚 , and the corresponding variance is 𝑉𝑎𝑟
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then the model-averaged estimate of the parameter is as equation 2.14 and its variance is
as in equation 2.15 (Bilder and Loughin 2014).
𝑀

𝜃̂𝑀𝐴 = ∑ 𝜏̂ 𝑚 𝜃̂𝑚

(2.14)

𝑚=1
𝑀

̂ (𝜃̂𝑀𝐴 ) = ∑ 𝜏̂𝑚 [(𝜃̂𝑚 − 𝜃̂𝑀𝐴 )2 + 𝑉𝑎𝑟
̂ (𝜃̂𝑚 )]
𝑉𝑎𝑟

(2.15)

𝑚=1

Confidence intervals (CI) can be constructed for the model-averaged parameters
̂ (𝜃̂𝑀𝐴 ). BMA results in non-zero estimates of all the parameters,
based on 𝜃̂𝑀𝐴 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟
but the explanatory variables that are truly unimportant are less likely to appear in models
with high probability, so 𝜃̂𝑀𝐴 will be closer to 0 (Bilder and Loughin 2014). In this study,
BMA was used in the CTT crash analysis. Also, Corrected Akaike Information Criteria
(AICc) was used in the BMA procedure, instead of BIC, as AICc, relative to BIC, is
inclined towards models with larger number of explanatory variables, which was
desirable in this study.
3.6 Interpretation Tools for Statistical Models
Quantifying the effects of explanatory variables on response variables can be
done in different ways, depending on the model and purpose. In this dissertation, Odds
Ratios (OR) were used for binary, multi-category and ordinal response models, while
Percentage Change (PC) was utilized for the count-response models.
Odds for binary response models is defined as the division of probability of
hazmat release by probability of no release, in the conditional release models (similarly
can be defined for other binary response variables, such as CTT rollover). For a c-unit
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increase in a continuous explanatory variable, x, equation 2.16 gives the odds ratio. The
interpretation is that “the odds of hazmat release change by OR times for every c-unit
increase in x, holding other variables constant”. If x is a categorical explanatory variable,
the value of c is 1, and the interpretation changes to “the odds of hazmat release change
by OR times as x changes from 0 to 1, holding other variables constant” (Bilder and
Loughin 2014).
𝑂𝑅 =

𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑥+𝑐
= 𝑒 𝑐𝛽𝑖
𝑂𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑥

(2.16)

PC is defined as the percentage change in the mean response that results from a cunit change in an explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖 (holding other explanatory variables constant)
(Bilder and Loughin 2014). In MNBR, PC for 𝑥𝑖 equals 100(𝑒 𝑐𝛽𝑖 − 1), if only the main
effects of 𝑥𝑖 is used in the model, and equals 100(𝑒 𝑐𝛽𝑖 +𝑐𝛽𝑖 ′𝑥𝑖 − 1), if the quadratic form
of 𝑥𝑖 is also in the model (𝛽𝑖 ′ is the coefficient of the quadratic term). OR for MOLMs is
defined as the change in the odds of 𝑌 > 𝑗 versus 𝑌 ≤ 𝑗, corresponding to a c-unit change
in an explanatory variable, 𝑥𝑖 (also, holding other explanatory variables constant).
Similarly, in case of inclusion of only the main effects of 𝑥𝑖 , OR equals 𝑒 𝑐𝛽𝑖 , and equals
𝑒 𝑐𝛽𝑖 +𝑐𝛽𝑖 ′𝑥𝑖 , if the quadratic form is included.
3.7 Random Forests (RF)
RF is an ensemble machine learning method (methods that generate many
classifiers/regressors and aggregate their results), proposed by Breiman (Breiman 2001).
RF is based on bagging (bootstrap aggregating) with decision trees, meaning successive
classification/regression trees are generated from data which do not depend on earlier
trees (using a bootstrap sample of the training set), and the results of each
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classification/regression are aggregated as the final result (Breiman 2001; Friedman,
Hastie, and Robert 2007). In RF, each node is split using the best among a subset of
explanatory variables randomly chosen at that node. Performance of RF depends on
tuning of the hyperparameters (parameters whose values should be set before training).
In this study, the hyperparameters included number of explanatory variables
sampled randomly as candidates at each split (v), number of trees to generate (t), and
terminal nodes’ minimum size (n) (terminal nodes on decision trees are the nodes the
algorithm do not split, and node size is the number of data observations associated with
each node). RF was used as a classifier for hazmat release in train incidents and CTT
crashes, and rollover for CTT crashes, and as a regressor for number of damaged/derailed
railcars in a train incident. Due to data imbalance for classification in this study (the cases
of hazmat release/rollover were significantly infrequent), RF was used with undersampling. This means that the sample of the data for each tree is drawn with equal
frequency of classes. Also, the hyperparameter tuning was based on out-of-bag samples
(Friedman, Hastie, and Robert 2007).
3.8 Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes is a classification technique which is based on the Bayes’ theorem
and is appropriate when the number of explanatory variables is large. This method
assumes that given a class for the response variable, the explanatory variables are
independent (Friedman, Hastie, and Robert 2007). In other words:
𝑝

𝜋𝑖 (𝑗|𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 ) = ∏ 𝜋𝑖 (𝑗|𝑥𝑖𝑘 )
𝑘=1

(2.17)
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In this equation, 𝜋𝑖 (𝑗|𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 ) is the probability of outcome j given the set of
explanatory variables 𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 , for observation i. The naïve Bayes classifier determines
the classes based on the calculated 𝜋𝑖 (𝑗|𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 ) using equation 2.18 for each
observation and depending on the cutoff probability. Naïve Bayes was utilized as a
classifier, for similar objectives as RF.
𝜋𝑖 (𝑗|𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 ) =

𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 |𝑗)𝜋𝑖 (𝑗)
𝜋𝑖 (𝑥𝑖1 , … , 𝑥𝑖𝑝 )

(2.18)

3.9 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
SVM is a machine learning approach, used for classification and regression,
originally developed by Vapnik et al. (Boser, Guyon, and Vapnik 1992; Wu and Vapnik
1999). It is a system for efficiently training linear learning machines in the kernelinduced feature spaces, while respecting the insights provided by the generalization
theory, and exploiting the optimization theory (Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor 2000). In
this study, C-classification and 𝜀-regression were used as the SVM setting for
classification and count regression, respectively. A kernel function should be chosen to
use in the structure of the algorithm, for which the Gaussian radial basis kernel was used
in this study. This kernel function has a hyperparameter, 𝛾, that should be tuned along
with c, the cost of violation of the constraints of the optimization problem solved during
training of SVM. Hyperparameter tuning for SVM in this study was based on 5-fold
stratified cross validation. More in-depth information about SVM and stratified cross
validation is available in (Friedman, Hastie, and Robert 2007). In this dissertation, SVM
was used for the same objectives as RF.
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3.10 Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) Curves and Cutoff Probabilities
ROC curves plot “sensitivity” (also known as “recall” in the classification
evaluation) versus rate of “false positive (FP)” for various cutoff probabilities used with a
classification method to choose a cutoff probability that corresponds to an appropriate
level of sensitivity and FP rate. While these terms are explained in more details in the
next section, in the context of ROC curves in this study, sensitivity was the proportion of
actual cases of hazmat release (or other binary outcomes) correctly classified, while FP
rate was actual non-release cases, incorrectly classified as release. The area under these
curves (AUC) is a general criterion for performance evaluation in classification (Fawcett
2006).
3.11 Classification and Count Prediction Performance Evaluation Measures
The classification performance evaluation criteria in this study included confusion
matrix, precision, recall (sensitivity), F1 score and AUC (these measures were calculated
for each method based on the test dataset). Confusion matrix summarizes the results of a
classification method. For a binary classification with classes “negative” and “positive”,
the confusion matrix will be:
Classified
Classes -

+

-

TN

FP

+

FN

TP

Original
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In this matrix, TN, FP, FN and TP denote true negative, false positive, false
negative and true positive, respectively. In the hazmat release classification, instead of
negative and positive, the classes were “no release” and “release”, respectively. For
example, TN is the number of no release crashes in the test dataset correctly classified as
no release and FN is the number of release crashes incorrectly classified as no release.
Precision, recall and F1 score are defined as below:
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

F1 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 2

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙

(2.19)

(2.20)

(2.21)

In this study, recall is the proportion of real hazmat release cases that are correctly
classified as hazmat release. Precision denotes the proportion of cases classified as
hazmat release that are correctly hazmat release. Since cases with release of hazmat are
significantly costlier than others, recall may be a better evaluation criterion in this study.
However, precision may also provide useful information depending on how the estimated
probabilities are to be used, as it captures the costs of misclassifying a non-release case as
release. F1 score is the harmonic average of precision and recall. These three criteria
evaluate the performance of the classification after determination of the cutoff point,
while AUC assesses the general classification regardless of the cutoff point.
This study used two measures for evaluating the prediction of number of
damaged/derailed cars in a train, given an incident: Root Mean Square Error (RMSE),
and Total Count Error (TCE). These measures are defined as below:
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∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝜇𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖 )2
𝑛

(2.22)

∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜇𝑖 − ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖
𝑇𝐶𝐸 = |
|
∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝜇𝑖

(2.23)

𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = √

In the above equations, 𝜇𝑖 is the actual number of derailed or damaged cars in
incident i, 𝑦𝑖 is the predicted number of derailed or damaged cars in incident i, and n is
the size of the test dataset. In case of this study, RMSE is more insightful relative to TCE,
as the major use of the number of derailed/damaged cars prediction is using in the hazmat
release models. In an independent usage where the number of derailed/damaged cars
itself is of interest, TCE may be a more useful measure.
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CHAPTER 4 TRAIN-LEVEL AND CAR-LEVEL MODELING OF HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS RELEASE IN RAILROAD INCIDENTS
4.1 Introduction
Identification of operational, environmental, and technical factors affecting the
probability of hazmat release from trains in railroad incidents is important for making
decisions toward decreasing the probability of hazmat release in train incidents; it can
also be useful in risk-based methods designed to improve the safety of rail transportation
of hazmat.
This chapter presents analysis of hazmat-carrying train incidents to fulfil two
objectives: 1) quantifying the impacts of incident, railroad, environment and train/car
characteristics on conditional probability of hazmat release (given a train incident) and 2)
developing a prediction tool for this conditional probability. This chapter considered two
sets of models; trains were the unit of analysis for the first set of models while hazmat
cars were the unit of analysis for the second set. For both sets, logistic regression and
mixed logistic regression were estimated using the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) 2012-2016 rail equipment incident dataset. Single-level and two-level groupings
in the train-level and hazmat car-level models (due to possible hazmat release
interdependence among cars belonging to a train and trains belonging to an incident)
were considered, and significant factors associated with hazmat release identified.
Moreover, ROC curves were developed to improve the prediction performance of the
models, by defining an appropriate cut-off point.
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The next section explains the methods of this chapter. The ensuing section
introduces the dataset and variables, followed by the estimation results of the models and
interpretation. The last section presents the conclusions of this chapter.
4.2 Methods
As was mentioned in section 3.2, there is a possibility of interdependence in
hazmat release from trains involved in an incident and hazmat cars that belong to a train,
which may lead to a single-level correlation in the train-level models and a two-level
correlation in the car-level models. Logistic regression does not consider multi-level
correlation among observations, but mixed logistic regression has the capability of
addressing it. Therefore, this study took both into account. As is shown in Figure 4.1, a
single-level grouping existed in the train-level models while a two-level grouping was
present in the car-level models. Neglecting these correlations might result in smaller
estimated variances, leading to model misinterpretation (Bilder and Loughin 2014).
The response variable in the train-level logistic regression and mixed logistic
regression models was a variable that indicated the occurrence of hazmat release from a
train, given an incident. The response variable in the car-level logistic regression and
mixed logistic regression models was the occurrence of hazmat release from a hazmat car
(including tank cars, covered hoppers, gondolas, etc.), given an incident. The explanatory
variables for the two sets of models included train/car, railroad, operation, environment
and incident characteristics.
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Note: Icons in this figure were obtained from http://iconfinder.com, http://clipartfest.com and
http://thenounproject.com

Figure 4.1 Multi-level structure of the mixed logistic regression models.
The logistic regression and mixed logistic regression models can serve as
prediction tools. As in section 3.10, ROC curves in this study aided visualizing,
organizing and selecting prediction models based on their performance. In the context of
this chapter, the definition of sensitivity was the proportion of actual incidents with
hazmat release correctly predicted while the FP rate was actual incidents without hazmat
release incorrectly predicted as hazmat release. Cut-off probabilities is the threshold for
the estimated probabilities the model uses to predict “release” or “no release” for each
incident. ROC curves plot sensitivity versus false positive rate for various cut-off
probabilities used with a prediction model.
4.3 Data and Variables
Railroad reported incidents involving a hazmat-carrying train were extracted from
the 2012-2016 US rail equipment incident database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration
Office of Safety Analysis 2017). According to FRA: “Rail equipment incidents are
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collisions, derailments, fires, explosions, acts of God, and other events involving the
operation of on-track equipment (standing or moving) that result in damages higher than
the current reporting threshold (i.e., $9,500 for calendar year 2012, $9,900 for calendar
year 2013, $10,500 for calendar year 2014, $10,500 for calendar year 2015, $10,500 for
calendar year 2016, and $10,700 for calendar years 2017 and beyond, until revised) to
railroad on-track equipment, signals, tracks, track structures, or roadbed, including
labor costs and the costs for acquiring new equipment and material.” The extracted
dataset consisted of 2581 incidents, 2787 trains, and 39162 hazmat cars. Car-level data
was generated based on the original train-level dataset using information on number of
hazmat-carrying cars, and number of cars that released hazmat. Tonnage of train cars was
approximated by dividing the gross tonnage of trains (excluding the power units) by the
number of cars in each train.
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 present the variables of train-level and car-level datasets,
respectively. Car-level models did not utilize train-level variables (e.g., hazdamrate,
derrate, typrr, tonnage, and hazcarrate), since their possible impacts on hazmat release
were at the train level; train-level models did not utilize the car-level variable cartonnage.
All the categorical explanatory variables were used in the models as sets of dummy
(indicator) variables, with the base level set to the first level (alphabetical order), with the
exception of typinc, in which the third level (crossing incidents) was chosen as the base
level. Track classes 1 and X were aggregated in one level for the variable trkcls, as they
represented the same maximum speed for freight trains (10 mph). Also, track classes 5 to
9 were aggregated into one level (they were infrequent in the dataset).
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Table 4.1 Statistics for Train-Level Variables
Variable
Response Variable
Hazmat Release
Explanatory Variables
Incident Characteristics
Type of incident
Proportion of damaged/derailed hazmat
cars to all hazmat cars
Locomotive(s) derailed
Proportion of damaged/derailed cars to
all cars

Cause of incident

Railroad Characteristics
Type of railroad (Interstate Commerce
Commission)

Variable
Name

Values and Statistics

hazrel

0 = No (96.73%), 1 = Yes (3.26%)

typinc

1 = Derailment (62.68%), 2 = Collision
(12.77%), 3 = Crossing (8.50%), Others
(16.04%)

hazdamrate

Mean = 0.2504, Variance = 0.1540

locder

0 = No (91.96%), 1 = Yes (8.04%)

derrate

Mean = 0.0989, Variance = 0.0331

cause

E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures
(12.16%), H = Human Factors (39.25%), M
= Miscellaneous (20.99%), S= Signal and
Communication (3.01%), T= Track, Roadbed
and Structures (24.58%)

typrr

1 = Class I (83.05%), 2 = Class II (0.90%), 3
= Class III (16.05%)
1 = Signal indication (24.26%), 2 = Direct
train control (6.71%), 3 = Yard/restricted
limits (2.08%), 4 = Block register territory
(0.47%), 5 = Other than main track rules
(66.49%)
1 = Classes 1 and X (67.60%), 2 = Class 2
(7.61%), 3 = Class 3 (6.71%), 4 = Class 4
(14.46%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (3.62%)

Method of operation

mopera

Track class

trkcls

Type of track

typtrk

1 = Main (32.44%), 2 = Yard (59.78%), 3 =
Siding (2.37%), 4 = Industry (5.42%)

Environmental Characteristics
Temperature

temp

Mean = 58.62, Variance = 496.55

Visibility

visibility

1 = Dawn (7.86%), 2 = Day (42.59%), 3 =
Dusk (7.39%), 4 = Dark (42.16%)

Weather

weather

1 = Clear (66.49%), 2 = Cloudy (22.53%), 3
= Rain (7.14%), 4 = Fog (1.15%), 5 = Sleet
(0.25%), 6 = Snow (2.44%)

Train Characteristics
Train speed (mph)
trnspd
Mean = 12.37, Variance = 211.40
Train gross tonnage (ton)
tonnage
Mean = 4404, Variance = 21787396
Proportion of hazmat tank-cars to all
hazcarrate
Mean = 0.2947, Variance = 0.0958
tank-cars
Remote control locomotive
rclmod
0 = No (80.19%), 1 = Yes (19.81%)
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety
Analysis 2017))
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Table 4.2 Statistics for Hazmat Car-Level Variables
Variable
Response Variable
Hazmat Release
Explanatory Variables
Incident Characteristics

Variable
Name

Values and Statistics

hazrel

0 = No (99.38%), 1 = Yes (0.62%)

Type of Incident

typinc

Locomotive(s) derailed

locder

1 = Derailment (67.46%), 2 = Collision
(11.89%), 3 = Crossing (10.14%), Others
(10.51%)
0 = No (89.93%), 1 = Yes (10.07%)

cause

E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures
(14.38%), H = Human Factors (35.03%), M
= Miscellaneous (20.01%), S= Signal and
Communication (1.65%), T= Track, Roadbed
and Structures (28.93%)

Method of operation

mopera

1 = Signal indication (32.67%), 2 = Direct
train control (8.25%), 3 = Yard/restricted
limits (2.75%), 4 = Block register territory
(0.60%), 5 = Other than main track rules
(55.72%)

Track class

trkcls

1 = Classes 1 and X (57.83%), 2 = Class 2
(9.75%), 3 = Class 3 (10.03%), 4 = Class 4
(20.18%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (2.21%)

Type of track

typtrk

1 = Main (43.11%), 2 = Yard (48.92%), 3 =
Siding (2.80%), 4 = Industry (5.17%)

Environmental Characteristics
Temperature

temp

Visibility

visibility

Weather

weather

Cause of incident

Railroad Characteristics

Mean = 57.30, Variance = 509.56
1 = Dawn (8.15%), 2 = Day (43.68%), 3 =
Dusk (6.81%), 4 = Dark (41.37%)
1 = Clear (65.81%), 2 = Cloudy (22.60%), 3
= Rain (6.84%), 4 = Fog (2.06%), 5 = Sleet
(0.25%), 6 = Snow (2.45%)

Train/Car Characteristics
Train speed (mph)
trnspd
Mean = 13.89, Variance = 213.38
Tank car tonnage (ton)
cartonnage
Mean = 77.30, Variance = 5356.59
Remote control locomotive
rclmod
0 = No (88.37%), 1 = Yes (11.63%)
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety
Analysis 2017))

4.4 Modeling Results
This section presents the estimation results, model interpretations and prediction
considerations.
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4.4.1 Train-Level Models
This set of models provides the probability of hazmat release from one or more
cars of each train, given an incident. The five binary response models (Table 4.3) include
two logistic regression models estimated by ML (A1 and A2), one logistic regression
model estimated by Firth’s bias reduction estimator (FE) (A3), and two mixed logistic
regression models (A4 and A5). The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test provided information on
the impacts of each variable on probability of hazmat release, and variable selection
(along with Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)). A comparison of models A2 and A3
shows a slight difference in the estimations, indicating possible biased estimation of A2;
hence, A3 is preferable. The AIC values and the p-values of the LR test of the random
parameters show that a mixed effects model is not necessary in train-level models. So, A3
was chosen as the best model for further interpretation (in terms of re-substitution
validation, the performance of models was similar).

Table 4.3 Estimated Train-Level Models

typinc

A1) Logistic
regression (ML)
LR test p-value
0.01219
*

A2) Logistic
regression (ML)
LR test p-value
0.00778
**

A3) Logistic
regression (FE)
LR test p-value
0.00893
**

A4) Mixed logistic
regression
LR test p-value
0.01219
*

A5) Mixed logistic
regression
LR test p-value
0.00778
**

hazdamrate

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

temp

0.79757

—

—

0.79757

—

visibility

0.62895

—

—

0.62895

—

weather

0.81558

trnspd

0.00003

***

0.00001

***

0.00001

***

0.00003

***

0.00001

***

tonnage

0.00470

**

0.00547

**

0.00564

**

0.00470

**

0.00547

**

trkcls

0.01460

*

0.01326

*

0.01483

*

0.01460

*

0.01326

*

typtrk

0.56286

—

—

0.56286

—

locder

0.88518

—

—

0.88518

—

derrate

0.27772

—

—

0.27772

—

hazcarrate

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

cause

0.00040

***

0.00022

***

0.00026

***

0.00040

***

0.00022

***

typrr

0.95962

—

—

0.95962

—

rclmod

0.12957

—

—

0.12957

—

mopera

0.99563

0.03931

0.99563

0.03931

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA
NA

Intercept
0.00000

Intercept
0.00000

NA

NA

NA

Model A1

Model A2

NA

NA

NA

0.49962

0.50000

20.88%
97.00%
584.64

20.88%
97.20%
585.52

20.88%
97.24%
615.5

20.88%
97.20%
586.6

Variables

Random Effects

Variables
Variance
Variance LR test
comparison with
Variance LR test pvalue
Release
Overall

***

—

20.88%
97.24%
AIC
613.47
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
NA: Not Applicable, — : Variable not used
Re-substitution
Validation

***

***

—

*

0.04360

***

—

0.81558

*

***

*
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Table 4.4 presents estimated coefficients and standard errors, the values of 𝑐 for
odds ratios, estimated odds ratios and 95% profile LR confidence intervals for odds ratios
for model A3. The model interpretation is as follows (all the statements in the next two
paragraphs are subject to “95% confidence” and “conditional on keeping all the other
variables constant”):
Table 4.4 Estimated Coefficients and Odds Ratios for Model A3
Coefficients

Odds Ratios

Estimate

Std. Error

c

Point
Estimate

Lower
Bound of
C.I.

Upper
Bound of
C.I.

(Intercept)

-8.6420

0.9631

NA

NA

NA

NA

typinc1

1.8090

0.5819

1

6.1055

1.9992

24.3916

typinc2

1.4260

0.7245

1

4.1634

0.9403

20.0359

typinc4

1.0590

0.6620

1

2.8822

0.7167

12.1323

hazdamrate

1.9220

0.3043

0.1

1.2119

1.1401

1.2955

trnspd

0.0515

0.0124

5

1.2934

1.1467

1.4924

tonnage

0.0001

0.0000

1000

1.0632

1.0207

1.1049

trkcls2

1.1100

0.4647

1

3.0346

1.1827

7.8901

trkcls3

1.0140

0.5390

1

2.7559

0.9264

8.3848

trkcls4

0.0606

0.6027

1

1.0625

0.2987

3.5781

trkcls5

0.2340

0.7896

1

1.2637

0.2241

5.9801

hazcarrate

2.5200

0.3450

0.1

1.2867

1.2016

1.3918

causeh

1.2340

0.5194

1

3.4358

1.2622

11.6063

causem

1.1060

0.5278

1

3.0208

1.0801

10.0642

causes

2.0230

0.7551

1

7.5599

1.3317

34.6251

casuet

1.7910

0.4570

1

5.9956

2.5679

18.7879

mopera2

-0.0712

0.3487

1

0.9313

0.4435

1.8342

mopera3

0.1922

0.6187

1

1.2119

0.279

3.8557

mopera4

0.4817

0.8202

1

1.6189

0.2403

7.2008

mopera5

-1.4510

0.5132

1

0.2343

0.0819

0.6649

Variables

NA: Not Applicable

Derailment incidents increased the odds of hazmat release by 2.0 to 24.4 times
compared to a crossing incident, while sufficient evidence was not available to show that
collisions and other types of incidents changed the odds of hazmat release, compared to

48
crossing incidents. A 10% increase in the ratio of damaged or derailed cars resulted in
14% to 30% increase in the odds of hazmat release, and a 10% increase in the ratio of
hazardous materials-carrying cars on a train increased these odds by 20% to 39%. A 5mph increase in train speed was associated with 15% to 49% increase in the odds of
hazmat release, and a 1000-ton increase in the gross tonnage of the train resulted in 2% to
11% increase in these odds.
FRA track class 2 increased the odds of hazmat release (given an incident) by
1.18 to 7.89 times, compared to FRA track class 1 and X. Other FRA track classes did
not show statistically significant evidence of affecting the probability of hazmat release.
Incidents due to track, roadbed and structures, signal and communication, human factors
and miscellaneous causes compared to mechanical and electrical issues increased the
odds of release by 2.57 to 18.79 times, 1.33 to 34.63 times, 1.26 to 11.61 times, and 1.08
to 10.06 times, respectively.
4.4.2 Hazmat Car-Level Models
This set of five binary response models provides the probability of hazmat release from
each hazmat car, given an incident. A number of cars carried hazmat on each train with
some releasing hazmat, leading to a potential two-level grouping in the dataset: hazmat
cars belonging to the same train; and hazmat cars that belonged to the same incident from
the same or different trains.

48
Table 4.5 presents the five estimated models including two logistic regression
models with ML (B1 and B2), two single-level mixed logistic regression models (B3 and
B5) with different explanatory variables and a 2-level mixed logistic regression (B4) to
account for the two possible levels of grouping (there is no FE model as it was similar to
the ML models).
AIC values and the LR test for variances of the random parameters in the mixed
logistic regression models showed that grouping in the car level was statistically
significant but the incident level grouping could be ignored. All mixed logistic regression
showed the same cross validation performance and were superior to the logistic
regression models; Model B5 was selected for interpretation.

Table 4.5 Estimated Hazmat Car-Level Models

Variables
typinc

B1) Logistic
regression (ML)
LR test p-value
0.00000
***

B2) Logistic
regression (ML)
LR test p-value
0.00000
***

B3) Mixed logistic
regression
LR test p-value
0.00033
***

B4) 2-level Mixed
logistic regression
LR test p-value
0.00033
***

B5) Mixed logistic
regression
LR test p-value
0.00055
***

temp

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

0.20616

0.20524

0.14155

visibility

0.00002

***

0.00001

***

0.44398

0.44358

—

weather

0.00804

**

0.00433

**

0.89123

0.89141

—

trnspd

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

0.00000

cartonnage

0.12937

0.06547

.

0.89327

trkclas

0.00006

0.00000

***

0.06485

typtrk

0.87620

locder

0.01132

*

0.00718

cause

0.00000

***

0.00000

rclmod

0.04997

*

—

mopera

0.38831

—

0.80503

0.80434

—

Levels

NA

NA

1 Level (trains)

2 Levels (trains,
incidents)

1 Level (trains)

Variables
Variance

NA
NA

NA
NA

Intercept
4.0200

Intercept
(4.0140, 0.0000)

Intercept
4.2820

Variance LR test
comparison with

NA

NA

Model B1

Model B3

A logistic regression
with similar
variables

NA
0.00%
99.38%
2354.8

0.00000
4.98%
99.41%
2101.3

0.50000
4.98%
99.41%
2103.3

0.00000
4.98%
99.41%
2080.3

Models

Random Effects

LRT p-value
Release
Overall

***

—

NA
0.00%
Re-substitution
Validation
99.38%
AIC
2356.5
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
NA: Not Applicable
— : Variable not used

***

0.00000

***

0.06488

.

0.00001

0.90482

0.90495

—

**

0.87437

0.87437

—

***

0.00000

***

0.00000

***

0.00000

0.04045

*

0.04040

*

0.10905

***

***

—

0.89327
.

0.00000

***

***

***
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Table 4.6 presents odds ratios and their 95% profile LR confidence intervals for
Model B5 along with estimated coefficients, standard errors and the values for the
parameter c. All interpretations are subject to “95% confidence” and “conditional on
keeping all the other variables constant”. The model interpretation is as follows.
Table 4.6 Estimated Coefficients and Odds Ratios for Model B5
Coefficients

Odds Ratios

Estimate

Std.
Error

c

Point
Estimate

Lower
Bound of
C.I.

Upper
Bound of
C.I.

(Intercept)

-11.1806

0.9912

NA

NA

NA

NA

typinc1

2.3070

0.7003

1

10.0447

2.5459

39.6298

typinc2

2.0391

0.8566

1

7.6837

1.4335

41.1857

typinc4
temp

2.0841

0.7568

1

8.0376

1.8235

35.4276

-0.0071

0.0059

10

0.9317

0.8305

1.0452

trnspd

0.0593

0.0145

5

1.3451

1.1671

1.5502

trkcls2

1.6586

0.4454

1

5.2517

2.1937

12.573

trkcls3

1.4134

0.5152

1

4.1098

1.4973

11.281

trkcls4

0.5925

0.5848

1

1.8085

0.5748

5.6904

trkcls5

0.4597

0.9016

1

1.5836

0.2705

9.2701

causeh

1.5382

0.5839

1

4.656

1.4825

14.6227

causem

1.5662

0.6045

1

4.7885

1.4644

15.6576

causes

3.3066

0.8892

1

27.2922

4.7768

155.934

casuet
rclmod

2.0961

0.5125

1

8.1344

2.9793

22.2088

0.7857

0.4812

1

2.1939

0.8543

5.634

Variables

NA: Not Applicable

Derailment incidents, collisions and other types of incident increased the odds of
hazmat release from a car by 2.55 to 39.63 times, 1.43 to 41.19 times and 1.82 to 35.43
times, respectively, compared to a crossing incident. The odds of release given an
incident also increased by 17% to 55% for each 5-mph increase in train speed. FRA track
classes 2 and 3 increased the odds of hazmat release by 2.19 to 12.57 times and 1.50 to
11.28 times compared to FRA tack class 1 and X, respectively. Incidents caused by track,
roadbed and structures, signal and communication, human factors and miscellaneous
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compared to mechanical and electrical issues, increased the odds of release by amounts
between 2.97 to 22.21 times, 4.78 to 155.93 times, 1.48 to 14.62 times, and 1.46 to 15.66
times, respectively.
4.4.3 Prediction
For both train-level and hazmat car-level models, the datasets were randomly
divided to model estimation (80%) and model validation (20%) subsets. Models A3 and
B5 were re-estimated using the estimation data subsets. Figure 4.2 presents the ROC
curves for both models. The larger area under ROC curves showed that the car-level
model provided better overall predictions.

Figure 4.2 ROC curves for train-level and hazmat car-level models.
To achieve higher sensitivity without a large increase in false positive rates, using
the ROC curves, new cutoff points were selected as 0.05 and 0.01 for the train-level and
car-level models, respectively. The value of 0.05 relative to the default value of 0.5
corresponds to increase in sensitivity and false positive rate from 31.82% to 77.27% and
from 0.19% to 14.77%, respectively, in the train-level model. These values for choosing
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0.01 over 0.5 for the hazmat car-level model were from 3.85% to 78.85% and 0.01% to
7.38%, respectively. Table 4.7 shows the prediction results of both models for the
validation subsets for the cutoff point of 0.5 and the new cutoff points of 0.05 and 0.01.
Table 4.7 Prediction Results of Train-Level and Hazmat Car-Level Models
Train-Level Model
Cutoff
Probability

0.5

Hazmat Car-Level Model
0.05

0.5

0.01

No
Release

Release

No
Release

Release

No
Release

Release

No
Release

Release

No Release

534

1

456

79

7779

1

7206

574

Release

15

7

5

17

50

2

11

41

No Release

99.81%

0.19%

85.23%

14.77%

99.99%

0.01%

92.62%

7.38%

Release

68.18%

31.82%

22.73%

77.27%

96.15%

3.85%

21.15%

78.85%

Overall

97.13%

84.92%

99.35%

92.53%

The results showed that both models with the new cutoff probabilities correctly
predicted approximately 80% of hazmat release occurrences. However, the proportion of
“no release” incidents predicted as “release” was twice as large for the train-level models.
Overall, the new cutoff probabilities improved the prediction performance of the models,
and the car-level models were preferred over train-level models.
4.5 Conclusions and Discussion
The research presented in this chapter showed that derailment type incidents
increased the likelihood of hazmat release more than the other incident types. This
finding strengthens the existing emphasis of researchers and policy-makers on preventing
rail derailment incidents involving hazmat. Higher proportion of damaged/derailed
hazmat cars in a train increased hazmat release probability, emphasizing the need and use
of countermeasures aimed at decreasing the number of damaged/derailed cars in
incidents. While all causes of incidents increased hazmat release probability, relative to
the base level (mechanical and electrical failures), prioritization of the corresponding
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countermeasures and policies are suggested on this descending order: signal and
communication; track, roadbed and structures; human factors; and miscellaneous.
Track class 2 in both models and track class 3 in the car-level models were
associated with higher probability of hazmat release. This may be a consideration in
routing of hazmat-carrying trains. In the train-level model, other than main track rules as
a method of operation was associated with a decrease in hazmat release probability,
relative to signal indication. Statistically significant evidence was not available with
respect to the effects of environmental characteristics on hazmat release probability.
These characteristics might have indirect effects captured in the model through other
variables and may be assessed in a future study. Higher train speed, train gross tonnage
and proportion of hazmat tank-cars on trains increased the hazmat release probability.
These variables are useful in developing policies aimed at requiring railroad companies to
decrease train speed, gross tonnage, and proportion of hazmat cars in hazmat-carrying
trains.
The results of mixed models showed hazmat release from hazmat cars belonging
to a train were interdependent and hazmat release from trains belonging to an incident
were independent. Analyzing the incidents in train-level and car-level gave relatively
consistent results. The train-level model accounted for variables such as hazdamrate,
derrate, and hazcarrate leading to useful insights. The car-level model captured the effect
of the number of cars released by having cars as units of analysis. Characteristics of
hazmat cars were not available in the FRA dataset and therefore not considered in this
study (which is a limitation of this study). In addition, the car-level model had better
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performance in prediction, suggesting the implementation of risk-based analyses at the
car level.
As reported in the literature review, Liu et al. (Liu, Barkan, and Saat 2011) found
track-related derailments more likely on lower class tracks. They also reported higher
speed increased the average number of cars derailed in an incident, while Barkan et al.
(Barkan, Dick, and Anderson 2003) reported that train speed increased the probability of
hazmat release. These results are consistent with the findings of this study (reported
herein). Barkan et al. (Barkan, Dick, and Anderson 2003) also identified the incident
cause “broken rails or welds”, as the most significant incident cause on the number of
derailed cars. Although, the current study accounted for grouped incident causes (due to
limitations of the number of variables usable in the models), the group that contained this
incident cause (Track, Roadbed and Structures) increased hazmat release probability,
significantly. Other causes that were in the same group had different effects on release
probability in (Barkan, Dick, and Anderson 2003), which could not be addressed in the
current study.
The results and conclusions of this chapter may be biased to some degree because
of exclusion of the explanatory variables that were not available in the data and probably
were correlated to the explanatory variables that were included in modeling (this is also
known as unobserved heterogeneity). This unavailability was due to either data collection
restrictions or the fact that some potentially significant factors are not readily observable
or practically impossible to collect. While inclusion of random parameters in the models
of this chapter may have addressed this issue to some degree, in practice, the
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recommendations of this study based on its conclusions need to be taken into account
cautiously (for policy- and decision-making), considering the fact that some of the
observed effects of the explanatory variables may be fully or partially the actual effects of
other unobserved factors.
Future research on this topic may investigate the effects of other variables, such as
hazmat car specification and safety design, and type of hazmat on the hazmat release
probability. The effects of incident causes on hazmat release at a more detailed level in
train incidents can be the emphasis of a future study.
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CHAPTER 5 ROLLOVER AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE MODELS
FOR CARGO TANK TRUCK CRASHES
5.1 Introduction
CTTs are one of the major surface transportation carriers of hazmat. CTTs’
rollover crashes are the leading cause of injuries and death from hazmat transportation
incidents, accounting for approximately 75% of gasoline-related fatalities (Calabrese et
al. 2017). CTTs are susceptible to rollover crashes due to their size, weight distribution,
having a high center of gravity, and the surging and sloshing of the liquid cargo during
transportation. Major strategies to address these rollovers are electronic stability control
systems and driver training (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
2003; Calabrese et al. 2017; Douglas B Pape et al. 2007). Identification of factors that
affect or associate with probability of rollover and hazmat release in CTT crashes is a
step toward objectively reducing these probabilities.
The objectives of this chapter were identification and quantification of the effects
of various factors on the probability of rollover and release of hazmat in CTT crashes and
developing prediction tools for these two probabilities. Statistical modeling was
performed using logistic regression and BMA with rollover and hazmat release as the
binary response variables, and crash, trucks, roadway, environment, and driver
characteristics as the explanatory variables. States of Nebraska and Kansas 2010-2016
police reported crash datasets were combined and filtered for CTT-involved crashes and
used in the statistical modeling. ROC curves were developed for model validation and
prediction performance evaluation and improvement. Statistical modeling provided
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useful information about the presence and magnitude of effects of explanatory variables
on rollover and hazmat release. Based on the results, this chapter presents
recommendations for countermeasures and policies toward improving safety of CTTs.
The remainder of this chapter includes: an additional literature review on safety
aspects of CTTs; the chapter’s methods; introduction to the dataset and variables; results
of the statistical modeling; a discussion of the results; and finally, the chapter’s
conclusions.
5.2 Additional Literature Review
In addition to the general literature review of chapter 2 on hazmat transportation,
this section reviews studies on safety aspects of CTTs.
Some studies focused on analysis of CTT-involved crash data. McKnight and
Bahouth investigated 239 large truck rollover crashes in the US and found almost half of
the crashes resulted from failing to adjust speed to curves, characteristics of the load,
condition of the brakes, road surface, and intersection conditions. Other major crash
contributors involved driver’s attention, steering, and load size (McKnight and Bahouth
2009). Shen et al. studied 708 crashes of hazmat-carrying CTTs reported during 20042011 in China. They found the predominant crash types were rollover (29.10%), run-offthe-road (16.67%), and rear-end collisions (13.28%), with a high likelihood of hazmat
release (up to 75.00 % for freeway crashes). Human-related errors (73.8%) and vehiclerelated defects (19.6%) were the primary reasons of occurrence of such crashes (Shen et
al. 2014).
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Calabrese et al. analyzed 93 cargo tank rollovers (2011-2014) based on various
elements focusing on potential human factors contributors. Driver related factors were
most frequently identified contributing factors. Driver performance errors comprised
about half of the rollovers, followed by driver decision errors. Analysis of ten-year
historic crash statistics showed that the largest proportion of rollovers occurred on
undivided roadways, straight roads without curves and away from intersections. The most
effective countermeasures identified were stability control systems, lane departure
warning, and driver monitoring technologies (Calabrese et al. 2017). Pape et al. evaluated
different approaches to reducing CTT rollover and reported: motion-base simulators and
driver performance monitoring systems could improve drivers’ performance in avoiding
rollovers; electronic stability aids could prevent rollovers by direct intervention in
slowing the vehicle as it enters a curve at high speed; wider track width effective in
avoiding rollovers; and sag and horizontal curve combination and pavement conditions as
associated with tank trucks’ rollovers (Douglas B Pape et al. 2008).
Some studies analyzed mechanical design of CTTs and their rollover potential.
Kolaei et al. developed an analytical model of a partly-filled tank of arbitrary crosssection for predicting transient lateral slosh force and rollover moment. They suggested
that a tank cross-section with lower overall center of mass and lower critical slosh length
yielded an enhanced roll stability limit under medium- and high-fill conditions (Kolaei,
Rakheja, and Richard 2014). Kang et al. formulated an optimization problem for finding
optimal tank geometry to enhance roll stability limits of partial and fully loaded CTTs.
They identified wider bottom tanks desirable for high fill volumes, while tanks with
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approximately conical geometry were desirable when fill volume varied considerably (X.
Kang, Rakheja, and Stiharu 1999). Zheng et al. studied factors that influence driving
stability of CTTs. They developed a vehicle dynamics model considering liquid sloshing
during braking and turning for elliptical, circular and improved rectangular cross-section
tank shapes and found that the latter tank shape had better driving stability, while the fill
level of the liquid and the sloshing frequency of the tank influenced driving stability
(Zheng et al. 2017).
As a summary, a number of studies worked on quantifying trucks’ tank design
features on rollovers by experimentation and simulation. A few studies quantified hazmat
release probability from trains in train incidents. Although some studies used descriptive
statistics (and not rigorous modeling techniques) in analyzing CTT crashes, the review of
published literature did not uncover any studies specifically focused on identifying and
quantifying the effects of the type of factors considered in this study on CTTs’ rollover
and hazmat release probabilities.
5.3 Methods
This chapter involves the estimation of statistical models for two outcomes of
traffic crashes involving CTTs: rollover and hazmat release. These two binary variables
(rollover/no rollover and hazmat release/no release) were the response variables modeled
based a set of explanatory variables including characteristics of crashes, trucks, roadway,
environment, and driver traits. The binary response models used were BMA-based
logistic regression which combines logistic regression with BMA as an explanatory
variable selection tool (introduced in section 3.5). This chapter utilized BMA-based
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logistic regression because: 1) availability of a relatively large set of explanatory
variables made the task of variable selection for inclusion in the model specification more
complicated thus requiring the use of a robust variable selection method and 2) this was
an exploratory study and consideration of a model selection approach, such as BMA that
does not eliminate variables from the models was desirable.
The BMA-based logistic regression models can serve as prediction (classification)
tools for CTTs’ rollover and hazmat release in crashes. In the context of this chapter,
sensitivity was the proportion of actual crashes with rollover/hazmat release correctly
classified, while FP rate was actual non-rollover/non-release crashes, incorrectly
classified as rollover/release. Cutoff probability is the threshold for the estimated
probabilities the model uses to classify outcomes: “rollover/release” or “no rollover/no
release” for each crash.
5.4 Data and Variables
The 2010-2016 police-reported crash data from Nebraska and Kansas were
combined and used in the statistical analysis. Other states in the Midwest were contacted
but their data were unavailable in the timeframe for this study. The Nebraska and Kansas
datasets were obtained from Nebraska Department of Transportation and Kansas
Department of Transportation, respectively. Crashes with the involvement of CTTs were
extracted from the combined dataset. This resulted in 2015 crashes with a CTT involved
(all CTTs subset) and 546 crashes with a hazmat-carrying CTT involved (hazmatcarrying subset). The model for truck rollover used all the CTT-involved crashes
(carrying hazmat or not), while the model for hazmat release used a subset of the data
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with hazmat-carrying trucks only. Besides rollover and hazmat release as response
variables, this study utilized different characteristics of crash, CTTs, roadway,
environment, and drivers as explanatory variables. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present these
variables and their statistics in the CTT and hazmat-carrying CTT subsets, respectively.
Criteria for inclusion of the explanatory variables in the study were: 1) variables
that were identified effective on different safety measures, e.g. injury severity, in the
literature; 2) variables available in both Nebraska and Kansas crash data without
significant ratio of missing values (while some information was collected differently in
the two states, they were converted to a compatible format); and 3) variables that were
identified potentially effective on probability of rollover and hazmat release in CTT
crashes. Relative rarity of reported crashes with involvement of CTTs was the reason for
using a larger crash interval (7 years), compared to usual crash data analyses.
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics for the CTT Crash Data
Variable

Values and Statistics

Response Variable
Rollover

1 = No (84.57%), 2 = Yes (15.43%)

Explanatory Variables
Crash Characteristics
Vehicle Point of
Impact

1 = None (3.08%), 2 = Center front (17.07%), 3 = Center rear (6.75%), 4 =
Left front (10.87%), 5 = Left rear (5.66%), 6 = Left side (11.76%), 7 = Right
front (14.29%), 8 = Right rear (5.26%), 9 = Right side (13.00%), 10 = All
areas (0.99%), 11 = Other (11.27%)

Type of Crash

1 = Collision (86.60%), 2 = Non-collision (13.40%)

Object Involved

1 = No (81.24%), 2 = Yes (18.76%)

Vehicle Movement

1 = Straight (61.04%), 2 = Turning left (8.24%), 3 = Turning right (7.44%), 4
= Changing lanes (2.73%), 5 = Slowing/stopped in traffic (7.49%), 6 =
Backing (2.68%), 7 = Other (10.37%)

CTT Characteristics
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Vehicle Body Style

1 = Single-unit (20.89%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (71.71%), 3 = Tractor
with doubles/triples (0.84%), 4 = Truck tractor (0.30%), 5 = Truck with trailer
(6.25%)

Vehicle Make

1 = Freightliner (22.63%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (10.87%), 3 = Kenworth
(19.90%), 4 = Mack (5.16%), 5 = Peterbilt (14.39%), 6 = Other (27.05%)

Vehicle Age
Gross Vehicle Weight

Mean = 7.55, SD = 6.62
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.63%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (9.33%), 3 = More
than 26,000 lbs. (88.04%)

Roadway
Characteristics
Speed Limit

Mean = 53.73, SD = 15.05

Number of Lanes

1 = One (4.27%), 2 = Two (61.89%), 3 = Three (3.57%), 4 = Four or more
(30.27%)

Road Surface Type

1 = Asphalt (55.78%), 2 = Concrete (35.38%), 3 = Dirt (1.84%), 4 = Gravel
(6.50%), 5 = Other (0.50%)

Road Surface
Condition

1 = Dry (82.03%), 2 = Ice (3.03%), 3 = Sand/mud (0.99%), 4 = Slush (0.15%),
5 = Snow (3.42%), 6 = Wet (9.23%), 7 = Other (1.14%)

Road Level

1 = Level (77.52%), 2 = Hilltop (1.89%), 3 = Slope (20.60%)

Road Curvature

1 = Straight (89.53%), 2 = Curved (10.47%)

Intersection Involved

1 = No (59.85%), 2 = Yes (40.15%)

Railroad Involved

1 = No (98.96%), 2 = Yes (1.04%)

In Workzone

1 = No (95.43%), 2 = Yes (4.57%)

Driver Characteristics
Driver's Sex

1 = Male (98.06%), 2 = Female (1.94%)

Driver's Age

Mean = 47.55, SD = 12.94

Alcohol Related

1 = No (98.51%), 2 = Yes (1.49%)

Environmental
Characteristics
Weather Conditions

1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.15%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow (1.34%), 3 =
Fog, smog, smoke (1.49%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/… (0.10%), 5 = Severe crosswinds
(6.80%), 6 = Snow (1.09%), 7 = Other (3.03%)

Light Conditions

1 = Daylight (73.50%), 2 = Dark (21.49%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk (5.01%)

(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation)

Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Hazmat-Carrying CTT Crash Data
Variable

Values and Statistics
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Response Variable
Hazmat Release

1 = No (87.00%), 2 = Yes (13.00%)

Explanatory Variables
Crash Characteristics
Vehicle Point of
Impact

1 = None (3.48%), 2 = Center front (17.58%), 3 = Center rear (6.78%), 4 =
Left front (10.07%), 5 = Left rear (5.68%), 6 = Left side (12.27%), 7 = Right
front (13.37%), 8 = Right rear (4.03%), 9 = Right side (14.10%), 10 = All
areas (0.37%), 11 = Other (12.27%)

Type of Crash

1 = Collision (86.08%), 2 = Non-collision (13.92%)

Object Involved

1 = No (85.35%), 2 = Yes (14.65%)

Vehicle Movement

1 = Straight (62.09%), 2 = Turning left (7.14%), 3 = Turning right (7.14%), 4
= Changing lanes (1.83%), 5 = Slowing/stopped in traffic (8.06%), 6 =
Backing (1.47%), 7 = Other (12.27%)

Rollover

1 = No (84.57%), 2 = Yes (15.43%)

CTT Characteristics
Vehicle Body Style

1 = Single-unit (21.25%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (69.41%), 3 = Tractor
with doubles/triples (1.47%), 4 = Truck tractor (0.37%), 5 = Truck with trailer
(7.51%)

Vehicle Make

1 = Freightliner (22.63%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (11.36%), 3 = Kenworth
(24.73%), 4 = Mack (4.21%), 5 = Peterbilt (28.21%), 6 = Other (11.17%)

Vehicle Age
Gross Vehicle Weight

Mean = 6.30, SD = 5.30
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.01%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (5.13%), 3 = More
than 26,000 lbs. (92.86%)

Roadway
Characteristics
Speed Limit

Mean = 54.86, SD = 14.46

Number of Lanes

1 = One (3.85%), 2 = Two (60.26%), 3 = Three (3.85%), 4 = Four or more
(32.05%)

Road Surface Type

1 = Asphalt (56.04%), 2 = Concrete (34.98%), 3 = Dirt (1.83%), 4 = Gravel
(6.41%), 5 = Other (0.73%)

Road Surface
Condition

1 = Dry (81.32%), 2 = Ice (4.40%), 3 = Sand/mud (1.28%), 4 = Slush (0.18%),
5 = Snow (4.40%), 6 = Wet (7.88%), 7 = Other (0.55%)

Road Level

1 = Level (76.37%), 2 = Hilltop (1.47%), 3 = Slope (22.16%)

Road Curvature

1 = Straight (89.19%), 2 = Curved (10.81%)

Intersection Involved

1 = No (63.19%), 2 = Yes (36.81%)

Railroad Involved

1 = No (98.53%), 2 = Yes (1.47%)

In Workzone

1 = No (95.97%), 2 = Yes (4.03%)

Driver Characteristics
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Driver's Sex

1 = Male (98.90%), 2 = Female (1.10%)

Driver's Age

Mean = 48.76, SD = 11.92

Alcohol Related
Environmental
Characteristics

1 = No (98.35%), 2 = Yes (1.65%)

Weather Conditions

1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.81%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow (1.10%), 3 =
Fog, smog, smoke (0.73%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/… (6.59%), 5 = Severe crosswinds
(0.92%), 6 = Snow (3.85%), 7 = Other (0.00%)

Light Conditions

1 = Daylight (72.89%), 2 = Dark (22.89%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk (4.21%)

(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation)

5.5 Results
This section presents the results of the BMA-based models for CTTs’ rollover and
hazmat release including the results and their interpretations of the statistical models
regarding the effects of different factors on probability of rollover and hazmat release in
CTT crashes. It also provides the ROC curves, cut-off probability determination and
prediction performance evaluation of the estimated models.
5.5.1 Estimated Models
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 present the BMA-based logistic regression models for
rollover and hazmat release, respectively, in terms of estimated odds ratios and their 95%
CIs. In these two tables, the variables are sorted based on their significance, according to
the frequency of appearance in the estimated models with the highest AICc. Inclusion of
“1.0” in a CI for an explanatory variable indicates a lack of sufficient statistical evidence
for the effects of that explanatory variable on the response variable. The variables with
sufficient statistical evidence towards their effects on the response variables are in bold
fonts in these tables. Interpretation of the estimated odds ratios and CIs follows next. All
the statements regarding the effects of each explanatory variable on the response
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variables are subject to 95% confidence while holding other explanatory variables in the
model constant.
Table 5.3 Odds Ratios and 95% CIs for the Rollover Model

Center front

1.99

95% Confidence Interval
(CI)
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
0.46
8.71

Center rear

0.47

0.07

3.33

Left front

1.86

0.41

8.37

Left rear

0.70

0.11

4.39

Left side

3.69

0.84

16.13

Right front

2.41

0.56

10.31

Right rear

1.01

0.17

6.09

Right side

6.53

1.55

27.50

All areas

45.06

4.86

417.62

Other

0.30

0.07

1.38

Type of Crash

Non-collision

188.96

101.28

352.54

Object Involved

Yes

15.35

9.05

26.02

10,001 to 26,000 lbs.

12.53

1.42

110.47

More than 26,000 lbs.

12.53

1.58

99.16

1.17

1.07

1.29

Two

0.48

0.23

1.02

Three

0.01

0.00

0.21

Four or more

0.22

0.09

0.55

Tractor & semi-trailer

0.59

0.36

0.98

Tractor with doubles/triples

1.01

0.11

9.12

Truck tractor

11.39

0.39

329.44

Truck with trailer

0.84

0.36

1.99

Turning left

1.23

0.51

2.93

Turning right

1.38

0.60

3.18

Changing lanes

0.63

0.05

7.30

Slowing/stopped in traffic

0.44

0.10

1.96

Backing

0.00

0.00

0.09

Other

2.47

1.37

4.47

Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow

0.09

0.00

1.56

Fog, smog, smoke

0.39

0.08

1.86

Rain/Sleet/...

0.83

0.28

2.45

Severe crosswinds

5.03

1.19

21.33

OR Point
Estimate

Variables

Vehicle Point of Impact

Gross Vehicle Weight
Speed Limit (c = 5 mph)
Number of Lanes

Vehicle Body Style

Vehicle Movement

Weather Condition
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Light Condition
Driver Sex

Vehicle Make

Road Surface Type

Road Surface Condition

Snow

0.59

0.14

2.46

Other

0.00

0.00

0.00

Dark

1.09

0.69

1.74

Dawn/Dusk

0.32

0.11

0.95

Male

0.84

0.24

2.98

Internat. Harvester

1.58

0.78

3.20

Kenworth

0.55

0.28

1.06

Mack

0.83

0.32

2.18

Peterbilt

1.24

0.72

2.14

Other

0.63

0.31

1.28

Concrete

0.73

0.43

1.25

Dirt

4.38

1.06

18.05

Gravel

1.91

0.91

3.98

Other

1.57

0.24

10.19

Ice

0.39

0.10

1.47

Sand/Mud

18.30

1.44

233.11

Slush

0.00

0.00

0.00

Snow

1.08

0.34

3.45

Wet

1.05

0.43

2.57

Other

0.22

0.04

1.35

Driver Age

1.00

0.98

1.01

Hilltop

1.21

0.42

3.46

Slope

1.52

0.87

2.64

Alcohol Related

Yes

1.03

0.74

1.43

Intersection Involved

Yes

1.04

0.88

1.23

Railroad Involved

Yes

0.88

0.50

1.55

1.00

1.00

1.01

Road Level

Truck Age
In Work Zone

Yes

1.00

0.93

1.07

Road Curvature

Curved

1.01

0.96

1.06

The odds of CTTs’ rollover in a crash increased by an amount between 1.55 to
27.50 times when the point of impact was the right side of the truck, relative to when
there is no impact. Also, in case of all areas of the truck being impacted, these odds
increased by 4.86 to 417.62 times, relative to no impacts. The odds of rollover increased
by an amount between 101.28 to 352.54 times in non-collision crashes, relative to
collision crashes. Involvement of an object in crashes increased the rollover odds by 9.05
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to 26.02 times. Gross truck weight groups of 10,001 to 260,000 lbs., and more than
26,000 lbs. increased the odds of rollover by amounts between 1.42 to 110.47, and 1.58
to 99.16, respectively, compared to trucks lighter than 10,001 lbs.
Each 5 mph increase in the posted speed, increased the odds of rollover of the
CTTs in crashes by 7% to 29%. Relative to one lane, highways with three lanes, and
highways with four or more than four lanes decreased the odds of rollover by 0.00 to 0.21
times, and 0.09 to 0.55 times, respectively. In terms of truck body style, tractor and semitrailer decreased the odds of rollover, relative to single-unit trucks, by an amount between
0.36 to 0.98 times. Compared to moving straight ahead during a crash, backing decreased
the odds of rollover by 0.00 to 0.09 times, while the movement group “Other” increased
these odds by 1.37 to 4.47 times. Severe crosswinds, relative to clear weather increased
the odds of rollover by 1.19 to 21.33 while light conditions during dawn/dusk, relative to
daylight, decreased the odds of rollover by 0.11 to 0.95.
Dirt as the road surface type, compared to asphalt, increased the odds of truck
rollover by 1.06 to 18.05 times, while sand/mud, as road surface condition, relative to dry
surface, increased these odds by 1.44 to 233.11 times. Each year increase in the age of
CTTs increased the odds of rollover by an amount up to 1%. The modeling effort did not
uncover sufficient evidence toward the effects of other explanatory variables on the
probability of CTT’s rollover in crashes. Only two explanatory variables statistically
significantly affected hazmat release from these trucks given a crash in a direct manner.
Relative to non-rollover crashes, rollovers increased the odds of hazmat release by an
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amount between 8.22 to 29.27 times. When intersections were involved in a crash, the
odds of hazmat release increased by 1.02 to 3.47 times.
Table 5.4 Odds Ratios and 95% CIs for the Hazmat Release Model
OR Point
Estimate

Variables

Rollover
Gross Vehicle Weight
Intersection Involved

Lower
Bound

Upper
Bound

Yes

15.51

8.22

29.27

10,001 to 26,000 lbs.

1.70

0.17

16.56

More than 26,000 lbs.

0.75

0.09

6.16

Yes

1.89

1.02

3.47

0.95

0.89

1.01

1.64

0.77

3.46

1.03

0.93

1.15

Truck Age
Object Involved

95% Confidence
Interval (CI)

Yes

Speed Limit (c = 5 mph)
In Work Zone

Yes

0.84

0.36

1.96

Road Curvature

Curved

1.07

0.80

1.43

Alcohol Related

Yes

1.13

0.69

1.87

Tractor & semi-trailer

1.02

0.91

1.15

Tractor with doubles/triples

1.13

0.69

1.84

Truck tractor

0.00

0.00

Inf.

Truck with trailer

1.00

0.90

1.11

Non-collision

0.99

0.93

1.06

Dark

0.99

0.96

1.03

Dawn/Dusk

1.02

0.92

1.13

Two

1.00

0.96

1.04

Three

1.01

0.93

1.10

Four or more

1.00

0.96

1.04

Hilltop

1.00

0.95

1.04

Slope

1.00

0.98

1.02

Internat. Harvester

1.01

0.96

1.06

Kenworth

1.00

0.97

1.04

Mack

1.01

0.95

1.08

Peterbilt

1.00

0.98

1.02

Other

1.02

0.94

1.12

Male

0.99

0.94

1.05

1.00

1.00

1.00

Ice

1.00

0.99

1.01

Sand/Mud

1.00

0.98

1.01

Slush

0.00

0.00

Inf.

Vehicle Body Style

Type of Crash
Light Condition

Number of Lanes

Road Level

Vehicle Make

Driver Sex
Driver Age
Road Surface Condition
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Railroad Involved

Vehicle Movement

Weather Condition

Road Surface Type

Vehicle Point of Impact

Snow

1.00

1.00

1.00

Wet

1.00

1.00

1.00

Other

1.00

0.99

1.01

Yes

1.00

1.00

1.00

Turning left

1.00

1.00

1.00

Turning right

1.00

1.00

1.00

Changing lanes

1.00

1.00

1.00

Slowing/stopped in traffic

1.00

1.00

1.00

Backing

1.00

1.00

1.00

Other

1.00

1.00

1.00

Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow

1.00

1.00

1.00

Fog, smog, smoke

1.00

1.00

1.00

Rain/Sleet/...

1.00

1.00

1.00

Severe crosswinds

1.00

1.00

1.00

Snow

1.00

1.00

1.00

Concrete

1.00

1.00

1.00

Dirt

1.00

1.00

1.00

Gravel

1.00

1.00

1.00

Other

1.00

1.00

1.00

Center front

1.00

1.00

1.00

Center rear

1.00

1.00

1.00

Left front

1.00

1.00

1.00

Left rear

1.00

1.00

1.00

Left side

1.00

1.00

1.00

Right front

1.00

1.00

1.00

Right rear

1.00

1.00

1.00

Right side

1.00

1.00

1.00

All areas

Inf.

0.00

Inf.

Other

1.00

1.00

1.00

5.5.2 Prediction
For both BMA-based logistic regression models (rollover and hazmat release), the
datasets were split into two model estimation (80%) and model validation (20%) subsets.
The splitting was stratified and random, meaning observations were randomly selected to
be put in each subset, while the ratio of the classes (rollover/no rollover or release/no
release) in each subset was held equal to the original data. This was to avoid conclusions
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that could vary due to randomness of the splitting, as the response variables’ classes were
highly imbalanced (positive outcomes were rare). Both models were re-estimated using
the estimation subsets, validated using the validation subsets, and ROC curves were
generated as in Figure 5.1. The area under the curves indicates that the rollover model did
a better job in terms of prediction. Despite having a low rate of variables that statistically
significantly affect the response variable, the hazmat release model also had a relatively
sufficient prediction performance.

Figure 5.1 ROC curves for the rollover and hazmat release models.
Changing the cutoff probabilities based on the ROC curves can result in higher
model sensitivity without a large increase in FP rates. For the rollover and hazmat release
models, the new cutoff probabilities of 20% and 40% (instead of 50%), respectively,
were determined. Table 5.5 shows the models’ prediction performance for both sets of
cutoff probabilities. Correct prediction of rollovers and hazmat release cases increased
from 71% to 89%, and 45% to 64%, respectively, after using the alternative cutoff
probabilities. These improvements are at the price of increase in FP rates from 4% and
5% in the rollover and hazmat release models, to 14% and 12%, respectively.
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Table 5.5 Prediction Performance of the Models
Rollover Model
Cutoff Probability

0.5
No
Rollover

Rollover

Hazmat Release Model
0.2
No
Rollover

Rollover

0.5
No
Release

Release

0.4
No
Release

Release

No Rollover/Release

328

12

293

47

92

5

85

12

Rollover/Release

18

44

7

55

6

5

4

7

No Rollover/Release

96.47%

3.53%

86.18%

13.82%

94.85%

5.15%

87.63%

12.37%

Rollover/Release

29.03%
92.54%

70.97%

11.29%
86.57%

88.71%

54.55%
89.91%

45.45%

36.36%
85.19%

63.64%

Overall

5.6 Discussion and Conclusions
A relatively large number of explanatory variables were found to affect or
associate with the probability of CTTs’ rollover in crashes. This justifies the use of BMA
in this study. Only two explanatory variables, including rollover itself, influenced the
probability of hazmat release. This indicates actions taken to avoid rollovers may affect
hazmat release indirectly and in the same direction (if a change in the value of a variable
decreases the probability of rollover, it decreases the probability of hazmat release as
well).
Non-collision crashes were more probable to result in a rollover (representing
only-rollover crashes). This finding emphasizes the possibility of the role of the other
driver characteristics that were not included in this study (due to unavailability in the
analyzed data). These characteristics, according to the literature, include inattention, and
specific skills for driving CTTs in terms of speed adjustment, effective braking, and
steering. In terms of point of impact, side impacts in addition to impacts to all areas of the
vehicle, increases the likelihood of rollover, indicating it may be more effective if drivers
of CTTs get trained towards avoiding such crashes.

72
Relative to moving straight ahead, the probability of rollover in a crash does not
change for other types of movements (except backing), while one may expect turning
movements may lead to rollovers more often. This finding is consistent with Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) CTT safety recommendations, where it is
emphasized only 7% of CTTs’ rollovers occur on exit ramps (Douglas B Pape et al.
2007). Backing crashes are less likely to lead into a rollover, probably due to lower speed
and less severe collisions. Based on this finding, the roadway-related countermeasures for
truck rollover and hazmat release are recommended to not be restricted to ramps.
Severe crosswinds was the only weather condition that increased the probability
of rollover, relative to clear/cloudy weather. Such weather is suggested to be avoided by
CTTs. This can be taken into consideration by policy-makers, private shippers, or truck
drivers. If possible, driving during dawn and dusk and road surface conditions of sand
and mud should be avoided. Probability of overturn increases when the CTTs are heavier
(consistent with (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 2003)) and
older. Probability of hazmat release increases when there is a rollover. Consequently,
shippers are encouraged to consider newer trucks and also lighter trucks, in terms of truck
type, body style and amount of loaded hazmat, specifically in cases of more dangerous
classes of hazmat. The body style of tractor and semi-trailer decreases the probability of
rollover, compared to all other body styles and is recommended to consideration, if
practical.
Collision with objects increased the probability of CTT rollover. Guardrails and
other roadside safety structures include a significant portion of these objects. Therefore,
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considering CTTs in the design of such structures, especially in the regions with higher
traffic of CTTs, may be a reasonable approach for decreasing these rollovers. Only a 5mph increase in the posted speed resulted in up to 27% increase in the odds of rollover of
CTTs in crashes. Therefore, consideration of lower speed limits is recommended in areas
with frequent passage of CTTs. In routing for CTTs, shippers may prioritize their options
based on number of lanes (3 or more) and fewer intersections in addition to usual
economic concerns, as higher number of lanes is associated with lower probability of
overturn and intersections increase the odds of hazmat release.
Based on area under the ROC curves, both models had reliable prediction
performances. Choosing alternative cutoff probabilities led to about 89% and 64% correct
prediction of rollover and hazmat release cases. While this ensures the appropriateness of
the models for inference on this crash data, these models can be utilized for prediction in
risk-based hazmat transportation decision frameworks, such as routing, facility location,
and network design. Besides hazmat release probability given a crash, these frameworks
require quantification of other components of risk, e.g. CTT crash frequency, and
consequences of hazmat release.
A limitation of this chapter was the geographic coverage of the analyzed data. A
source for a national comprehensive police-reported crash data is not available, and each
state keeps its own crash database, with different variables and not readily available to
public. Although, Nebraska and Kansas, as two Midwestern states with relatively similar
traits in terms of weather, roadways and driver behavior may provide results for the
Midwest, the results may not be generalizable across the U.S. Another limitation was
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unavailability of some variables in the dataset that could potentially affect probabilities of
rollover and hazmat release, such as more detailed driver and CTT characteristics, crash
speed, type and amount of loaded hazmat, etc. (described as unobserved heterogeneity in
chapter 4). This needs to be taken into account when implementing the policy- and
decision-making recommendations of this chapter (the fact that some of the observed
effects of the explanatory variables may be fully or partially the actual effects of other
unobserved factors).
Future studies may address these limitations by using more comprehensive
datasets and possible inclusion of missing information in this study’s data. Utilizing other
modeling methods and algorithms for inference and prediction may uncover additional
useful information in future studies.
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CHAPTER 6 MODELING THE PROBABILITY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
RELEASE AT HIGHWAY-RAIL GRADE CROSSINGS
6.1 Introduction
Trucks and trains carry substantial amount of hazmat in the U.S., leading to the
potential of costly hazmat release incidents. While these incidents may occur anywhere
on the transportation system, crashes at highway-rail grade crossings (HRGCs) may lead
to hazmat release from either trucks or trains, or both. Identifying the contributing factors
to hazmat release in HRGC crashes involving a hazmat-carrying truck or train is
important for setting policies and for making more informed public safety-related
decisions.
With a focus on crashes at HRGCs involving hazmat-carrying trucks and/or
trains, the research objective of this chapter was to identify the effects of highway users’
characteristics, truck/train attributes, environment, land-use and HRGC traits on the
probability of hazmat release from trucks or trains in these crashes. The FRA’s HRGC
crash dataset (2007-2016) yielded two crash data subsets: 1) crashes involving hazmatcarrying trucks and 2) crashes involving hazmat-carrying trains. Logistic regression
models were estimated using each data subset with hazmat release/no release as the
response variable. Both models provided useful information about the presence and
magnitude of effects of explanatory variables on hazmat release from these two
transportation modes. Based on the results, this chapter presents recommendations for
countermeasures and for policies toward decreasing hazmat release in HRGC crashes.
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Organization of the remaining of this chapter is as follows. The next section
presents an additional review of literature on safety of HRGCs. Methods, data and
variables, and modeling results are the ensuing sections of this chapter. Discussion,
conclusions and a list of references complete this chapter.
6.2 Additional Literature Review
In addition to the general literature review of chapter 2 on hazmat transportation,
this section reviews studies on safety aspects of HRGCs.
The majority of studies on safety of HRGCs focused on analysis of crash
frequency and severity at these transportation junctions. Raub examined the performance
of four specific warning device classes (crossbucks only, STOP signs, flashing lights and
gates) at HRGCs and compared their effects on crash frequency (Raub 2006). Hu et al.
studied and identified factors associated with crash injury severity at HRGCs, which
included number of daily trains, number of daily trucks, highway separation, an obstacle
detection device, and approaching crossing marks (Hu, Li, and Lee 2010). Other factors
that were associated with crash frequency and severity at HRGCs include highway motor
vehicle driver’s age and behavior, traffic volume, and weather conditions (Hao and
Daniel 2013; Russo and others 2013). Zhao and Khattak found that greater number of
highway lanes at HRGCs, the presence of standard flashing-light signals and clear
weather decreased the likelihood of severe injuries (Shanshan Zhao and Khattak 2015).
Zhao et al. showed that higher train speed, female pedestrians and commercial land use
were associated with more severe injuries in pedestrian-train crashes at HRGCs (S. Zhao,
Iranitalab, and Khattak 2018). Fan et al. identified pick-up trucks, concrete, and rubber
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surfaces associated with more severe crashes at HRGCs, while truck-trailers, snow and
fog, and higher daily traffic volumes were more likely to be observed in less severe
crashes (Fan, Kane, and Haile 2015).
The contributing factors to crash frequency and severity at HRGCs were
relatively consistent in the reviewed studies. However, these results do not necessarily
hold in describing probability of hazmat release, which warrants the investigation of
hazmat-related crashes at HRGCs. The review of published literature did not uncover
studies specifically focused on the safety of hazmat transportation at HRGCs by trucks
and trains.
6.3 Methods
This chapter involved estimation of two logistic regression models for capturing
possible impacts and associations of explanatory variables on the probability of hazmat
release from hazmat-carrying trucks (Truck Model) and trains (Train Model) in crashes
reported at HRGCs. Occurrences of hazmat release/no release from trucks and trains
respectively were binary response variables in the two logistic regression models.
Explanatory variables included HRGC-related traits, train and highway user
characteristics, type of crash, and environmental and land-use characteristics.
6.4 Data and Variables
Ten-year U.S. HRGC accident/incident data (2007-2016) and HRGC history
inventory data were obtained from FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration
Office of Safety Analysis 2017). According to FRA: “Each HRGC accident/incident must
be reported to the FRA, regardless of the extent of damages or whether a casualty
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occurred.” Crashes were matched with the inventory dataset based on unique HRGC
identification number and approximate date of crash. Two subsets of crashes were
extracted from this dataset: 1) crashes with hazmat-carrying highway users (trucks)
containing 75 crashes and 2) crashes with hazmat-carrying trains, including 3726 crashes.
Truck Model and Train Model were estimated using these two subsets, respectively.
Table 6.1 presents the variables and their statistics for the truck subset, while Table 6.2
shows similar information for the train subset.
Table 6.1 Variables and Statistics of the Hazmat-Carrying Truck Data Subset
Variable

Variable Name

Values and Statistics

HAZREL

1 = No (45.33%), 2 = Yes (54.67%)

Response Variable
Hazmat Release
Explanatory Variables
Highway User Characteristics
Type of Vehicle

TYPVEH

Vehicle Speed

VEHSPD

1 = Truck (20.00%), 2 = Truck-trailer
(72.00%), 3 = Pick-up Truck (08.00%)
Mean = 8.3467, Variance = 164.5268

Driver Age

DRIVAGE

Mean = 47.3467, Variance = 169.0944

Driver gender

DRIVGEN

1 = Male (98.67%), 2 = Female (1.33%)

Train Characteristics
Railroad Class

TYPRR

Freight Train

FREIGHT

1 = Class I (81.33%), 2 = Class II (01.33%), 3
= Class III (17.33%)
1 = No (21.33%), 2 = Yes (78.67%)

Train Speed

TRNSPD

Mean = 32.4110, Variance = 326.5510

Number of Cars

NBRCARS

Mean = 51.5135, Variance = 1615.2670

TYPACC

1 = Train Struck Highway User (92.00%), 2 =
Train Struck by Highway User (08.00%)

Crash Characteristics
Type of Crash

Environment and Land-use Characteristics
Temperature
TEMP
Weather

WEATHER

Visibility

VISIBLTY

Type of Land Use

DEVELTYPE

Mean = 63.1600, Variance = 473.4335
1 = Clear (64.00%), 2 = Cloudy (30.67%), 3 =
Rain (05.33%), 4 = Fog, Sleet, Snow
(00.00%)
1 = Dawn (06.67%), 2 = Day (70.67%), 3 =
Dusk (08.00%), 4 = Dark (14.67%)
1 = Open Space (41.33%), 2 = Residential
(09.33%), 3 = Commercial (10.67%), 4 =
Industrial (30.67%), 5 = Other (08.00%)
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HRGC Characteristics
Cantilever Flashing-Light
Signals
Standard Flashing-Light
Signals
Bells
Crossbucks

CANTALIVERFLS

1 = No (94.67%), 2 = Yes (05.33%)

STANDARDFLS

1 = No (69.33%), 2 = Yes (30.67%)

BELLS
CROSSBUCKS

1 = No (58.67%), 2 = Yes (41.33%)
1 = No (32.00%), 2 = Yes (68.00%)

Gates

GATES

1 = No (70.67%), 2 = Yes (29.33%)

Highway Traffic Signal

HWYTRFICSIG

1 = No (98.67%), 2 = Yes (01.33%)

Audible

AUDIBLE

1 = No (80.00%), 2 = Yes (20.00%)

Stop Sign

STOPSIGNS

1 = No (64.00%), 2 = Yes (36.00%)

Other Control Devices

OTHER

1 = No (82.67%), 2 = Yes (17.33%)

Public/Private HRGC

PUBLIC

1 = No (29.33%), 2 = Yes (70.67%)

Table 6.2 Variables and Statistics of the Hazmat-Carrying Train Data Subset
Variable

Variable Names

Values and Statistics

HAZREL

1 = No (99.86%), 2 = Yes (0.13%)

Type of Vehicle

TYPVEH

1 = Auto (42.53%), 2 = Truck/Trucktrailer/Pick-up Truck (40.55%), 3 =
Van/Bus/School Bus (03.43%), 4 =
Pedestrian (04.85%), 5 =
Motorcycle/Other (08.64%)

Vehicle Speed

VEHSPD

Mean = 7.2321, Variance = 128.9675

Driver Age

DRIVAGE

Mean = 42.3601, Variance = 299.6472

Driver gender

DRIVGEN

1 = Male (75.46%), 2 = Female (24.54%)

Response Variable
Hazmat Release
Explanatory Variables
Highway User Characteristics

Train Characteristics
Railroad Class

TYPRR

Train Speed

TRNSPD

1 = Class I (86.23%), 2 = Class II
(02.60%), 3 = Class III (11.16%)
Mean = 32.7384, Variance = 243.8642

Number of Cars

NBRCARS

Mean = 69.1539, Variance = 1322.8460

TYPACC

1 = Train Struck Highway User (82.54%),
2 = Train Struck by Highway User
(17.46%)

Crash Characteristics
Type of Crash

Environment and Land-use Characteristics
Temperature

TEMP

Mean = 60.8345, Variance = 491.5737

Weather

WEATHER

1 = Clear (69.78%), 2 = Cloudy (20.33%),
3 = Rain (05.60%), 4 = Fog, Sleet, Snow
(04.29%)
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Visibility

VISIBLTY

1 = Dawn (05.17%), 2 = Day (57.11%), 3
= Dusk (05.52%), 4 = Dark (23.18%)

Type of Land Use

DEVELTYPE

1 = Open Space (28.35%), 2 = Residential
(21.08%), 3 = Commercial (26.79%), 4 =
Industrial (16.30%), 5 = Other (07.48%)

Cantilever Flashing-Light Signals

CANTALIVERFLS

1 = No (80.69%), 2 = Yes (19.31%)

Standard Flashing-Light Signals

STANDARDFLS

1 = No (54.30%), 2 = Yes (45.70%)

Bells
Crossbucks

BELLS
CROSSBUCKS

1 = No (41.88%), 2 = Yes (58.12%)
1 = No (32.00%), 2 = Yes (68.00%)

Gates

GATES

1 = No (70.67%), 2 = Yes (29.33%)

Highway Traffic Signal

HWYTRFICSIG

1 = No (97.61%), 2 = Yes (02.39%)

Audible

AUDIBLE

1 = No (63.88%), 2 = Yes (36.12%)

Stop Sign

STOPSIGNS

1 = No (78.98%), 2 = Yes (21.02%)

Other Control Devices

OTHER

1 = No (83.75%), 2 = Yes (16.25%)

Public/Private HRGC

PUBLIC

1 = No (12.82%), 2 = Yes (87.18%)

HRGC Characteristics

6.5 Modeling Results
Two logistic regression models were estimated for hazmat release from trucks
(Truck Model) and trains (Train Model) in crashes at HRGCs. Variable selection was
based on AICc. Some variables in both models were not statistically significant (at α =
0.10 level), but were retained in model specifications, since they contributed to the
models according to AICc (via describing small proportions of variations in the response
variable and affecting other parameters of the models) (Bilder and Loughin 2014). Table
6.3 shows the modeling results including estimated coefficients, standard errors, odds
ratios and 90% profile likelihood ratio confidence intervals for odds ratios. The
significance of estimated coefficients with 90% confidence can be judged by looking at
the odds ratios’ confidence intervals (if each interval does not contain 1, hypothesis of
equality of the coefficient with zero is rejected).
In hazmat-carrying truck crashes at HRGCs, with 90% confidence and holding all
the other variables constant except the variable being interpreted, presence of standard
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flashing-light signals decreased the odds of hazmat release from trucks by an amount
between 0.0475 to 0.4716 times, relative to its absence. Railroad crossbucks decreased
the odds of release from trucks by 0.0461 to 0.4065 times and public crossings increased
these odds by 1.6148 to 15.8892 times, compared to private crossings. Railroad classes II
and III decreased the odds of release from trucks by amounts between 0.0013 and 0.9781
and between 0.0496 and 0.4631, respectively, relative to railroad class I. Freight trains
increased truck release odds by 1.9958 to 17.4551 times, compared to non-freight trains.
Crossing control devices introduced as “Other Control Devices” (in Table 6.1) decreased
the odds of release from trucks by 0.0907 to 0.8836 times, compared to absence of these
control devices. Sufficient statistical evidence was not available to support the existence
of effects of any other variables that were considered in this study on the release of
hazmat from trucks in HRGC crashes.
In hazmat-carrying train crashes at HRGCs, again, with 90% confidence and
holding all the other variables constant except the variable being interpreted, railroad
class II increased the odds of hazmat release from trains by 1.3266 to 62.4336 times,
relative to railroad class I. Railroad class III did not have any significant difference from
railroad class I regarding the probability of hazmat release from trains. Type of highway
user changed the probability of hazmat release from trains: trucks, truck-trailers and pickup trucks increased the odds of release by an amount between 1.6463 to 57.1876 times,
compared to automobiles; crashes with motorcycles, other motor vehicles and other
objects increased these odds by 2.1248 to 112.5912 times, relative to automobiles;
hazmat release probability did not change in crashes with vans, buses and school buses,
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and pedestrians relative to automobiles. An increase in temperature by 5o F decreased the
odds of hazmat release from trains by an amount between 0.7990 to 0.9863 times. Fog,
sleet and snow increased the odds of release by 1.3229 to 24.0584 times, relative to clear
weather. There was not enough statistical evidence toward the existence of any impacts
or association of any other variables on the release of hazmat from trains in HRGC
crashes.

Table 6.3 Results of Truck and Train Logistic Regression Models
Truck Model
Variable

c

Train Model

Estimated
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Odds
Ratios

Odds Ratios 90%
Confidence Interval
Upper
Level
NA

Estimated
Coefficient

Standard
Error

Odds
Ratios

-7.52731

1.44417

Odds Ratios 90%
Confidence Interval

(Intercept)

NA

0.1276

0.6314

NA

Lower
Level
NA

NA

Lower
Level
NA

Upper
Level
NA

TYPACC2

1

-1.5033

1.0194

0.2224

0.0409

1.0216

0.94787

0.66771

2.5802

0.8604

7.738

STANDARDFLS

1

-1.8406

0.7061

0.1587

0.0475

0.4716

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

CROSSBUCKS

1

-1.9297

0.6706

0.1452

0.0461

0.4065

—

PUBLIC

1

1.5747

0.7058

4.8294

1.6148

15.8892

—

—

—

—

—

TYPRR2

1

-2.6878

2.4092

0.0680

0.0013

0.9781

2.20836

1.17077

9.1008

1.3266

62.4336

TYPRR3

1

-1.8332

0.6919

0.1599

0.0496

0.4634

-0.84804

1.12983

0.4283

0.0668

2.7466

NA

NA

NA

NA

FREIGHT

1

1.7275

0.6682

5.6267

1.9958

17.4551

NA

OTHER

1

-1.2336

0.7053

0.2912

0.0907

0.8836

—

—

—

—

—

TYPVEH2

1

—

—

—

—

—

2.27244

1.07845

9.7031

1.6463

57.1876

TYPVEH3

1

—

—

—

—

—

2.32472

1.51188

10.2238

0.8503

122.9214

1.50243

10.1529

0.8577

120.1858

TYPVEH4
TYPVEH5

1
1

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA
NA

NA
NA

2.31776
2.73871

1.20683

15.467

2.1248

112.5912

TEMP

5

—

—

—

—

—

-0.02382

0.01281

0.8877

0.799

0.9863

WEATHER2

1

—

—

—

—

—

1.00773

0.68463

2.7394

0.8883

8.4473

WEATHER3

1

—

—

—

—

—

0.80258

1.16608

2.2313

0.3278

15.1896

WEATHER4

1

—

—

—

—

—

1.73017

0.88173

5.6416

1.3229

24.0584

DEVELTYPE2

1

—

—

—

—

—

-0.42363

1.22511

0.6547

0.0873

4.9111

DEVELTYPE3

1

—

—

—

—

—

0.42381

0.89897

1.5278

0.3482

6.7025

—
—

—
—

—
—

1.18478

0.84209

3.27

0.8185

13.0645

1.53165

0.97012

4.6258

0.9379

22.8138

DEVELTYPE4
1
—
—
DEVELTYPE5
1
—
—
—: Not Used in the final model, NA: Not Applicable
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6.6 Discussion and Conclusions
Standard flashing-light signals, railroad crossbucks and “other crossing control
devices” (as is in Table 6.1) were effective in reducing the probability of hazmat release
from trucks in truck-train HRGC crashes. The use of such control devices is
recommended at HRGCs with high hazmat-carrying truck traffic. Prioritization of safety
countermeasures implementation may be given to public HRGCs since hazmat release is
more probable at these locations relative to private crossings. Freight trains were
associated with higher probability of hazmat release from trucks. This finding is
reasonable as freight trains are usually longer and heavier relative to other (e.g.,
passenger) trains. HRGCs with more frequent passage of trains that belong to railroad
classes II and III, and less frequent passage of freight trains were safer for hazmatcarrying trucks. Routes that minimize the interaction between these trucks with class I
railroads and freight trains may be preferred and considered in the route selection of
hazmat-carrying trucks.
Hazmat-carrying class II railroads were more vulnerable in HRGC crashes
relative to class I railroads in terms of hazmat release. Extra train hazmat safety
consideration is recommended for hazmat carrying trains on routes with HRGCs that
carry high volumes of trucks, truck-trailers and pick-up trucks, and also motorcycle and
other vehicles (relative to automobiles). With the exception of motorcycles, different
types of trucks and other vehicles (e.g. recreational vehicles) are heavier than
automobiles on average, leading to potentially more severe collisions and higher
probability of hazmat release from trains. Since higher temperature and presence of fog,
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sleet and snow were associated with smaller and larger probability of hazmat release,
respectively, weather considerations are recommended in shipping of hazmat by rail and
may be used in relevant policy-making.
Both models may be used as a part of a risk assessment framework as explained
in section 1.3. The framework may include at least two steps: models that predict the
occurrence of crashes at HRGCs, based on variables such as highway and rail traffic, land
use, control devices, etc. (e.g. (Oh, Washington, and Nam 2006; Yan, Richards, and Su
2010)); and models, such as those estimated in this study, that predict the probability of
hazmat release from trucks, trains, or both, given the occurrence of a crash. The product
of these two probabilities can provide a hazmat risk measure for each HRGC, useful to
serve as a prioritization tool for countermeasure implementation or resource allocation.
As was mentioned in the literature review, a significant number of papers studied
injury severity of HRGC crashes and used this criterion to evaluate control devices and
other related factors at HRGCs. It was also mentioned that there was a lack of research on
hazmat release crashes reported at HRGCs. The question that may arise is whether the
factors that increase/decrease crash severity at HRGCs are consistent with the factors that
increase/decrease the probability of hazmat release (positive correlation between crash
severity and hazmat release). This consistency may question the importance of this study.
To investigate this possibility, Table 6.4 summarized the results of six studies regarding
crash severity at HRGC, and the results of this study for comparison. It should be noted
that, although some variables were defined differently in some studies, the final results
were consistently reported in this table.
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Table 6.4 Comparison of the Results of Six HRGC Crash Severity Studies with Hazmat
Release

Variables

TYPACC2
STANDARDFLS
CROSSBUCKS
PUBLIC
TYPRR2
TYPRR3
FREIGHT
OTHER
TYPVEH2
TYPVEH3
TYPVEH4
TYPVEH5
TEMP
WEATHER2
WEATHER3
WEATHER4
DEVELTYPE2
DEVELTYPE3
DEVELTYPE4
DEVELTYPE5
OFFPEAK
VEHSPD
VISIBLTY1
VISIBLTY3
VISIBLTY4
TRNSPD
DRIVAGE
NONPAVED
AADT
DRIVGEN
BELLS
GATES
HWYTRFICSIG
AUDIBLE
STOPSIGNS
NBRCARS

(Hao
and
Daniel
2013)

((Haleem
and Gan
2015)

—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
I
I
NA
I
—
I
I
I
D
D
D
D
D
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

I
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
D
D
NS
NS
—
NS
NS
D
NS
NS
D
NS
—
—
—
—
—
I
I
—
D
I
D
—
—
—
—
—

Crash Severity
(Shanshan
Zhao,
(Eluru
Iranitalab,
et al.
and
2012)
Khattak
2016)
I
I
NS
NS
D
NS
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
I
NS
—
NS
NA
D
NA
—
NA
—
NA
D
NS
NS
NS
D
I
D
I
—
NS
—
I
—
NS
—
NS
—
—
—
NA
—
—
—
—
—
—
I
I
I
I
—
—
—
NS
I
I
—
I
I
NS
NS
—
NS
—
I
—
—
—

Hazmat Release
(Y.
Kang
and
Khattak
2017)

(Shanshan
Zhao and
Khattak
2015)

Highway
User

Train

I
I
I
—
—
—
—
—
D
NS
—
I
—
I
NS
D
NS
NS
D
NS
—
I
NS
I
I
I
I
—
D
I
—
NS
NS
NS
D
I

I
—
—
—
—
—
I
—
D
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
I
NS
D
NS
I
I
—
—
I
—
—
—
—
—
—

NS
D
D
I
D
D
I
D
NS
NS
NA
NA
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
—
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
—
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This comparison shows that there were variables that affected crash severity in
different studies, almost consistently, but were not associated with hazmat release
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probability, such as type of crash, train speed, driver age and gender, vehicle speed and
some types of land-use. The effects of types of highway user, temperature and weather on
crash severity were inconsistent throughout the severity papers. While these variables
were not significant in hazmat release from trucks, some of them affected hazmat release
from trains, but not necessarily in the same way (direction) as in the crash severity. The
positive effects of standard flashing-light signals, railroad crossbucks and other control
devices on hazmat release from trucks were not observed in the majority of the crash
severity literature. Public/private HRGCs and type of railroad were not considered in the
reviewed crash severity studies, while they were associated with hazmat release. Freight
trains increased crash severity and the probability of hazmat release from trucks in
crashes at HRGCs. In general, with an exception of some cases, crash severity modeling
results were not consistent with hazmat release modeling outcomes, indicating that
policies and countermeasures based on crash severity studies may not be relevant to
decreasing hazmat release in crashes at HRGCs. Thus, this underscores the necessity of
investigating hazmat release in crashes at HRGCs.
Large proportion of missing values in potentially important variables in the
dataset and consequently, not using those variables in the model specifications was a
limitation in this research. These variables included details about HRGC control devices,
actions of highway users during crashes, sight obstructions, type of hazmat, roadway
conditions, etc. Similar to chapters 4 and 5, this unobserved heterogeneity and its likely
effects on the parameter estimates, conclusions and recommendations of this chapter
should be considered in using the models in practice. Examples of these possible effects
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include the counterintuitive results regarding the impacts of public/private HRGCs, or
HRGCs with crossbucks on hazmat release in this chapter.
For future studies, researchers may address the data issue by using datasets with
fewer missing values/variables. Other modeling methods can be utilized for analyzing
hazmat-related crashes at HRGCs that might lead to further insights. Short-term and
long-term costs and damages of hazmat release at HRGCs may be studied to prioritize
countermeasures and policies regarding public safety improvements at HRGCs.
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CHAPTER 7 PREDICTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASE IN TRAIN
INCIDENTS AND CARGO TANK TRUCK CRASHES
7.1 Introduction
Quantifying conditional probability of release of hazmat from trains in rail
incidents and CTTs in highway crashes assists safety agencies and shippers in decisionmaking, as this probability is an important component of hazmat transportation risk
(other components include probability of occurrence of an incident, and consequences of
hazmat release).
The objective of this chapter was providing computational tools with reliable
performance for quantifying probability of hazmat release in train incidents and CTT
crashes. Hazmat release was considered as a binary response variable (release or no
release), and statistical and machine learning classification methods were utilized to
probabilistically classify this binary outcome using explanatory variables. The
explanatory variables included incident/crash, railroad/roadway, environment, and
train/CTT characteristics. Some of the incident/crash characteristics were also outcomes
of the incident/crash, and separate tools were developed for their estimation to use in the
hazmat release models. The datasets were Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 2012March 2018 rail equipment incident data, and combined Nebraska and Kansas 2010-2017
police reported traffic crash data. Classification methods comprised of logistic regression,
naïve Bayes, random forests (RF), and support vector machines (SVM). The performance
assessment of the various methods utilized different criteria, leading to usage
recommendations for different purposes.
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7.2 Additional Literature Review
The additional literature review covers the use of methods of this chapter in the
transportation safety literature.
Injury severity of crashes is a multiclass categorical variable and statistical
models and machine learning techniques are intensively used for classification and
inference in this field. Examples of statistical models for analyzing injury severity are
logistic regression or multinomial regression (Abdel-Aty and Keller 2005; Abdel-Aty and
Abdelwahab 2004; Shaheed and Gkritza 2014; Shanshan Zhao and Khattak 2015; S.
Zhao, Iranitalab, and Khattak 2018), while examples of machine learning include SVM,
RF, and neural networks (Iranitalab and Khattak 2017; Li et al. 2012; Abdelwahab and
Abdel-Aty 2001). This review did not uncover the use of the majority of the methods
employed in this study for classification and probability estimation of hazmat release
from trains and CTTs.
7.3 Methods
In risk analysis of hazmat transportation, the ability to accurately estimate the
probability of hazmat release in rail incidents or CTT crashes is important. As was
discussed in section 1.3, in the context of hazmat transportation, risk has different
definitions. The majority of them include a form of a multiplication of the probability of
release from a hazmat carrier by a measure of consequences of release. Probability of
release is comprised of probability of occurrence of an incident/crash for a hazmat carrier
and the conditional probability of release given the incident/crash. Some studies have
investigated probability of occurrence of incidents/crashes for hazmat-carrying trains and
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trucks, e.g. (Anderson and Barkan 2004; Harwood, Viner, and Russell 1990). This
chapter focused on estimating probability of hazmat release given an incident/crash using
classification methods for trains and CTTs. The binary variable hazmat release given an
incident/crash (yes/no) was the response variable and the explanatory variables included
incident, railroad, environment, and train characteristics in train incidents and crash,
trucks, roadway, environment, and driver characteristics for the CTT crashes.
Similar to chapter 4, this chapter classified hazmat release for trains at two levels:
train and car. In the train-level classification each row of data was a hazmat-carrying train
involved in an incident, while in the car-level classification each row was a hazmatcarrying car on a train involved in an incident. The predicted quantity in the train-level
and car-level approaches were probability of release from trains and cars, respectively.
The explanatory variables at each level changed accordingly as in chapter 4. The number
of cars derailed/damaged in each incident was used in calculation of some of the trainlevel explanatory variables. Since this variable was also an outcome of the train incidents,
predicting its values was necessary to use in the hazmat release classification. Therefore,
tools for this prediction were also developed in this study and number of
derailed/damaged cars was the count response variable.
Classification of hazmat release for CTTs was a similar procedure. Each row of
data was a hazmat-carrying CTT involved in a crash. One of the explanatory variables
that was also an outcome of the crash was rollover; a binary variable that indicated if the
CTT rolled over in the crash. A similar set of explanatory variables were used for
classifying CTT crashes to rollover/no rollover for use in the hazmat release
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classification. In the rollover classification, data comprised of the CTT crashes regardless
of what the CTT has been carrying, hazmat or non-hazmat (since the probability of
rollover was under study).
In summary, this study involved four classifications and estimation of a count
regression model. The classifications include train-level and car-level classification of
hazmat release, rollover and hazmat release classification of CTTs, and the count
regression pertained to the number of derailed/damaged cars per train incident. The
classifiers and the regressors were developed based on a training dataset and compared
using a test dataset. The classification and regression methods and the performance
evaluation tools were introduced in chapter 3.
7.4 Datasets
Rail incidents and CTT crashes were the two datasets used in this study. This
section introduces the datasets, along with their variables and statistics.
7.4.1 Rail Dataset
Railroad reported incidents including derailments, collisions, crossing incidents
and other incidents involving a hazmat-carrying train were extracted from the January
2012-March 2018 U.S. rail equipment incident database (Federal Railroad
Adminsitration Office of Safety Analysis 2017), with 2012-2016 subset as the training
dataset and January 2017-March 2018 as the test dataset. The training dataset consisted of
2581 incidents, 2787 trains, and 39162 hazmat cars and the test dataset had 579 incidents,
615 trains and 8318 hazmat cars. Car-level data was generated based on the original
train-level data using information on number of hazmat-carrying cars, and number of cars
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that released hazmat. Weight of hazmat cars were approximated by dividing the gross
weight of trains (excluding the power units) by the number of cars in each train. Table 7.1
and Table 7.2 present the variables and their statistics of the train-level and car-level data,
respectively. Similar to chapter 4, track classes 1 and X were aggregated in one level for
the track class variable, as they represented the same maximum speed for freight trains
(10 mph). Track classes 5 to 9 were aggregated into one level as they were infrequent in
the data.
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for the Train-Level Incident Data
Variable
Response Variables
Hazmat Release
Number of
Derailed/Damaged
Cars
Explanatory Variables
Incident
Characteristics
Type of incident
Proportion of
damaged/derailed
hazmat cars to all
hazmat cars
Locomotive(s)
derailed
Proportion of
damaged/derailed cars
to all cars
Cause of incident
Railroad
Characteristics
Type of railroad
(Interstate Commerce
Commission)
Method of operation

Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %)
0 = No (96.73%, 97.07%), 1 = Yes (3.26%, 2.93%)
Training: Mean = 1.27, SD = 1.66, Test: 1.21, SD = 1.61

1 = Derailment (62.68%, 62.76%), 2 = Collision (12.77%, 9.11%), 3 =
Crossing (8.50%, 9.43%), 4 = Others (16.04%, 18.70%)
Training: Mean = 0.2504, SD = 0.3924, Test: Mean = 0.2550, SD = 0.3928

0 = No (91.96%, 93.66%), 1 = Yes (8.04%, 6.34%)
Training: Mean = 0.0989, SD = 0.1820, Test: Mean = 0.1079, SD = 0.1987
E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures (12.16%, 13.50%), H = Human Factors
(39.25%, 38.37%), M = Miscellaneous (20.99%, 20.33%), S= Signal and
Communication (3.01%, 3.90%), T= Track, Roadbed and Structures (24.58%,
23.90%)

1 = Class I (83.05%, 85.04%), 2 = Class II (0.90%, 0.33%), 3 = Class III
(16.05%, 14.63%)
1 = Signal indication (24.26%, 28.94%), 2 = Direct train control (6.71%,
6.99%), 3 = Yard/restricted limits (2.08%, 2.44%), 4 = Block register territory
(0.47%, 0.00%), 5 = Other than main track rules (66.49%, 61.63%)
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Track class
Type of track
Environmental
Characteristics
Temperature

1 = Classes 1 and X (67.60%, 61.95%), 2 = Class 2 (7.61%, 8.29%), 3 = Class
3 (6.71%, 7.80%), 4 = Class 4 (14.46%, 17.40%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (3.62%,
4.55%)
1 = Main (32.44%, 37.40%), 2 = Yard (59.78%, 53.01%), 3 = Siding (2.37%,
2.60%), 4 = Industry (5.42%, 6.99%)

Training: Mean = 58.62, SD = 22.28, Test: Mean = 56.58, SD = 23.10

Visibility

1 = Dawn (7.86%, 7.48%), 2 = Day (42.59%, 41.95%), 3 = Dusk (7.39%,
8.13%), 4 = Dark (42.16%, 42.44%)

Weather

1 = Clear (66.49%, 65.37%), 2 = Cloudy (22.53%, 25.53%), 3 = Rain (7.14%,
6.83%), 4 = Fog (1.15%, 0.98%), 5 = Sleet (0.25%, 0.33%), 6 = Snow (2.44%,
0.98%)

Train Characteristics
Train speed (mph)
Training: Mean = 12.37, SD = 14.54, Test: Mean = 12.88, SD = 15.26
Train gross tonnage
Training: Mean = 4404, SD = 4667.70, Test: Mean = 5111.04, SD = 4742.96
(ton)
Proportion of hazmat
tank-cars to all tankTraining: Mean = 0.2947, SD = 0.3095, Test: Mean = 0.2761, SD = 0.3038
cars
Remote control
0 = No (80.19%, 85.04%), 1 = Yes (19.81%, 14.96%)
locomotive
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety
Analysis 2017))

Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Train Car-Level Incident Data
Variable
Response Variable
Hazmat Release
Explanatory Variables
Incident
Characteristics

Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %)
0 = No (99.38%, 99.46%), 1 = Yes (0.62%, 0.54%)

Type of Incident

1 = Derailment (67.46%, 65.66%), 2 = Collision (11.89%, 9.59%), 3 =
Crossing (10.14%, 9.37%), 4 = Others (10.51%, 15.38%)

Locomotive(s)
derailed

0 = No (89.93%, 90.53%), 1 = Yes (10.07%, 9.47%)

Cause of incident

E = Mechanical and Electrical Failures (14.38%, 17.25%), H = Human Factors
(35.03%, 34.70%), M = Miscellaneous (20.01%, 21.78%), S= Signal and
Communication (1.65%, 1.60%), T= Track, Roadbed and Structures (28.93%,
24.67%)

Railroad
Characteristics
Method of operation

1 = Signal indication (32.67%, 40.19%), 2 = Direct train control (8.25%,
9.99%), 3 = Yard/restricted limits (2.75%, 2.55%), 4 = Block register territory
(0.60%, 0.00%), 5 = Other than main track rules (55.72%, 47.27%)

Track class

1 = Classes 1 and X (57.83%, 48.86%), 2 = Class 2 (9.75%, 9.44%), 3 = Class
3 (10.03%, 13.18%), 4 = Class 4 (20.18%, 23.61%), 5 = Classes 5 to 9 (2.21%,
4.92%)
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Type of track
Environmental
Characteristics
Temperature
Visibility
Weather

1 = Main (43.11%, 51.02%), 2 = Yard (48.92%, 39.87%), 3 = Siding (2.80%,
3.77%), 4 = Industry (5.17%, 5.34%)

Training: Mean = 57.30, SD = 22.57, Test: Mean = 54.01, SD = 24.49
1 = Dawn (8.15%, 65.69%), 2 = Day (43.68%, 22.93%), 3 = Dusk (6.81%,
9.91%), 4 = Dark (41.37%, 42.25%)
1 = Clear (65.81%, 63.69%), 2 = Cloudy (22.60%, 22.93%), 3 = Rain (6.84%,
9.91%), 4 = Fog (2.06%, 0.72%), 5 = Sleet (0.25%, 0.04%), 6 = Snow (2.45%,
2.72%)

Train/Car
Characteristics
Train speed (mph)
Training: Mean = 13.89, SD = 14.61, Test: Mean = 14.47, SD = 15.06
Tank car tonnage (ton) Training: Mean = 77.30, SD = 73.19, Test: Mean = 80.75, SD = 43.29
Remote control
0 = No (88.37%, 91.67%), 1 = Yes (11.63%, 8.33%)
locomotive
(Note: Data obtained from the FRA safety database (Federal Railroad Adminsitration Office of Safety
Analysis 2017))

7.4.2 CTT Dataset
For the CTT classification, 2010-2017 police-reported crash data from the states
of Nebraska and Kansas were combined (obtained from Nebraska and Kansas
Departments of Transportation), with 2010-2016 as the training dataset and 2017 as the
test dataset. Crashes with the involvement of CTTs were extracted from the combined
dataset. This resulted in 2015 crashes with a CTT involved and 546 crashes with a
hazmat-carrying CTT involved in the training data. These numbers were 183 and 32 in
the test data. Trainings for truck rollover used all the CTT-involved crashes (carrying
hazmat or not), while training for hazmat release used a subset of the data with hazmatcarrying trucks only. The variables and their statistics are presented in Table 7.3 for all
CTT crashes and Table 7.4 for hazmat-carrying CTT crashes.
Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics for the CTT Crash Data
Variable

Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %)

Response Variable
Rollover

1 = No (84.57%, 93.44%), 2 = Yes (15.43%, 6.56%)
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Explanatory Variables
Crash Characteristics
Vehicle Point of
Impact

1 = None (3.08%, 4.37%), 2 = Center front (17.07%, 17.49%), 3 = Center rear
(6.75%, 7.10%), 4 = Left front (10.87%, 12.57%), 5 = Left rear (5.66%,
9.84%), 6 = Left side (11.76%, 8.74%), 7 = Right front (14.29%, 8.20%), 8 =
Right rear (5.26%, 10.93%), 9 = Right side (13.00%, 12.57%), 10 = All areas
(0.99%, 1.64%), 11 = Other (11.27%, 6.56%)

Type of Crash

1 = Collision (86.60%, 92.35%), 2 = Non-collision (13.40%, 7.65%)

Object Involved

1 = No (81.24%, 83.06%), 2 = Yes (18.76%, 16.94%)
1 = Straight (61.04%, 59.02%), 2 = Turning left (8.24%, 9.29%), 3 = Turning
right (7.44%, 6.01%), 4 = Changing lanes (2.73%, 4.92%), 5 =
Slowing/stopped in traffic (7.49%, 9.29%), 6 = Backing (2.68%, 2.73%), 7 =
Other (10.37%, 8.74%)

Vehicle Movement

CTT Characteristics
Vehicle Body Style

1 = Single-unit (20.89%, 14.75%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (71.71%,
75.41%), 3 = Tractor with doubles/triples (0.84%, 1.63%), 4 = Truck tractor
(0.30%, 2.19%), 5 = Truck with trailer (6.25%, 6.01%)

Vehicle Make

1 = Freightliner (22.63%, 25.14%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (10.87%, 8.20%), 3
= Kenworth (19.90%, 15.30%), 4 = Mack (5.16%, 1.64%), 5 = Peterbilt
(14.39%, 28.42%), 6 = Other (27.05%, 21.31%)

Vehicle Age
Gross Vehicle Weight

Training: Mean = 7.55, SD = 6.62, Test: Mean = 7.59, SD = 7.49
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.63%, 3.83%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (9.33%,
19.13%), 3 = More than 26,000 lbs. (88.04%, 77.05%)

Roadway
Characteristics
Speed Limit

Training: Mean = 53.73, SD = 15.05, Test: Mean = 50.00, SD = 17.68

Number of Lanes

1 = One (4.27%, 3.28%), 2 = Two (61.89%, 55.74%), 3 = Three (3.57%,
6.56%), 4 = Four or more (30.27%, 34.43%)

Road Surface Type

1 = Asphalt (55.78%, 46.45%), 2 = Concrete (35.38%, 48.63%), 3 = Dirt
(1.84%, 0.00%), 4 = Gravel (6.50%3.28%), 5 = Other (0.50%, 1.64%)

Road Surface
Condition

1 = Dry (82.03%, 75.41%), 2 = Ice (3.03%, 8.20%), 3 = Sand/mud (0.99%,
0.00%), 4 = Slush (0.15%, 0.00%), 5 = Snow (3.42%, 3.82%), 6 = Wet
(9.23%, 11.48%), 7 = Other (1.14%, 1.09%)

Road Curvature

1 = Level (77.52%, 85.24%), 2 = Hilltop (1.89%, 1.64%), 3 = Slope (20.60%,
13.12%)
1 = Straight (89.53%, 88.52%), 2 = Curved (10.47%, 11.48%)

Intersection Involved

1 = No (59.85%, 52.46%), 2 = Yes (40.15%, 47.54%)

Railroad Involved

1 = No (98.96%, 98.91%), 2 = Yes (1.04%, 1.09%)

In Workzone

1 = No (95.43%, 93.44%), 2 = Yes (4.57%, 6.56%)

Driver Characteristics
Driver's Sex

1 = Male (98.06%, 97.27%), 2 = Female (1.94%, 2.73%)

Driver's Age

Training: Mean = 47.55, SD = 12.94, Test: Mean = 47.81, SD = 13.17

Alcohol Related

1 = No (98.51%, 99.45%), 2 = Yes (1.49%, 0.55%)

Road Level
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Environmental
Characteristics
Weather Conditions

1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.15%, 85.25%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow
(1.34%, 2.73%), 3 = Fog, smog, smoke (1.49%, 1.09%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/…
(0.10%, 8.74%), 5 = Severe crosswinds (6.80%, 0.00%), 6 = Snow (1.09%,
2.19%), 7 = Other (3.03%, 0.00%)

Light Conditions

1 = Daylight (73.50%, 78.14%), 2 = Dark (21.49%, 18.03%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk
(5.01%, 3.83%)

(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation)

Table 7.4 Descriptive Statistics for the Hazmat-Carrying CTT Crash Data
Variable

Values and Statistics (training dataset %, test dataset %)

Response Variable
Hazmat Release

1 = No (87.00%, 87.50%), 2 = Yes (13.00%, 12.50%)

Explanatory Variables
Crash Characteristics
Vehicle Point of
Impact

1 = None (3.48%, 3.13%), 2 = Center front (17.58%, 15.63%), 3 = Center rear
(6.78%, 9.38%), 4 = Left front (10.07%, 9.38%), 5 = Left rear (5.68%, 12.5%),
6 = Left side (12.27%, 12.5%), 7 = Right front (13.37%, 9.38%), 8 = Right
rear (4.03%, 9.38%), 9 = Right side (14.10%, 15.63%), 10 = All areas (0.37%,
0.00%), 11 = Other (12.27%, 3.13%)

Type of Crash

1 = Collision (86.08%, 90.63%), 2 = Non-collision (13.92%, 9.38%)

Object Involved

1 = No (85.35%, 90.63%), 2 = Yes (14.65%, 9.38%)
1 = Straight (62.09%, 62.50%), 2 = Turning left (7.14%, 6.25%), 3 = Turning
right (7.14%, 3.13%), 4 = Changing lanes (1.83%, 0.00%), 5 =
Slowing/stopped in traffic (8.06%, 12.50%), 6 = Backing (1.47%, 3.13%), 7 =
Other (12.27%, 12.50%)
1 = No (84.57%, 90.63%), 2 = Yes (15.43%, 9.38%)

Vehicle Movement
Rollover
CTT Characteristics
Vehicle Body Style

Vehicle Make
Vehicle Age
Gross Vehicle Weight

1 = Single-unit (21.25%, 15.63%), 2 = Tractor & semi-trailer (69.41%,
68.75%), 3 = Tractor with doubles/triples (1.47%, 0.00%), 4 = Truck tractor
(0.37%, 9.38%), 5 = Truck with trailer (7.51%, 6.25%)
1 = Freightliner (22.63%, 28.13%), 2 = Internat. Harvester (11.36%, 6.25%), 3
= Kenworth (24.73%, 15.63%), 4 = Mack (4.21%, 0.00%), 5 = Peterbilt
(28.21%, 37.50%), 6 = Other (11.17%, 12.50%)
Training: Mean = 6.30, SD = 5.30, Test: Mean = 5.44, SD = 6.12
1 = 10,000 lbs. or less (2.01%, 3.13%), 2 = 10,001 to 26,000 lbs. (5.13%,
6.25%), 3 = More than 26,000 lbs. (92.86%, 90.63%)

Roadway
Characteristics
Speed Limit

Training: Mean = 54.86, SD = 14.46, Test: Mean = 50.31, SD = 17.27
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Number of Lanes

1 = One (3.85%, 6.25%), 2 = Two (60.26%, 46.88%), 3 = Three (3.85%,
12.50%), 4 = Four or more (32.05%, 46.88%)

Road Surface Type

1 = Asphalt (56.04%, 50.00%), 2 = Concrete (34.98%, 50.00%), 3 = Dirt
(1.83%, 0.00%), 4 = Gravel (6.41%, 0.00%), 5 = Other (0.73%, 0.00%)

Road Curvature

1 = Dry (81.32%, 90.63%), 2 = Ice (4.40%, 3.13%), 3 = Sand/mud (1.28%,
0.00%), 4 = Slush (0.18%, 0.00%), 5 = Snow (4.40%, 0.00%), 6 = Wet
(7.88%, 6.25%), 7 = Other (0.55%, 0.00%)
1 = Level (76.37%, 84.38%), 2 = Hilltop (1.47%, 3.13%), 3 = Slope (22.16%,
12.50%)
1 = Straight (89.19%, 96.88%), 2 = Curved (10.81%, 3.13%)

Intersection Involved

1 = No (63.19%, 50.00%), 2 = Yes (36.81%, 50.00%)

Railroad Involved

1 = No (98.53%, 93.75%), 2 = Yes (1.47%, 6.25%)

In Workzone

1 = No (95.97%, 100.00%), 2 = Yes (4.03%, 0.00%)

Road Surface
Condition
Road Level

Driver Characteristics
Driver's Sex

1 = Male (98.90%, 100.00%), 2 = Female (1.10%, 0.00%)

Driver's Age

Training: Mean = 48.76, SD = 11.92, Test: 47.94, SD = 10.68

Alcohol Related
Environmental
Characteristics

1 = No (98.35%, 96.88%), 2 = Yes (1.65%, 3.13%)

Weather Conditions

1 = Clear/Cloudy (86.81%, 90.63%), 2 = Blowing sand, soil, dirt, snow
(1.10%, 0.00%), 3 = Fog, smog, smoke (0.73%, 0.00%), 4 = Rain/Sleet/…
(6.59%, 9.38%), 5 = Severe crosswinds (0.92%, 0.00%), 6 = Snow (3.85%,
0.00%), 7 = Other (0.00%, 0.00%)

Light Conditions

1 = Daylight (72.89%, 68.75%), 2 = Dark (22.89%, 28.13%), 3 = Dawn/Dusk
(4.21%, 3.125%)

(Note: Data obtained from Nebraska and Kansas Departments of Transportation)

7.5 Results
This section presents the results of the train (train-level and car-level) and CTT
conditional hazmat release classification, along with CTT rollover classification and
prediction of number of cars damaged or derailed in train incidents. While logistic
regression, mixed logistic regression, naïve Bayes and Poisson regression do not have
hyperparameters to tune, RF and SVM do require it. Also, since RF was trained using the
under-sampling technique, cutoff probability was not adjusted (and the default 50% was
used for classification). However, for other methods ROC curves were developed and
new cutoff probabilities were adjusted. Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 present the adjusted
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cutoff probabilities, and the classification and prediction results for train and CTT,
respectively. Figure 7.1 shows the ROC curves for all classification methods with
adjusted cutoff probabilities.
The hyperparameters of RF (v, t and n) were tuned using grid search and out-ofbag cross validation. In other words, a range of values for these three hyperparameter
were considered based on literature, and RFs were trained using all possible
combinations of these values on the training set. Best out-of-bag performances (based on
precision, recall, F1 Score and AUC) resulted in the best trained RFs (in cross validation
and final training, each RF was run 15 times and the average of the outcomes was used
for comparison, due to randomness in the structure of RF). The values used in grid search
were 𝑣 = 1,2, … , 𝑝, 𝑡 = 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, and 𝑛 = 1, 10, 20, 50, 100,
where p is the number of explanatory variables. Similarly, SVM’s hyperparameters (𝛾
and c) were tuned using grid search and 5-fold cross validation. The grid search values
included 𝛾 = 2−15 , 2−13 , … , 212 , 214 , and 𝑐 = 2−15 , 2−13 , … , 212 , 214 . While different
criteria yielded one single set of hyperparameters for SVM as the best performance in all
cases, three different sets of hyperparameters were identified for RF in classification. So,
three RFs are reported in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6.
The results showed the three RFs had the best performance in train-level hazmat
release classification, based on different criteria. Two of RFs for car-level hazmat release
classification had the best performance, as well, while the mixed logistic regression
model had the best precision. According to RMSE, RF had the best prediction
performance for number of cars damaged or derailed, while the Poisson regression had
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better TCE. In classification of CTT rollovers, naïve Bayes had the highest precision and
F1 score, one of the RFs had the best recall, and logistic regression had the highest AUC.
SVM and one of the RFs had the highest precision and F1 score for CTT hazmat release
classification, while logistic regression and naïve Bayes performed better based on recall.
Naïve Bayes had the highest AUC.

Table 7.5 Results of Train and Car-Level Hazmat Release Classification and Number of Damaged/Derailed Cars Prediction

Method

Parameters
TrainLevel

Cutoff
Release
0
1
Precision
Recall
𝐅𝟏 Score
AUC
Method

Parameters
Car-Level

Cutoff
Release
0
1
Precision
Recall
𝐅𝟏 Score
AUC

Number of
Cars
Damaged
or
Derailed

Method

Parameters
RMSE
TCE

Logistic Regression

0.05
0
1
84.25%
15.75%
50.00%
50.00%
8.74%
50.00%
14.88%
71.73%

RF 1

RF 2

RF 3

𝑣 = 16, 𝑡 = 1000,
𝑛 = 100
0.5
0
1
56.06%
43.94%
0.00%
100.00%
6.42%
100.00%
12.07%
86.53%

𝑣 = 2, 𝑡 = 500,
𝑛=1
0.5
0
1
91.45%
8.55%
41.11%
58.89%
17.19%
58.89%
26.61%
84.20%

𝑣 = 5, 𝑡 = 1000,
𝑛 = 10
0.5
0
1
87.31%
12.69%
35.56%
64.44%
13.28%
64.44%
22.03%
87.45%

0.05
0
1
67.67%
32.33%
38.89%
61.11%
5.39%
61.11%
9.91%
72.59%

0
1
85.93%
14.07%
38.89%
61.11%
11.58%
61.11%
19.47%
83.72%

RF 1

RF 2

RF 3

Naïve Bayes

SVM

𝑣 = 1, 𝑡 = 500,
𝑛=1
0.5
0
1
84.29%
15.71%
21.15%
78.85%
2.65%
78.52%
5.12%
82.96%

𝑣 = 3, 𝑡 = 50,
𝑛=1
0.5
0
1
92.35%
7.65%
32.44%
67.56%
4.59%
67.56%
8.59%
83.20%

𝑣 = 3, 𝑡 = 1000,
𝑛=1
0.5
0
1
92.61%
7.39%
31.11%
68.89%
4.83%
68.89%
9.02%
83.03%

Mixed Logistic
Regression
0.01
0
1
93.82%
6.18%
42.22%
57.78%
4.84%
57.78%
8.93%
80.30%

Naïve Bayes

SVM
𝛾 = 2−15
𝑐 = 214
0.04

-

𝛾 = 2−2
𝑐 = 210
0.01

0.05
0
1
76.80%
23.20%
24.44%
75.56%
1.74%
75.56%
3.40%
80.53%

0
1
82.81%
17.19%
37.78%
62.22%
1.93%
62.22%
3.75%
73.15%

Poisson Regression

RF

SVM

-

𝑣 = 2, 𝑡 = 1000, 𝑛 = 1

𝛾 = 20 , 𝑐 = 214

2.6313
1.73%

2.4825
6.74%

2.9117
9.47%

Table 7.6 Results of the CTT Hazmat Release and Rollover Classification

Method

Parameters
Rollover

Cutoff
Rollover
0
1
Precision
Recall
𝐅𝟏 Score
AUC
Method

Parameters
Hazmat
Release

Cutoff
Release
0
1
Precision
Recall
𝐅𝟏 Score
AUC

Logistic
Regression

0.1
0
1
86.55% 13.45%
16.67% 83.33%
30.30%
83.33%
44.44%
92.69%
Logistic
Regression

0.1
0
1
64.29% 35.71%
25.00% 75.00%
23.08%
75.00%
35.29%
62.50%

RF 1

RF 2

RF 3

𝑣 = 21
𝑡 = 1000
𝑛 = 100
0.5
0
1
81.68% 18.32%
8.33% 91.67%
25.98%
91.67%
40.49%
89.58%

𝑣=3
𝑡 = 500
𝑛=1
0.5
0
1
93.14% 6.86%
32.04% 67.96%
41.14%
67.96%
51.25%
89.98%

𝑣=8
𝑡 = 1000
𝑛 = 10
0.5
0
1
91.70% 8.30%
23.33% 76.67%
39.32%
76.67%
51.98%
90.62%

RF 1

RF 2

RF 3

𝑣 = 23
𝑡 = 100
𝑛 = 50
0.5

𝑣 = 16
𝑡 = 500
𝑛 = 100
0.5

𝑣=4
𝑡 = 500
𝑛 = 10
0.5

0
1
67.86% 32.14%
28.33% 71.67%
24.16%
71.67%
36.13%
75.60%

0
1
96.43% 3.57%
50.00% 50.00%
66.67%
50.00%
57.14%
69.88%

0
1
76.72% 23.28%
50.00% 50.00%
23.44%
50.00%
31.91%
73.07%

Naïve Bayes

SVM

-

𝛾 = 2−8
𝑐 = 20

0.5
0
1
97.08% 2.92%
33.33% 66.67%
61.54%
66.67%
64.00%
88.79%

0.5
0
1
96.49% 3.51%
33.33% 66.67%
57.14%
66.67%
61.54%
91.33%

Naïve Bayes

SVM

-

𝛾 = 2−2
𝑐 = 2−4

0.1
0
1
85.71% 14.29%
25.00% 75.00%
42.86%
75.00%
54.55%
80.36%

0.5
0
1
96.43% 3.57%
50.00% 50.00%
66.67%
50.00%
57.14%
62.50%

Figure 7.1 ROC curves for the classification methods with cutoff probability adjustment.
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7.6 Discussion and Conclusions
The main use of estimating conditional probability of hazmat release from trains
and CTTs is in risk assessment. Risk assessment combined with economic analyses may
be used for cost-sensitive decision-making. The type of the decision-making problem
affects the choice of the criteria for comparison of the methods, and consequently the
choice of the classification method. In other words, the benefits and costs of correctly
classifying a hazmat release or misclassifying non-release cases as release depends on the
objectives of the analysis. In train-level classification, for example, based on all criteria,
RF is preferred. Among different settings for RF, the choice of method depends on the
usage. RF1 is preferred if the cost of misclassifying non-release cases as release is not
high, and RF2 is preferred, otherwise. RF3 is the best choice if these costs are not easy to
estimate or have too many fluctuations. Similar type of analysis for car-level and CTTs
should be considered.
Selection of explanatory variables in this study was based on the reviewed
literature, availability in the data, and avoidance of variables with missing values. In
practice, variable selection may depend on other factors, as well. For example, a railroad
company may have access to more detailed information about characteristics of the
trains, cars, and operations. The use of these variables may affect the performance of the
methods presented herein. Also, the purpose of classification and the stage of
classification affects the availability of variables. Some explanatory variables may be
outcomes of the incident/crash, and independent of all the other explanatory variables.
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Such information may be unavailable and very hard to estimate, e.g. point of impact in a
CTT crash.
The classification methods classify outcomes of the incidents/crashes based on the
probabilities they calculate for each class. In case of hazmat risk assessment, it is
important to estimate these probabilities accurately. However, many classifiers are unable
to produce accurate probability estimates and their initial estimates need to be calibrated
(Zhong and Kwok 2013; Niculescu-Mizil and Caruana 2005). Some of the most popular
calibration methods are Platt scaling (Platt and others 1999) and isotonic regression
(Zadrozny and Elkan 2001, 2002). Among the classification methods of this study,
logistic regression’s estimated probabilities are automatically calibrated, but RF, naïve
Bayes and SVM need further calibration by the above methods, before using in risk
assessment. Since RF used under-sampling, alternative calibration methods such as (Dal
Pozzolo et al. 2015) can be utilized.
The major limitations of this chapter were related to the datasets. The FRA rail
incidents dataset does not include car characteristics. Availability of such information
may improve the classification performance of the car-level classification. The CTT crash
data was limited only to two Midwestern states, which may make the results less
comprehensive and generalizable (a national police-reported crash data is not available).
Also, there were some missing variables in the CTT data that could potentially affect
probabilities of rollover and hazmat release, e.g. detailed driver and CTT characteristics,
crash speed, type and amount of loaded hazmat, etc. For future studies, using other
incident/crash dataset may address such limitation. Other classifiers and regressors may
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be applied to the hazmat release problem and the results can compare to this study.
Classification methods of this study can be implemented to the other components of
hazmat risk, such as incident/crash frequency and release consequences in the future
studies.
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CHAPTER 8 MODELING OF FREQUENCY AND AGGREGATE MEASURES OF
SEVERITY OF U.S. RAIL-BASED CRUDE OIL RELEASE INCIDENTS
8.1 Introduction
Production of crude oil has significantly increased in the U.S. over the past
decade and trains transport a large portion of this crude oil to the refineries (26% in 2016
and 12% in 2016). Between 2008 and 2014, the number of annual train carloads of crude
oil increased by about 5100%. Despite a modest reduction in crude oil carloads after
2015 due to changes in the U.S. pipeline capacity and international crude oil market,
more than 200,000 carloads of crude oil were moved by rail in 2016 (Association of
American Railroads 2017). This constitutes approximately one-fifth of the total hazmat
moved by trains in that year in the U.S. (Bing et al. 2015). The transportation of large
quantities of crude oil by trains potentially exposes people living near railways and the
proximate environment to the ill effects of hazmat in cases of release incidents. The
objective of this chapter is to estimate statistical models that can identify and quantify the
effects of volumes and distances of rail-based crude oil transport and other macroscopiclevel variables on the frequency and severity of crude oil release incidents. These models
may enable decision- and policy-makers to work towards better preparation for dealing
with such incidents, decreasing crude oil release costs, and predict these costs for future.
In this chapter, four OD-based statistical models were estimated for rail-based
crude oil release incidents in the U.S.: one model for frequency and three models for
measures of aggregate severity (number of released tank cars, quantity released, and total
costs). State-to-state volume of crude oil movement (as a measure of exposure), transport
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distance, availability of other modes of transportation and number of competing class I
railroad companies served as explanatory variables in the models. This chapter utilized
the 2007-2016 Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) railbased crude oil release data. Since the state-to-state volume of crude oil movement is not
available, a Linear Program (LP) was formulated to approximate these volumes of crude
oil movement based on Energy Information Administration (EIA) higher-level
production-consumption data (EIA divides the U.S. into 5 districts and reports the crude
oil movement among these 5 districts). The estimated models quantified the effects of
explanatory variables on frequency and aggregate measures of severity of crude oil
release, along with providing a tool for predicting these safety measures for future.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 provides an
additional literature review, section 3 introduces the methods used in this chapter, section
4 presents all the datasets that were combined and used in the modeling, section 5 reports
the modeling results, and conclusions and discussion in section 5 complete this chapter.
8.2 Additional Literature Review
The additional reviewed literature focused on transportation of crude oil, and
macroscopic-level analysis of traffic crashes.
8.2.1 Crude Oil Transportation
Exclusive studies on surface transportation of crude oil received more attention in
the early 2010’s following the crude oil boom in the U.S. Oke et al. presented a mediumterm market equilibrium model of the North American crude oil sector to evaluate
different strategies, such as restricting rail loads, increasing pipeline capacity, and lifting
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U.S. crude oil export ban, for mitigating the environmental and public-safety risk due to
crude oil transportation by rail (Oke et al. 2016). Liu proposed a method for risk
management of crude oil rail transportation that accounted for track segment specific
characteristics, train-specific characteristics, and population density along each segment
(Liu 2016). Liu and Dick estimated unit-train crude oil transportation risk by frequency
of location-specific rail defect inspection through an optimization framework (Liu and
Dick 2016). Yazdi and Bagheri compared the risk of transportation of crude oil by
pipelines, trains and trucks, through a case study and found pipelines as the safest mode
(Yazdi and Bagheri 2017). Other studies focused on chemical characteristics of different
types of crude oil, regarding their effects on transportation risk (David Lord et al. 2015;
Andrews 2014).
8.2.2 Macroscopic-Level Accident Analysis
A common macroscopic-level accident analysis in the transportation safety
literature is crash frequency modeling (Mannering and Bhat 2014). These studies frame
analytic approaches to identify factors that affect the number of crashes occurring in a
geographical unit (e.g. a roadway segment, an intersection or a census tract) over a
specified time period (Dominique Lord and Mannering 2010). The models use different
explanatory variables, including land-use, demographic, employment, roadway, and
environmental characteristics (Hadayeghi, Shalaby, and Persaud 2010, 2003; Park and
Lord 2007). Modeling techniques utilized to account for different aspects of accident data
included models such as Poisson regression, negative binomial regression, duration,
multivariate, mixed effects, spatial/temporal correlation, and non-parametric (Mannering
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and Bhat 2014; Dominique Lord and Mannering 2010). Several studies focused on
modeling truck accident frequency (Miaou et al. 1992; Harwood, Viner, and Russell
1990, 1993; Joshua and Garber 1990), and some investigated train accident frequency for
different type of accidents, especially derailments (Anderson and Barkan 2004; Liu,
Rapik Saat, and Barkan 2017).
8.2.3 Summary
The additional literature review revealed the relatively recent crude oil
transportation literature focused on risk assessment, market equilibrium, mode choice,
and chemical aspects of crude oil. Despite the availability of macroscopic-level studies of
traffic accidents, this review did not find any studies focused on modeling hazmat
incident frequency or other aggregate measures for hazmat-related incidents. As well, this
review did not uncover the use of OD-based accident frequency models in published
literature.
8.3 Methods
The explanatory variables in this chapter comprised of state-to-state volume of
crude oil shipment (as a measure of exposure), distance of shipment, availability of other
modes of transportation, and the number of class I railroads competing for market. This
chapter used Mixed-effects Negative Binomial Regression (MNBR) for modeling
frequency and number of tank cars that released crude oil, and Mixed-effects Ordered
Logit Models (MOLM) for modeling categorized quantity of release and total costs (the
reason for categorization of these continuous variables is mentioned in the data and
variables section). As a state-level crude oil movement data was not available to use as an
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exposure measure in the models, an LP was formulated for approximating the volumes of
state-to-state crude oil movement volumes.
The EIA reports the movement of crude oil in the U.S. based on Petroleum
Administration for Defense Districts (PADDs), which are geographic aggregations of the
50 states and the District of Columbia into five districts. Figure 8.1 presents a map of
these districts. Based on the available information regarding annual state production of
crude oil, annual state capacity of petroleum refineries, state-to-state transportation
distance, unit-price of crude oil transportation for different modes (rail, pipeline and
water), and the PADD-to-PADD movement of crude oil by transportation mode
information, an LP was formulated to approximate annual state-to-state volume of crude
oil movement. In other words, the LP disaggregates the PADD-to-PADD crude oil
movement data to the state-to-state level based on the above additional information.
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Figure 8.1 Map of U.S. states, PADDs, oil and gas wells, refineries, and their geometric
centroids (from various sources mentioned in the data and variables section).
Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 be volume of crude oil movement from state i to refineries in state j by
transportation mode m (rail, pipeline and water), 𝑑𝑖𝑗 be the defined distance from state i
to state j, 𝑐𝑚 be the cost per unit volume per unit distance of transportation of crude oil
by mode m, 𝑃𝑖 be the annual crude oil production of state i, 𝑅𝑗 be the annual petroleum
refinery capacity for state j, 𝑁𝑘 be a set of states that belong to PADD k, and 𝑇𝑘𝑙,𝑚 be the
annual volume of crude oil movement from PADD k to PADD l by transportation mode
m. The formulated LP for minimizing the total cost of crude oil movement in the U.S.,
denoted by Z, is as follows:
50 50

3

𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝑍 = ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑐𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑗=1 𝑚=1

subject to:

(8.1)
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50

3

(𝑖) ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 = 𝑃𝑖

for 𝑖 = 1 to 50

𝑗=1 𝑚=1
50 3

(𝑖𝑖) ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 ≤ 𝑅𝑗

for 𝑗 = 1 to 50

𝑖=1 𝑚=1

(𝑖𝑖𝑖) ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 = 𝑇𝑘𝑙,𝑚

for 𝑘 = 1 to 5, 𝑙 = 1 to 5, 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 3

𝑖𝜖𝑁𝑘 𝑗𝜖𝑁𝑙

(𝑖𝑣) 𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑚 ≥ 0

for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1 to 50 and 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 3

The objective function Z is the total costs of movement of crude oil among all the
50 U.S. states. Constraint (i) for each state i, assures that the volume of crude oil moved
from state i to all other states j is equal to the total crude oil produced in state i.
Constraint (ii) holds the annual volume of crude oil moved to each state less than or equal
to the annual refining capacity of the state. Constraint (iii) satisfies the PADD-to-PADD
crude oil movement by transportation mode among states, and Constraint (iv) is the nonnegativity constraint. For 50 origins, 50 destinations, 3 modes of transportation, and 5
PADDs, the LP included 7500 decision variables, 150 type (i) equality constraints, 150
type (ii) inequality constraints, 60 type (iii) equality constraints, and 7500 non-negativity
constraints. The Simplex method (Dantzig, Orden, and Wolfe 1955) was used to solve the
LP in this study.
The underlying assumptions of the LP include:
-

Minimizing the overall transportation costs of the movement of crude oil provides an
approximation of the crude oil shippers’ decision on the volumes and destinations of
shipment,

-

𝑐𝑚 𝑠 by mode are equal across the U.S., regardless of origins and destinations,

-

Crude oil produced in a certain year is shipped to refineries in the same year,

-

Transportation cost is the only factor affecting mode and destination choice.
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8.4 Data and Variables
The data used in this study comprised of a number of datasets obtained from
different sources. These included U.S. crude oil release rail incidents data, state
production of crude oil, crude oil wells and refineries locations, state capacity of crude oil
refining, PADD-to-PADD data of crude oil movement by water, pipeline and rail, U.S.
class I railroads maps, and U.S. crude oil pipeline and waterway maps. This section
presents these datasets and the final variables.
Transportation distance was used as a cost factor in the LP (equation 8.1), and
also used as an explanatory variable that affected frequency and severity of incidents.
This study defined this distance as the geodesic (the shortest path between two points on
a sphere) distance between each state’s origin points to all the states’ destinations points.
Origin points of each state were defined as the geometric centroid of the crude oil wells
in that state, and the destination points of each state was defined as the geometric centroid
of the refineries located in that state. Origin/destination was the geometric centroid of the
state, if there were not wells/refineries located in that state. The location information of
2016 U.S. oil and gas wells and 2017 U.S. refineries were obtained from FracTracker
(FracTracker n.d.) and the EIA (Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2017a),
respectively. This study calculated the geometric centroids of oil and gas wells and
refineries in each state (origins and destinations), and the distances from all origins to all
destinations using the geographic information system software ArcGIS version 10.5.1.
Figure 8.1 presents this information.
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The LP introduced in the methodology section was solved for ten years (20072016) to approximate the state-to-state crude oil movement volumes. The LP’s input data
was from different sources. Distance (𝑑𝑖𝑗 ) was defined as above and was assumed
constant throughout the ten years. It was sufficient to consider the cost of moving crude
oil by mode m, 𝑐𝑚 , in a relative manner. Based on an internet search of crude oil carriers,
the costs of moving crude oil by rail was assumed 7.15 times as large as pipeline and 5
times as large as water (𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙 = 5.0, 𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒 = 0.7 and 𝑐𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 = 1.0). Despite the existence of
spatial and temporal variations in these ratios, they were assumed constant in this study,
as the LP was very insensitive to changes of these values (less than 1% changes in the
output) due to consideration of constraint (iii) which assures the correct share of modes.
Annual crude oil production (𝑃𝑖 ), annual petroleum refinery capacity (𝑅𝑗 ) and the annual
PADD-to-PADD volume of crude oil movement were from EIA (Energy Information
Administration (EIA) 2017b) for 2007-2016.
Two variables captured the possible effects of availability of other modes or other
class I railroad companies on frequency and severity of incidents. This was based on the
hypothesis that in case of availability of pipelines and/or waterway for movement of
crude oil, the railroad companies may try to decrease their price to stay in a competitive
mode by decreasing their costs, leading to a lower level of safety. Also, the larger the
number of competing class I railroad companies are available between the origin and
destination, similar intention may result in cheaper but less safe transportation. A binary
variable accounted for availability of other modes based on the petroleum pipelines and
waterways for petroleum movement maps, obtained from EIA (Energy Information
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Administration (EIA) 2017a). A continuous variable captured the number of available
class I railroads between origins and destinations, based on the class I railroad maps
available from Association of American Railroads (Association of American Railroads:
Freight Rail Works n.d.).
Ten-year data (2007-2016) of crude oil release incidents from trains in the U.S.
was extracted from the PHMSA incident database by the Incident Reports Database
Search tool (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety 2018). According to PHMSA, the reported incidents are
either reported through telephone within 12 hours after occurrence for more severe
incidents or through a written notice within 30 days for other incidents. The incidents that
require telephonic notice include cases “where: 1) as a direct result of a hazardous
material a person is killed or injured requiring admittance to a hospital, the general
public is evacuated for one hour or more, a major transportation artery or facility is
closed or shut down for one hour or more, or the operational flight pattern or routine of
an aircraft is altered; 2) fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected radioactive contamination
occurs involving a radioactive material; 3) fire, breakage, spillage, or suspected
contamination occurs involving an infectious substance other than a regulated medical
waste; 4) a release of a marine pollutant occurs in a quantity exceeding 119 gallons for a
liquid or 882 pounds for a solid; 5) a situation exists of such a nature that, in the
judgment of the person in possession of the hazmat, it should be reported; or 5) during
transportation by aircraft, a fire, violent rupture, explosion or dangerous evolution of
heat occurs as a direct result of a battery or battery-powered device. Other incidents
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include: 1) an unintentional release of a hazmat during transportation including loading,
unloading and temporary storage related to transportation; 2) a hazardous waste is
released; 3) an undeclared shipment with no release is discovered; or 4) a specification
cargo tank 1,000 gallons or greater containing any hazmat that received structural
damage to the lading retention system or damage that requires repair to a system
intended to protect the lading retention system, and did not have a release.”
The extracted data included 460 release incidents, 680 released tank cars,
1,738,926 gallons of released crude oil and $65,608,355 total damages. Total damages
included carrier/property damage, response/clean-up costs, evacuation costs,
injuries/fatalities, and roadway closure (costs of evacuation were assumed $250 per
person-day (Saat et al. 2014), monetary costs of not-hospitalized injury as the only type
of injury/fatality that occurred in the dataset was assumed $62,500 per injury (Iranitalab
and Khattak 2017), and roadway closure was assumed to cost $218,000 per day (Erkut,
Tjandra, and Verter 2007; Mallela and Sadavisam 2011)). This dataset included the origin
and destination of movement of each train that was involved in the release incidents.
Using this information, the annual frequency of incidents, number of tank cars, quantity
of crude oil released, and total costs for each pair of states (with at least one incident)
were extracted. Pairs of states with larger-than-zero approximated crude oil movement
volumes were added to the dataset with zero for frequency and severity of incidents.
Volumes and other variables (distance, other modes and other class I railroad companies)
were also added. The final dataset comprised of 318 rows; each row was a pair of states
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with positive volume of crude oil exchange in one of the years 2007-2016. Table 8.1
presents a summary of the variables.
Table 8.1 Variables and Descriptive Statistics of the Final Dataset
Variable

Variable Type

Values and Statistics
Response Variables

Frequency
Number of Tank
Cars

Count

Min = 0, Max = 17, Mean = 1.3648, Var. = 5.6772

Count

Min = 0, Max = 35, Mean = 2.0440, Var. = 19.6511

Continuous
(gallons)

Min = 0, Max = 475176.00, Mean = 5451.20, Var. =
1.93E+09
Categories: = 0, 0 < ≤100, 100 < ≤10000, >10000
Ratios: 0 (45.77%), 1 (47.34%), 2 (04.07%), 3 (02.82%)

Quantity Released
Categorical

Total Costs

Continuous
(2016 U.S.
Dollar)

Min = 0, Max = 25,632,806, Mean = 205,669, Var. =
2.71E+11

Categorical

Categories: = 0, 0 < ≤15000, 15000 < ≤100000,
>100000
Ratios: 0 (56.43%), 1 (33.86%), 2 (04.39%), 3 (05.33%)
Explanatory Variables

Volume (volume)
Distance (distance)
Other Modes
(omodes)
Number of Class I
Railroad Companies
(railroads)

Continuous
(1000 barrels)
Continuous
(miles)

Min = 0, Max = 1.54E+05, Mean = 1.75E+04, Var. =
9.35E+08
Min = 67.03, Max = 2384.39, Mean = 742.0607, Var. =
2.20E+05

Dichotomous

Yes (38.99%), No (61.01%)

Count

Min = 0, Max = 3, Mean = 1.3648, Var. = 0.8066

The variances of the two continuous response variables (quantity released and
total costs) were very large. This was due to a few extremely large values relative to the
other values in these two variables, which could cause biased estimates, if a linear
regression model was utilized (Nachtsheim et al. 2004). Natural logarithm or a root
transformation were possible solutions for this issue, however as logarithm of zero is not
computable and model interpretation of a root transformed response variable is not as
conclusive, an ordinal categorization of these variables was preferred. Categorization also
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alleviated the effects of possible inconsistency and inaccuracies in reporting and
approximating costs and quantities. The thresholds of the categories were determined
based on the variables’ dispersion between maximum and minimum values, and abating
the effects of the very large values without excluding them.
8.5 Modeling Results
This section presents the results of the four models estimated for frequency and
aggregate measures of severity of crude oil release rail incidents. The frequency model
used the number of incidents between each pair of states with positive crude oil
transportation volume as the response variable in an MNBR. The three aggregate severity
models used three criteria as response variables to account for severity of incidents,
again, between each pair of states with positive crude oil transportation volume: 1) the
number of tank cars that released crude oil; 2) the quantity of crude oil released; and 3)
the total monetary costs of crude oil release. The tank car model was also a MNBR. The
quantity of release and total costs models were MOLM.
In all the four models, the explanatory variables included volume and distance of
crude oil shipment between pairs of states as continuous variables, availability of other
modes of transportation as a binary variable (yes/no), number of available class I
railroads as an integer variable (0-7), and quadratic and interaction terms for volume and
distance variables. Three grouping factors were considered in the models: year; origindestination state pairs; and origin-destination PADD pairs. All the four main variables
(volume, distance, other modes and railroad companies) were used in the models
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regardless of their statistical significance, while the inclusion of quadratic and interaction
terms, and the grouping factors were decided based on AICc values (Cavanaugh 1997).
Table 8.2 presents the estimated coefficients, likelihood ratio (LR) test p-values
and estimated standard deviations of random effects for the intercepts. The quadratic
form of volume of crude oil was significant in all models, while the quadratic form of
distance and the interaction of distance and volume did not contribute to any of the
models in terms of AICc, and were excluded. The contribution of three grouping factors
varied among the models which led to different random effects specifications. Random
effects for variables other than the intercept did not contribute to the models’ AICc.
Equations 8.2 to 8.5 present the estimated equations for the frequency, tank cars,
quantity, and costs models, respectively. In these equations 𝜇̂ 𝑖 is the estimated frequency
of crude oil rail incidents, 𝜇̂ 𝑡 is the estimated number of tank cars released crude oil,
𝑃̂(𝑌𝑞 ≤ 𝑗) is the estimated probability of amount of crude oil release falling in a category
equal or smaller than category j, 𝑃̂(𝑌𝑐 ≤ 𝑗) is the estimated probability of costs of crude
oil release falling in a category equal or smaller than category j, 𝑋1 is the amount of crude
oil shipped between a pair of states in thousand barrels per year, 𝑋2 is the geodesic
distance between a pair of states in miles, 𝑋3 is the availability of modes other than rail
(pipeline/water) between a pair of states, 𝑋4 is the number of available class I railroad
companies between a pair of states, e is the base of natural logarithm and N(𝜇, 𝜎 2 )
denotes a normal distribution with mean of 𝜇 and variance of 𝜎 2 . The other parameters
are similar to their definitions in sections 3.3 and 3.4.
𝜇̂ 𝑖 = 𝑒 −2.76761+0.00003𝑋1 −0.000000000168𝑋1

2 +0.00131𝑋 +0.31678𝑋 +0.61329𝑋 +𝑏
̂𝑝
2
3
4 ̂𝑠 +𝑏

,

(8.2)
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𝑏̂𝑠 ~𝑁(0, 0.80902 ), 𝑏̂𝑝 ~𝑁(0, 0.20762 ).
𝜇̂ 𝑡 = 𝑒 −2.79799+0.00004𝑋1 −0.000000000207𝑋1
𝑏̂𝑠 ~𝑁(0, 1.08402 ).

2

+0.00148𝑋2 +0.29936𝑋3 +0.58017𝑋4 +𝑏̂𝑠

,
(8.3)

𝑃̂(𝑌𝑞 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − 𝑃̂(𝑌𝑞 ≤ 𝑗)
̂

= 𝑒 𝛽𝑗0 −0.00009𝑋1 +0.000000000462𝑋1

2 −0.00508𝑋 −1.77976𝑋 −1.00642𝑋 +𝑏
̂𝑝 +𝑏̂𝑦
2
3
4 ̂𝑠 +𝑏

,

𝑏̂𝑠 ~𝑁(0, 3.342682 ), 𝑏̂𝑝 ~𝑁(0, 1.881592 ), 𝑏̂𝑦 ~𝑁(0, 0.074152 ),
𝛽̂00 = 0, 𝛽̂10 = 5.711, 𝛽̂20 = 13.773, 𝛽̂30 = 15.263.
𝑃̂(𝑌𝑐 ≤ 𝑗)
1 − 𝑃̂(𝑌𝑐 ≤ 𝑗)
2
̂
̂ ̂
= 𝑒 𝛽𝑗0 −0.00008𝑋1 +0.000000000400𝑋1 −0.00271𝑋2 −1.18009𝑋3−0.55749𝑋4+𝑏𝑠 +𝑏𝑝 ,
𝑏̂𝑠 ~𝑁(0, 1.6232 ), 𝑏̂𝑝 ~𝑁(0, 1.3972 ),
𝛽̂00 = 0, 𝛽̂10 = 4.433, 𝛽̂20 = 8.206, 𝛽̂30 = 9.068.

(8.4)

(8.5)

This chapter used percentage change (PC) and odds ratios (OR) for interpretation
of MNBR and MOL, respectively. Confidence intervals (CI) were calculated for these
two measures, along with point estimates to assist with model interpretation. As the
quadratic form of the variable volume was in the final models, PC or OR for this variable
was a function of itself, while they were independent for other variables. Therefore, Table
8.3 presents point estimates and 95% CIs for PCs and ORs for variables distance,
omodes, and railroads, while Figure 8.2 illustrates these measures for volume,
corresponding to a range of values for volume. Parametric bootstrap and Wald 95% CI’s
were calculated for MNBR and MOL models, respectively. The value of c in calculating
PC and OR for volume, distance, omodes, and railroads were 1000, 100, 1, and 1,
respectively.

Table 8.2 Estimation Results of the Four Incident Frequency and Severity Models
Frequency Model
Model Components

Main
Effect
Fixed
Effects
Quadratic
and
Interaction
Terms
Standard Deviation
of Random Effects
for the Intercept

Variables

Coefficient

Tank Cars Model

LR Test pvalue

Coefficient

Quantity Released Model

LR Test pvalue

Coefficient

-2.79799

LR Test pvalue

Total Costs Model
Coefficient

Intercept

-2.76761

Volume

0.00003

0.00000

***

0.00004

0.00000

***

0.00009

0.00022

***

0.00008

0.00001

***

Distance

0.00131

0.00000

***

0.00148

0.00000

***

0.00508

0.00000

***

0.00271

0.00005

***

Other Modes

0.31678

0.14582

0.29936

0.23414

1.77020

0.06852

.

1.20350

0.07169

.

Railroad

0.61329

0.00000

***

0.58017

0.00005

***

1.00220

0.09064

.

0.67910

0.13693

-1.68E-10

0.00046

***

-2.07E-10

0.00015

***

-4.62E-10

0.01367

*

-4.00E-10

0.00129

***

Distance

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Volume*Dist.

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

States

0.809

1.084

3.34268

1.623

PADDs

0.2076

—

1.88159

1.397

—

0.07415

—

2

Volume

2

Year
—
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

5.711, 13.773, 15.263

LR Test pvalue

4.433, 8.206, 9.068

—: Not used in the model due to not contributing to the model according to AICc

Table 8.3 95% Confidence Intervals and Point Estimates of PCs and ORs
Frequency Model

Tank Cars Model

Quantity Released Model

Total Costs Model

Percentage Change
Lower
Upper
Point
Bound
Bound
Estimate
of CI
of CI

Percentage Change
Lower
Upper
Point
Bound
Bound
Estimate
of CI
of CI

Odds Ratios
Lower
Upper
Point
Bound
Bound
Estimate
of CI
of CI

Odds Ratios
Lower
Upper
Point
Bound
Bound
Estimate
of CI
of CI

Distance

14.01

7.78

19.08

15.92

8.00

21.10

1.66

1.31

2.11

1.31

1.14

1.51

Other Modes

37.27

-9.11

104.88

34.90

-18.24

117.16

5.93

0.84

42.05

3.25

0.85

12.43

Railroad

84.65

39.45

129.55

78.63

27.50

129.39

2.72

0.82

9.10

1.75

0.84

3.63

Variables

Figure 8.2 95% confidence intervals and point estimates of PC and OR for volume in the four estimated models.
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Inclusion of value of “0” in CI’s calculated for PC’s and inclusion of value of “1”
in CI’s calculated for OR’s denote the lack of evidence towards the statistical
significance of the variable’s effects on or association with the response variable. With
95% confidence and holding all variables constant except the variable being interpreted,
the models can be interpreted as follows:
For each 100-mile increase in the distance of crude oil shipment by rail between
pairs of states, the frequency of crude oil release incidents increased by 7.78% to 19.08%.
This change in distance led to 8.00% to 21.10% increase in the number of released tank
cars. Corresponding to the 100-mile increase in distance, the odds of increase in quantity
released from any of the predetermined levels to a higher level changed by 1.31 to 2.11
times. This change also resulted in 14% to 51% positive change in the odds of increase in
total costs from any level to a higher level.
The models indicated lack of evidence for existence of any impacts from
availability of modes of transportation (other than rail) from the origin states to the
destination states on frequency or severity of crude oil release incidents. However, the
number of class I railroad companies between states was statistically significant in the
frequency and tank car models. One unit increase in the number of class I railroad
companies resulted in an increase in the frequency of crude oil release incidents by
39.45% to 129.55% and in the number of release tank cars by 27.50% to 129.39%.
Statistical evidence was not sufficient for the effects of this variable on quantity released
or total costs.
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Figure 8.2 shows how point estimates and CI’s for volume’s PC and OR change
as a function of volume itself. For each 1-million-barrel per year increase in the shipment
of crude oil between a pair of states, sufficient statistical evidence was found regarding
the response variables limited to restricted volumes. The frequency of incidents increased
by variable amounts less than 5%, up to a volume point of approximately 32 million
barrels. The number of tank cars released crude oil increased by a value between 0 to 6%,
up to a volume point of approximately 40 million barrels. Quantity released and total
costs increased by less than 20% and 15%, respectively and for up to approximately 23
million and 29 million barrels per year. The accurate amount of change can be calculated
for all possible values of volume using the PC and OR estimated equations reported in
Figure 8.2. With 95% confidence, sufficient statistical evidence was not found for effects
of volume on the response variables for values higher than the ones mentioned. In all four
models, approximately after 100 million barrels, increase in volume was identified to
decrease frequency and aggregate severity of incidents, not statistically significantly. This
may be due to lack of sufficient observation in this volume range, relative to lower values
for volume.
8.6 Conclusions and Discussion
There are multiple factors that affect crude oil shippers’ destination choice. These
include type of crude oil, type and capacity of refineries in the destination, transportation
monetary and non-monetary (e.g. time) costs, etc. Distance affects transportation costs as
it is correlated with price of transportation and time. But due to presence of other
variables mentioned above, farther refineries may be more attractive to crude oil shippers.
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This chapter quantified the effects of distance on frequency and aggregate measures of
severity of incidents. Therefore, shippers are suggested to include these values in terms of
monetary or non-monetary costs in their destination choice procedure, potentially leading
to closer destinations. Policy-makers may consider these quantified impacts, in terms of
restricting shippers in their refinery destination choice and/or penalizing the choice of
further destinations. This may decrease potential costs of crude oil release incident,
benefiting the crude oil shippers and the society, simultaneously.
This chapter hypothesized that class I railroad companies attempt to decrease their
costs (leading to more risky performance and more incidents), in order to stay
competitive with other transportation modes (pipeline and water) and other class I
railroad companies. Although presence of other modes was not found to exacerbate
safety statistically, competition with other class I railroad companies was significantly
associated with lower level of safety, in terms of frequency of incidents and number of
tank cars released crude oil. Policy-makers may account for this factor in formulating
safety policies. Also, based on this finding, incident response facilities may be more
concentrated close to routes connecting origin-destination pairs with competing class I
railroad companies for crude oil transportation.
As expected, the larger the volume of crude oil shipped from one state to another,
the greater was the frequency and aggregate severity of incidents between the two states.
The finding that the rate of increase in frequency and aggregate severity reduced by
increase in volume can be attributed to several reasons: higher volumes of shipment of
crude oil may be more frequent between those pairs of states that have this interaction
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routinely and consequently have a safer performance due to a lower level of uncertainty.
Similarly, shipments with lower volumes may face more uncertainties due to smaller
frequency, leading to more incidents and lower level of safety. Larger shipments of crude
oil may occur more frequently between closer pairs of origin and destination, resulting in
less sensitive-to-changes impacts on frequency and severity of incidents.
In this chapter, the four response variables, despite being interdependent, captured
different phenomena with different objectives. While a safety planner may be more
interested in prediction of the frequency and the costs of the incidents, emergency
response or environmental agencies may find prediction of quantity of release more
useful. Railroad insurance companies may prefer a prediction tool for costs of incidents,
while number of released tank cars may be more important from a railroad engineering
point of view. Policy-makers may focus on any of the models, based on their priorities.
Frequency models consider all incidents equally, regardless of the size and consequences
of release. Such an approach is advantageous as it considers potential costs in, for
example, incidents with potentially large consequences that occurred with small
consequences due to fast response or occurrence in a small-populated location. As a
disadvantage, these models treat less-concerning incidents, such as non-accident releases,
similar to very costly incidents. The use of the frequency model along with at least one of
the aggregate severity models is recommended in practice.
The estimated models can be used for prediction in the future by inputting
predicted values for the explanatory variables. Calculated distances among states may
change in the future based on changes in number and locations of oil wells and refineries.
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Transportation modes and railroad companies’ information may be predicted for future to
use in the models. The parameters of the LP, including productions, refining capacity,
and PADD-to-PADD shipment volumes need projection for future, based on historic
data. Variations of the LP may approximate volumes of transportation of other hazmat
among states. The LP needs modification depending on the hazmat, available modes of
transportation, type of origin/destination, available production and consumption data, and
available auxiliary information (such as the PADD information in case of this chapter).
U.S. production of crude oil peaked in 2015 and faced a reduction in 2016. Also,
the amount of crude oil moved by rail in the U.S. peaked in 2014 and decreased in 2015
and 2016. These along with safety improvements have led to a smaller number of rail
crude oil-release incidents in 2015 and 2016, compared to 2014. However, this reduction
does not affect the importance of this study because of several of reasons: the future of
crude oil production and transportation depends on many factors, including international
crude oil market and prices, domestic demand, economic factors, governmental decisions,
etc., and the production and movement of crude oil may increase again in the coming
years; similar sudden and unexpected increases in the rail transportation demand of crude
oil or other hazmat may occur in the future, and this chapter provided a framework to
study such occasions; and the amount of movement of crude oil by rail and the resulting
release incidents, even after the recent reduction, is still considerable and necessary to
address.
One limitation of this chapter was the inevitable assumptions made due to lack of
data availability. The majority of these assumptions were made in the formulation and
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parameter tuning of the LP. It was attempted to minimize the sensitivity of the results due
to the assumptions, however there may be still possible differences in the conclusions of
this chapter as a result of different assumptions. The other limitation was in the
categorization of the continuous response variables (quantity of crude oil release and total
costs). It was preferable to model these two variables as continuous response variables
and estimate the quantified effects of explanatory variables on them directly.
Nevertheless, due to inconsistency in approximating and reporting of these values, very
large variations, and the impossibility of the utilization of a useful transformation, these
variables were categorized. Also, similar to chapters 4, 5 and 6, unobserved heterogeneity
may be an issue in the models of this chapter as well and needs to be considered in using
the models and their outcome in practice.
Future studies may focus on modeling frequency of crude oil-carrying train
incidents, regardless of releasing the crude oil, and modeling the probability of release of
crude oil, given an incident, separately. This approach can provide the effects of
microscopic factors, such as characteristics of crude oil, train, railroad, etc., on
occurrence of crude oil release incidents. Such a study requires a dataset of crude oilcarrying train incidents. The use of other statistical methods for modeling or machine
learning methods for better prediction performance may also be investigated.
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CHAPTER 9 JOINT AND SEPARATE MODELING OF TYPES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF RAIL-BASED CRUDE OIL RELEASE INCIDENTS
9.1 Introduction
The transportation of large quantities of crude oil by rail potentially exposes
people living in vicinity of railways and the proximate environment to the ill effects of
hazmat in case of incidents leading to release. Various factors can affect the likelihood of
incidents and consequences of crude oil release. Identifying these factors can assist crude
oil shippers, railroad companies and policy-makers with decisions resulting in safer crude
oil transportation.
The main objectives of this chapter were identification of the factors that affect
the types and consequences of crude oil release from trains, quantification of these
effects, and investigation of the effects of types and consequences of crude oil release on
the resulting costs and damages. The considered factors that can impact types and
consequences of release included characteristics of crude oil, tank cars, and release
incidents. On January 2, 2014, PHMSA issued a safety alert warning that the type of
crude oil transported from the Bakken region may be more flammable than traditional
heavy crude oil (U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), n.d.). A secondary objective
of this chapter was testing the hypothesis of the PHMSA safety alert throughout the
statistical modeling.
The investigation in this chapter involved estimation of two separate multinomial
response models for types of crude oil release (gas dispersion, spillage and both) and
consequences of crude oil release (fire, explosion and none), and one joint multinomial
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response model, for types and consequences of release. This chapter used the 2007-2016
PHMSA U.S. rail-based crude oil release data. Estimation of a robust linear regression
model captured the effects of the types and consequences of crude oil release on total
post-release costs, including carrier/property damage, response/clean-up costs, evacuation
costs, injuries/fatalities, and roadway closure.
An additional literature review pertaining to shipping of crude oil follows this
introduction. The ensuing section presents the methods of this chapter, dataset and
variables. Results from the modeling effort, their interpretations, discussion and
conclusions complete this chapter.
9.2 Additional Literature Review
Liu proposed a method for optimal safety risk management of rail transportation
of crude oil. The model accounted for track segment specific characteristics (segment
length, track class, method of operation, and annual traffic density), train-specific
characteristics (train length, train speed, and tank car safety design), and population
density along each segment. He measured segment-specific risk by the expected number
of affected persons. Also, the model estimated the average interval between release
incidents (Liu 2016). Oke et al. presented a medium-term market equilibrium model of
the North American crude oil sector to evaluate different strategies for mitigating the
environmental and public-safety risk due to crude oil transport by rail. They reported that
an integrated policy of restricting rail loads, increasing pipeline capacity, and lifting US
crude oil export ban can address medium-term risk of crude oil transport by rail (Oke et
al. 2016).
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Following PHMSA’s safety alert regarding the possible extra flammability of the
sweet light crude oil of the Bakken region relative to traditional heavy crude oil, several
studies investigated the chemical characteristics of this crude oil. Lord et al. reviewed
these studies and concluded that due to significant variability in criteria and procedures
used in selection, acquisition, and analysis of crude oil samples, the available information
was of insufficient quality to enable a meaningful comparison of crude oils. According to
Lord et al., current methods for crude oil hazard classification and packing were often
inadequate (David Lord et al. 2015). This provided the motivation to investigate the
validity of PHMSA’s safety alert in this research.
9.3 Methods
This section introduces the statistical approaches used in this chapter by first
discussing multinomial response models (used for separate and joint modeling of types
and consequences of release of crude oil), and then discussing continuous outcome
models (used in modeling post-release costs).
9.3.1 Multinomial Response Models for Types and Consequences of Release
Two modeling approaches were considered: estimating two separate multinomial
models for types and consequences of release; and estimating one joint model for types
and consequences of release, assuming a joint probability distribution for these two
variables. Figure 9.1 shows the outcomes of the release incidents based on their
frequencies in the dataset.
In the separate approach, the response variables in the two estimated models were
multinomial and indicated the type or consequence of crude oil release. One model with
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spillage (base level), gas dispersion, and simultaneous spillage and gas dispersion as
categories of the response variable was estimated. The categories for the consequences
model included fire, explosion and none (base level). Multinomial regression models
were used with characteristics of crude oil, tank car, and release incidents as the
explanatory variables.
In the joint approach, the response variable was constructed as a combination of
the types and consequences of release. Based on the possible combined outcomes for the
new response variable applicable to the dataset (refer to Figure 9.1), this variable had 5
levels: 1) spillage with no consequence; 2) spillage and fire; 3) spillage and explosion; 4)
gas dispersion and no consequence; 5) both types of release and no consequence. Again,
multinomial regression with a similar set of explanatory variables were used in the
modeling.

Figure 9.1 Types and consequences of crude oil release.
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The definition of odds ratios in this chapter is slightly different from section 3.6.
In the separate consequences model, for example, odds for explosion are the probability
of explosion divided by the probability of no explosion in an incident of crude oil release.
For c-unit increase in a continuous explanatory variable, x, the odds ratios are interpreted
as “the odds of explosion vs. no consequences (the base level) change by OR times for
every c-unit increase in x, holding the other variables constant”. If x is a categorical
explanatory variable, the value of c is 1, and the interpretation will be “the odds of
explosion vs. no release consequence change by OR times as large for x =1 than for x =
0, holding other variables constant” (Bilder and Loughin 2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011).
The interpretation of odds ratios for other levels of the separate models and for the joint
model is in a similar manner.
9.3.2 Continuous Response Model for Post-Release Costs
Linear regression models were used, with costs as continuous response variables,
and types and consequences of release, and two other factors as explanatory variables.
The objective of estimation of these models was testing whether the types and
consequences of release of crude oil significantly affect the post-release costs and
quantifying the possible effects.
One issue with such a statistical approach for modeling costs of release incidents
is the distributional assumptions of a regular linear regression (Normal error distribution)
do not necessary hold, and a heavy-tailed error term distribution is expected (due to
presence of numerous small and non-costly reported incidents as opposed to few very
costly release incidents). One remedy is to remove influential observations from the data
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prior to model estimation. Another approach, termed “robust regression”, is to use a
fitting criterion that is not as vulnerable as least squares to influential data points (Fox
and others 2002). While there are different methods for robust regression, the most
common type is M-estimation, which can be considered as a generalization of the ML
estimation (Fox and others 2002). This approach was utilized in this chapter and was
implemented by the iterated re-weighted least squares. More information and details are
available in (Huber 2011; Hampel et al. 2011).
9.4 Data and Variables
Similar to chapter 8, ten-year data (2007-2016) of crude oil release incidents from
trains in the U.S. was extracted from the PHMSA database using the Incident Reports
Database Search tool (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and
Office of Hazardous Materials Safety 2018). PHMSA incident data description and
reporting criteria are available in section 8.3. Missing values in the variables that were
used in the modeling resulted in less than 3.8% decrease in the dataset’s size, leading to a
final set of 638 tank cars.
Table 9.1 presents the variables and their respective statistics. The bakken
variable indicated whether the crude oil was shipped from the Bakken region and should
have been categorized as Bakken light sweet crude oil or not. This variable was formed
based on the origin state of the shipment (North Dakota or Montana). The packing group
information was available in the dataset. Packing group I, II and III represent great,
medium and minor danger, respectively. The criteria for assigning packing group for
crude oil is based on flash point and initial boiling point of the crude oil, that shippers
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should obtain through laboratory tests (Class 3-Assignment of Packing Group 2010).
Information regarding tank head puncture resistance system and tank insulation was
extracted from the tank car specification marking (Specifications for Tank Cars 2012),
that was available in the dataset. Tank head puncture resistance system is capable of
sustaining coupler-to-head impacts of the relative speed of 18 mph, usually accomplished
by the installation of separate head shields or full-head tank jackets made of 1/2-inchthick steel on each end of the tank car (Allen D. Maty 2017). Tank insulation is used to
moderate the temperature of crude oil during transportation (Allen D. Maty 2017).
FRA provides the definition of Non-Accident Releases (NARs) as: “the
unintentional release of a hazmat while in transportation, including loading and
unloading while in railroad possession, that is not caused by a derailment, collision or
other rail related accident. NARs consist of leaks, splashes, and other releases from
improperly secured or defective valves, fittings, and tank shells, and include venting of
non-atmospheric gases from safety relief devices.” NARs were detected in the data based
on the provided narrations.
Table 9.1 Variables and Their Statistics
Variable

Names

Values and Statistics

Response Variables
Type of Release

type

Spillage (86.21%), Gas Dispersion (08.93%), Both (04.86%)

Consequence of Release

cons

Joint Type and
Consequence of Release

typecons

Fire (07.21%), Explosion (07.21%), None (85.58%)
Spillage and None (71.79%), Spillage and Fire (07.21%),
Spillage and Explosion (07.21%), Gas Dispersion and None
(08.93%), Both and None (04.86%)

Explanatory Variables
Bakken Crude Oil
Packing Group
Tank Head Puncture
Resistance System

bakken

0 = No (51.72%), 1 = Yes (48.28%)

pack.group

I (51.88%), II (30.41%), III (17.71%)

punc.res

0 = No (90.28%), 1 = Yes (09.72%)
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Tank Insulation
Tank Design Pressure
(psi)
Quantity Released
(gallon)
Non-Accident Release
(NAR)

insulated

0 = No (95.45%), 1 = Yes (04.54%)

dsgnpress

mean = 107.97, variance = 3207.14

quant.rel

mean = 2994.55, variance = 56620119

nar

0 = No (20.53%), 1 = Yes (79.47%)

Similar to chapter 8, post-release costs, available in the dataset, included
carrier/property damage, response/clean-up costs, evacuation costs, injuries/fatalities, and
roadway closure (costs of evacuation were assumed $250.00 per person-day (Saat et al.
2014), monetary costs of not-hospitalized injury as the only type of injury/fatality that
occurred in the dataset was assumed $62500.00 per injury (Iranitalab and Khattak 2017),
and roadway closure was assumed to cost $218,000.00 per day (Erkut, Tjandra, and
Verter 2007; Mallela and Sadavisam 2011)). The minimum, maximum, mean and
standard deviation of the costs were $0.00, $25,330,322.00, $146,792.00 and
$1,365,787.00, respectively.
9.5 Modeling Results
This section presents the estimated statistical models. These include multinomial
regressions capturing the impacts of crude oil, tank car design and incident characteristics
on types and consequences (separately and jointly) of release of crude oil in a train
incident and a robust linear regression model quantifying the effects of type and
consequence of release of crude oil on the post-release costs.
9.5.1 Models for Types and Consequences of Release
The variables used in each model and the p-values of the LR tests are presented in
Table 9.2. Variable selection was performed using LR test and AICc (Bilder and Loughin
2014; Agresti and Kateri 2011).
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Table 9.2 p-values of the LR Test in the Release Type and Release Consequence Models
Separate
Variables

Crude Oil Characteristics

Type of Release

bakken
0.00062
***
pack.group
0.00101
**
Tank Car Characteristics
punc.res
0.00000
***
insulated
0.00198
**
dsgnpress
0.48524
Incident Characteristics
nar
0.00000
***
quant.rel
NA
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
—: Not Used, NA: Not Applicable

Joint

Consequence of
Release
0.09105
0.00000
0.07486
—
—
0.00000
0.00000

.
***
.

***
***

Type and
Consequence of
Release
0.00181
0.00000
0.00000
0.01316
—
0.00000
0.00000

**
***
***
*
***
***

Point estimates of the odds ratios and their 95% CI for the release type with
“spillage” as the base level are presented in Table 9.3. With 95% confidence and subject
to keeping all the other variables (rather than the variable being interpreted) constant, the
model interpretations are as follows. The odds of gas dispersion vs. spillage, and both
types of release vs. spillage change by an amount between 0.29 to 0.98 times, and 0.05 to
0.55 times, respectively, for the light sweet crude oil from Bakken region. Packing group
II decreased the odds of gas dispersion vs. spillage by 0.14 and 0.64 times relative to
packing group I. These values were estimated as 0.08 to 0.84 for packing group III.
Equipment of tank cars to puncture resistance system changed the odds of gas dispersion
vs. spillage by an amount between 2.35 to 9.70 times, and both release types vs. spillage
by an amount between 4.49 to 33.67 times. Insulation of the tank cars increased the odds
of both release types vs. spillage only by 2.58 to 20.26 times. The odds of gas dispersion
vs. spillage were increased by an amount between 1.74 to 466.39 times, for NARs. Other
than these effects, there was no sufficient evidence on the impacts of explanatory
variables on the types of release.
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Table 9.3 Values of c, Point Estimates of Odds Ratios and Profile LR Confidence
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Release Type Models
Gas
c

Point
Estimate

95% CI
Lower
Bound

95% CI
Upper
Bound

Point
Estimate

95% CI
Lower
Bound

95% CI
Upper
Bound

bakken

1

0.53

0.29

0.98

0.17

0.05

0.55

pack.groupII

1

0.30

0.14

0.64

1.09

0.41

2.85

pack.groupIII

1

0.27

0.08

0.84

2.10

0.77

5.74

punc.res

1

4.77

2.35

9.69

12.30

4.49

33.67

insulated

1

1.32

0.37

4.69

7.23

2.58

20.26

dsgnpress

25

0.97

0.80

1.18

0.93

0.77

1.13

nar

1

28.51

1.74

466.39

11.01

0.62

195.69

Variables

Crude Oil
Characteristics

Tank Car
Characteristics
Incident
Characteristics

Both (Gas and Spillage)

Table 9.4 presents the odds ratios and 95% CI’s for the consequences of crude oil
release model, with “none” as the base level. With 95% confidence and holding all the
other variables except the variable being interpreted constant, it can be said that packing
group II, relative to packing group I increased the odds of explosion vs. no release
consequence by an amount between 1.61 to 158.93 times. There was no sufficient
evidence towards the existence of any impacts of packing group II on fire and packing
group III on fire and explosion, relative to packing group I. NARs, relative to accident
releases, decreased the odds of fire and explosion vs. no consequence, by amounts
between less than 0.01 to 0.11 times, and less than 0.01 and 0.06 times, respectively. The
odds of fire and explosion vs. no release consequence in a crude oil release incident
increased for every 1000-gallon increase in quantity of release of crude oil by a
percentage between 13.69% to 37.56% and 12.96% to 37.91%, respectively. Sufficient
evidence was not available to support the existence of any effects of Bakken region crude
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oil, tank head puncture resistance system, tank car insulation and tank car design pressure
on fire or explosion.
Table 9.4 Values of c, Point Estimates of Odds Ratios and Profile LR Confidence
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Release Consequence Models
Fire
c

Point
Estimate

95% CI
Lower
Bound

95% CI
Upper
Bound

Point
Estimate

95% CI
Lower
Bound

95% CI
Upper
Bound

bakken

1

4.04

0.58

28.34

14.39

0.47

436.77

pack.groupII

1

0.52

0.05

5.50

15.98

1.61

158.93

pack.groupIII

1

0.48

0.07

3.06

0.08

0.00

2.40

punc.res

1

5.56

0.86

35.96

0.79

0.03

21.21

insulated

1

—

—

—

—

—

—

dsgnpress

25

—

—

—

—

—

—

nar

1

0.02

0.00

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.06

1000

1.25

1.14

1.38

1.25

1.13

1.38

Variables

Crude Oil
Characteristics

Tank Car
Characteristics
Incident
Characteristics

Explosion

quant.rel

—: Not Used

Table 9.5 presents the odds ratios and 95% CI’s for the joint model of type and
consequences of crude oil release, with “spillage and none” as the base level. Again, with
95% confidence and holding all the other variables except the variable under
interpretation constant, Bakken crude oil decreases the odds of simultaneous spillage and
gas dispersion with no consequences vs. spillage with no consequences by an amount
between 0.07 to 0.58 times. Packing group II, relative to packing group I, increased the
odds of spillage and explosion vs. spillage and no consequences by an amount between
1.70 to 138.33 times, while it decreased the odds of gas dispersion and no consequences
vs. spillage and no consequences by 0.14 to 0.65 times. Packing group III, relative to
packing group II, decreased the odds of gas disperse and none vs. spillage and none by an
amount between 0.07 to 0.66. Equipment of tank cars to puncture resistance system
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increased the odds of gas dispersion with no consequences, and both types of release with
no consequences vs. spillage with no consequences by amounts between 2.41 to 10.03
and 4.73 to 35.98 times, respectively. Insulation of the tank cars increased the odds of
spillage and explosion vs. spillage with no consequences by an amount between 1.82 to
17146.04 times, while it increased the odds of both types of release and no consequences
by 2.87 to 22.31 times. The odds of spillage with fire, spillage with explosion, as opposed
to spillage and no consequences for an NAR were decreased by amounts between less
than 0.01 to 0.14 times and less than 0.01 and 0.06 times, respectively. A 1000-gallon
increase in the amount of released crude oil increased the odds of spillage with fire, and
spillage with explosion vs. spillage with no consequences by amounts between 12.88% to
36.17% and 12.13% to 36.38%, respectively.
Table 9.5 Values of c, Point Estimates of Odds Ratios and Profile LR Confidence
Intervals for Odds Ratios in Release Consequence Models
Spillage and Fire
Variables

Crude Oil
Characteristics
Tank Car
Characteristics
Incident
Characteristics

95%
CI
Upper
Bound
23.20
4.55
2.66
38.16

1.85

0.02

154.96

Point
Estimate

bakken
pack.groupII
pack.groupIII
punc.res

1
1
1
1

insulated

1

dsgnpress
nar
quant.rel

25
1
1000

Variables

Crude Oil
Characteristics

3.31
0.48
0.45
5.94

95%
CI
Lower
Bound
0.47
0.05
0.08
0.92

c

bakken
pack.groupII
pack.groupIII

—
—
—
0.03
0.01
0.14
1.24
1.13
1.36
Gas Dispersion and None

c

Point
Estimate

1
1
1

0.55
0.30
0.21

95%
CI
Lower
Bound
0.29
0.14
0.07

95%
CI
Upper
Bound
1.02
0.65
0.66

Spillage and Explosion

19.99
15.33
0.04
0.82

95%
CI
Lower
Bound
0.56
1.70
0.00
0.03

176.68

1.82

Point
Estimate

—
0.00
1.24

719.82
138.33
1.67
23.04
17146.04

—
—
0.00
0.06
1.12
1.36
Both and None

Point
Estimate
0.18
1.12
1.74

95% CI
Upper
Bound

95%
CI
Lower
Bound
0.06
0.42
0.64

95% CI
Upper
Bound
0.58
2.94
4.73
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Tank Car
Characteristics

punc.res

1

4.92

2.41

10.03

13.05

4.73

35.98

insulated
dsgnpress
nar

1
25
1

1.38
—
7.95

0.39
—
0.54

4.97
—
116.85

7.99
—
9.98

2.86
—
0.43

22.31
—
233.75

1.19

0.99

1.43

Incident
Characteristics quant.rel
1000
1.08
0.90
1.30
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
—: Not Used

9.5.2 Model for Post-Release Costs
A robust linear regression model was estimated at the incident level, using total
costs as the response variables, and types of release and consequences of release as the
explanatory variables. The point estimates and 95% CI’s for the estimated coefficients,
along with LR test p-values and standard errors are presented in Table 9.6. LR test results
and CI’s indicate there was not enough evidence in the dataset to show that variations in
types of release affected the costs, directly. However, the estimated coefficients for fire
and explosion, along with NAR variable and quantity released were statistically
significant in the model. These variables changed damage costs by amounts between the
upper and lower bounds of the CI’s reported in Table 9.6.
Table 9.6 95% CI's for the Damage Costs Robust Linear Regression Models (rounded to
nearest $1)
Coefficients
(Intercept)
Gas Dispersion
Spillage
Fire
Explosion
NAR
Quantity Released

Point
Estimate

Standard
Error

LR Test p-value

95% CI
Lower Bound

95% CI
Upper Bound
255,109.33

253,274.38

936.22

—

251,439.42

-291.41

454.96

0.52220

-1,183.12

600.30

303.96

563.48

0.58990

-800.44

1,408.36

2,072,608.65

1205.57

0.00000

***

2,070,245.79

2,074,971.52

13,529,080.97

2188.78

0.00000

***

13,524,791.03

13,533,370.91

-251,744.34

755.17

0.00000

***

-253,224.45

-250,264.23

***

28,709.20

29,011.26

28,860.20
192.79 0.00000
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1
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9.6 Discussion and Conclusions
Sufficient evidence was not found in the data to show the light sweet crude oil of
Bakken region significantly increased the probability of fire and explosion in case of
release. Release of this type of crude oil was found less probable to lead to gas dispersion
or simultaneous spillage and gas dispersion, relative to spillage. Therefore, the results of
this chapter statistically cannot confirm PHMSA’s safety alert regarding the possibility of
Bakken crude oil being more flammable than traditional heavy crude oil or other light
sweet crude oil. While, in case of release, this type of crude oil is more probable to spill
rather than disperse as gas, there was no sufficient evidence that spillage is costlier than
gas dispersion, according to the costs model. So, evidence in this data do not support the
hypothesis that transportation of Bakken crude oil by rail results in a different degree of
risk, relative to other types of crude oil moved by rail in the U.S.
The crude oil categorized as packing groups II (medium danger) and III (minor
danger) decreased the probability of gas dispersion, and packing group II increased the
probability of explosion, relative to crude oil packing group I (great danger). This might
be due to possible inaccuracies in results of flash point and initial boiling point tests, or
effects of other potential important variables that were not considered in this study. This
finding was consistent with one of the findings of Lord et al. (David Lord et al. 2015), the
inadequacy of current methods for assignment of crude oil transportation hazard
classification and packing group. Based on these results, safety-related decisions solely
based on packing groups are not suggested.
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Tank car head puncture resistance system and tank car insulation were not found
to be directly associated with probability of fire or explosion (except for the ignorable
case of insulation and explosion in the joint model with an unusually wide CI, possibly
due to small variation in the variable values), but they increased the likelihood of gas
dispersion. The danger crude oil-carrying trains expose to the populations near railroads
due to toxic gas dispersion, and a corresponding possible explosion with no time for
evacuation (although not observed in the data but an example is the Lac-Mégantic rail
disaster in Canada) is not negligible. So, based on the results, the use of such tank cars is
not recommended for crude oil-carrying trains that pass though residential areas, while
they may be preferred in other routes, since far from population gas dispersion may be
preferred to spillage, due to generally lower probability of fire and explosion.
For each thousand-ton increase in quantity of crude oil spillage, the probability of
fire, explosion and total costs increased, significantly. This can be considered in terms of
the quantity of crude oil that is loaded in each tank car, especially the tank cars with
fewer safety design features, or tank cars with higher propensity to derail in an incident,
depending on their position in a train (Saccomanno and El-Hage 1991, 1989; Liu, Saat,
and Barkan 2014). NARs were associated with higher probability of gas dispersion, and
lower probability of fire and explosion. Due to significantly smaller quantities of crude
oil release in these releases, compared to accident-caused releases, they are generally less
hazardous, and according to the costs models, they cause approximately 250 thousand
dollars less than other releases on average. Countermeasures regarding prevention of such
releases, e.g. regular and frequent inspection of valves, can be prioritized for
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implementation based on the corresponding costs and benefits. Regarding the costs
model, decision-makers may consider how the consequences of release of crude oil from
trains affect damage and recovery costs. A more expensive countermeasure that is likely
to prevent explosions more efficiently may be preferred over a less costly countermeasure
that performs better towards fire prevention, despite its extra costs. The estimated costs
that these release consequences cause should be considered in a cost-benefit analysis for
decision-making.
The results of the joint and separate models were consistent, and the magnitudes
and directions of the odds ratios were relatively similar. Both approaches provided
informative outcomes, useful in inference, and interpretation of the relationships between
the explanatory and response variables. The differences in the results of the joint and
separate approaches indicated how using a joint modeling framework for types and
consequences of crude oil release from trains to account for the possible interdependence
between these two variables was informative. However, estimation and interpretation of
only the separate models assuming no correlation between the two response variables
could be sufficient with regards to the general results and conclusions. As was mentioned
in chapter 8, reduction in number of rail-based crude oil release incidents does not affect
the importance of this study because of similar reasons.
One limitation of this chapter was the unavailability of other potentially important
variables in the dataset, including other tank car and release characteristics. Some of
these variables were available in the dataset, but due to large proportion of missing
values, were not used in this study (such as causes of release, tank cars capacity, amount

146
of material in tank cars, age of tank cars, material of construction, shell and head
thickness, train speed, and weather conditions). This may have caused bias in the results,
conclusions and recommendations of this chapter due to unobserved heterogeneity and
should be considered in practice. Besides fire and explosion, entering a waterway/sewer
system and environmental damage were the other two reported consequences of release
of crude oil in the dataset. However, they were not considered in this study, since they are
not independent of the environment where the release occurred, and the environmental
information was not available in the dataset.
For future studies, researchers may address the mentioned limitations of this
chapter by obtaining datasets that are more comprehensive, in terms of safety design of
tank cars, release details, and environmental characteristics. Other modeling techniques
and data analysis approaches may be applied to crude oil release data, which might
uncover other useful findings. Similar modeling approaches can be utilized for
investigating types and consequences of other hazmat releases from different modes of
transportation, such as trucks and pipelines.
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CHAPTER 10 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter provides a summary of the research and the conclusions of each of the six
area foci of this dissertation, followed by recommendations for future studies.
10.1 Train-Level and Car-Level Modeling of Hazardous Materials Release in Railroad
Incidents
This effort quantified the impacts of incident type, railroad, environment and
train/car characteristics on the probability of hazmat release in a hazmat-carrying train
incident and provided a prediction tool for hazmat release. Two sets of models utilized
the FRA 2012-2016 rail equipment incident dataset. The units of analyses for these two
sets were trains and hazmat cars. Logistic regression and mixed logistic regression were
investigated to account for hazmat release and potential single-level and two-level
grouping in the data (due to possible hazmat release interdependence among hazmat cars
belonging to a train and trains belonging to an incident). Development of ROC curves
improved the prediction performance of the models by defining an appropriate cut-off
point.
Results showed that derailment increased hazmat release probability more than
other incident types. Incidents due to signal and communication causes were most likely
to result in hazmat release. Higher proportion of damaged/derailed hazmat cars and
proportion of hazmat cars in a train, track classes 2 and 3, higher train speed, and train
gross tonnage were the other important factors. Results of mixed models showed hazmat
release from cars belonging to a train were interdependent and hazmat release from trains
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belonging to an incident were independent. While models at both levels led to useful
results, car-level models had better prediction performance.
Future studies may utilize other explanatory variables to investigate their effects,
such as hazmat car specification and safety design, and type of hazmat on the hazmat
release probability. This requires the use of a more comprehensive train incident data.
The effects of incident causes on hazmat release at a more detailed level in train incidents
can be the emphasis of a future study.
10.2 Rollover and Hazardous Materials Release Models for Cargo Tank Truck Crashes
CTTs are one of the major surface transportation carriers of hazmat in the U.S.
CTT’s rollover crashes are the leading cause of injuries and fatalities from hazmat
transportation incidents. CTTs are susceptible to rollover crashes due to their size,
distribution of weight, a higher center of gravity, and the surging and sloshing of liquid
cargo during transportation. This endeavor concentrated on identification and
quantification of the effects of various factors on the probability of rollover and release of
hazmat in CTT-involved crashes, and developing a prediction tool for these probabilities.
BMA-based logistic regression models were estimated with rollover and hazmat release
as the binary response variables, and crash, trucks, roadway, environment, and driver
characteristics as the explanatory variables. States of Nebraska and Kansas 2010-2016
police reported crash data were combined and filtered for CTT-involved crashes and used
in modeling.
Salient results were: non-collision crashes were more likely to result in rollovers;
side impacts to CTTs and severe crosswinds increased the likelihood of rollovers; heavier
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and older trucks were more prone to rollovers; tractor and semi-trailer decreased the
probability of rollover compared to all other body styles; and collisions with objects and
higher posted speeds increased rollover probability. Rollover and involvement of
intersections in the crash increased the likelihood of hazmat release. ROC curves
indicated substantial prediction performance for both models, and ensured
appropriateness of the modeling approach for inference on the crash dataset.
Future studies may attempt to use more comprehensive datasets that include other
explanatory variables that could potentially affect probabilities of rollover and hazmat
release, such as more detailed driver and CTT characteristics, crash speed, type and
amount of loaded hazmat, etc. Utilizing other modeling methods and algorithms for
inference and prediction may uncover additional useful information in future studies.
While CTTs are one of the major truck carriers of hazmat, other types of trucks are also
used for this matter. Similar investigation may be considered for those trucks.
10.3 Modeling the Probability of Hazardous Materials Release at Highway-Rail Grade
Crossings
Crashes at HRGCs that involve a truck or a train carrying hazmat expose people
and the environment to the potentially severe consequences of hazmat release. This
research involved statistical modeling of the probability of hazmat release from trucks
and/or trains in crashes at HRGCs to identify factors associated with hazmat release. The
FRA HRGC crash dataset (2007-2016) yielded two subsets of crashes: 1) those involving
hazmat-carrying trucks and 2) those involving hazmat-carrying trains.
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Results from a logistic regression model using data subset 1 (crashes involving
hazmat-carrying trucks) with hazmat release/no release as the response variable showed
that standard flashing signal lights, railroad crossbucks, and railroad classes II and III
(relative to railroad class I) were associated with lower hazmat release probability from
hazmat-carrying trucks. Hazmat release probability from trucks was higher with freight
train involvement. Results from a logistic regression model using data subset 2 (crashes
involving hazmat-carrying trains) revealed that hazmat release probability from trains
was lower with warmer temperature. However, the probability of release from trains was
greater with railroad class II (relative to railroad class I), type of highway user (different
types of trucks and motorcycle relative to automobiles) and weather conditions (fog, sleet
or snow, relative to clear). A comparison of the results from this study with HRGC crash
severity studies highlighted the importance and usefulness of this study.
For future studies, researchers may use other HRGC crash data that include other
potentially important explanatory variables, e.g. details about HRGC control devices,
actions of highway users during crashes, sight obstructions, type of hazmat, roadway
conditions, etc. Different modeling approaches may be utilized for analyzing hazmatrelated crashes at HRGCs that might lead to further insights. Short-term and long-term
costs and damages of hazmat release at HRGCs may be studied to prioritize
countermeasures and policies regarding public safety improvements at HRGCs.
10.4 Prediction of Hazardous Materials Release In Train Incidents and Cargo Tank Truck
Crashes
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Quantifying conditional probability of release of hazmat from trains in rail
incidents and CTTs in highway crashes is an important component of hazmat
transportation risk as it assists safety agencies and shippers in decision-making. The
objective of this focus was identifying computational tools with reliable performance for
quantifying probability of hazmat release in train incidents as well as CTT crashes.
Hazmat release (release or no release) was classified by statistical and machine learning
methods (logistic regression, naïve Bayes, RF, and SVM) using available and relevant
explanatory variables. The datasets were FRA rail equipment incident data, and
combined Nebraska and Kansas police reported traffic crash data.
The results were compared based on precision, recall and area under ROC curves
(AUC). RF had the best performance in classifying hazmat release for trains and railcars
in almost all cases, based on different criteria. For CTTs, SVM and RF had the highest
precision, while logistic regression and naïve Bayes performed better based on recall.
Naïve Bayes had the highest AUC. The research provided recommendations regarding
usage of the classifiers and regressors depending on the purpose of analysis.
For future studies, using other incident/crash datasets may address limitation of
datasets of this focus, in terms of geographic diversity and potentially important
explanatory variables. Other classifiers and regressors may be applied to the hazmat
release problem and the results can compare to this study. Classification methods of this
study can be implemented to the other components of hazmat risk, such as incident/crash
frequency and release consequences in the future studies.
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10.5 Modeling of Frequency and Aggregate Measures of Severity of U.S. Rail-Based
Crude Oil Release Incidents
Trains transport a large portion of produced crude oil to the refineries in the U.S.
This potentially exposes people living near railways and the proximate environment to
the ill effects of incidents resulting in crude oil release. The objective of this focus was to
identify and quantify the effects of volumes and distances of rail-based crude oil transport
and other macroscopic-level variables on the frequency and severity of crude oil release
incidents. An optimization problem was formulated to approximate state-to-state volume
of crude oil movement based on higher-level production-consumption data. Four mixedeffects origin-destination based statistical models were estimated for rail-based crude oil
release incidents: one model for frequency and three models for measures of aggregate
severity (number of released tank cars, quantity released, and total costs). State-to-state
volume of crude oil movement, transport distance, availability of other modes of
transportation and number of class I railroad companies served as explanatory variables.
Results provided useful insights for policy-makers and shipping companies. Some
of the findings include: increase in volume of crude oil shipped from one state to another,
up to a point, led to greater frequency and severity of incidents between the two states;
for each 100-mile increase in the distance of crude oil shipment, the frequency of
incidents increased by 14.01%; there was lack of evidence for existence of any impacts
from availability of other modes of transportation on the response variables, while the
number of class I railroad companies significantly affected frequency and number of
released tank cars.
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Future studies may focus on modeling frequency of crude oil-carrying train
incidents, regardless of releasing the crude oil, and modeling the probability of release of
crude oil, given an incident, separately. This approach can provide the effects of
microscopic factors, such as characteristics of crude oil, train, railroad, etc., on
occurrence of crude oil release incidents. Such a study requires a dataset of crude oilcarrying train incidents. The use of other statistical methods for modeling or machine
learning methods for better prediction performance may also be investigated.
10.6 Joint and Separate Modeling of Types and Consequences of Rail-Based Crude Oil
Release Incidents
The main objectives of this focus were identification of the factors that affect the
types and consequences of crude oil release from trains, quantification of these effects,
and investigation of the impacts of types and consequences of crude oil release on the
resulting costs and damages. The factors considered as potentially affecting types and
consequences of release included characteristics of crude oil, tank cars, and release
incidents. Two separate multinomial response models for types of crude oil release (gas
dispersion, spillage and both) and consequences of crude oil release (fire, explosion and
none), and one joint multinomial response model were estimated using 2007-2016
PHMSA crude oil release data. Estimated robust linear regression models captured the
effects of the types and consequences of release on post-release costs.
Results showed that non-accident releases were associated with higher probability
of gas dispersion, lower probability of fire and explosion, and lower costs. Tank car head
puncture resistance system and tank car insulation did not directly affect the probability
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of fire or explosion, but they increased the probability of gas dispersion. For each
thousand-ton increase in quantity of spillage, the probability of fire and explosion
increased significantly. While sufficient evidence was not found in the data indicating a
relationship between types of crude oil release and post-release costs, fires and
explosions prominently increased these costs.
For future studies, researchers may consider using more comprehensive rail-based
crude-oil release incident data, in terms of availability of characteristics of design of tank
cars, details of release, and environmental characteristics. Other modeling techniques and
data analysis approaches may be applied to crude oil release data, which might uncover
other useful findings. Similar modeling approaches can be utilized for investigating types
and consequences of other hazmat releases from different modes of transportation, such
as trucks and pipelines.
10.7 Summary of Objectives and Achievements
This study had two main objectives. The first one was identification and
quantification of the effects of different factors on occurrence and consequences of
hazmat-related incidents, towards identifying effective policies and countermeasures for
improving safety. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 were fully or partially devoted to this
objective. Contributing factors to the conditional release of hazmat from trains and trucks
were identified and the magnitude of their effects on hazmat release was estimated in
chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 8 had a macroscopic perspective, with the objective of
identifying the factors that affect frequency and severity of crude oil release from trains,
while chapter 9 took into account the contributing factors to the consequences of crude
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oil release from trains. Each of the above studies were able to provide effective policies
and countermeasures for safety improvement.
The second objective of this study was quantifying components of risk of hazmat
transportation for costs prediction, planning purposes, or short-term decision-making.
While chapter 7 was completely devoted to this objective, the estimated models in the
other chapters were useful for this objective as well. The model-based and non-modelbased methods that were utilized in this study were able to estimate some components of
hazmat transportation risk, including conditional probability of hazmat release in rail
incidents, CTT crashes, and HRGC crashes, frequency and aggregate severity of railbased crude oil release incidents, and probability of types and consequences of crude oil
release from trains.
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